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Abstract 
 
This thesis explicates and critically considers the various roles played by moral psychology 
within the work of John Rawls throughout his career. In the second half of the 20th Century, 
Rawls’s development of a sophisticated theory of justice in the social contract tradition 
played a significant part in reviving the study of normative political philosophy in the 
western world. Rawls argued that any theory of justice must be closely integrated with our 
best contemporary understanding of human psychology. Moral psychology is hence widely 
recognised to play an important role in Rawls’s overall theory. But the precise role played 
has not been adequately examined. In this thesis, I identify six roles which moral 
psychology plays within the structure of Rawls’s theory. Moral psychology must defend 
the idea that the model for a just society which Rawls proposes is realisable and stable 
(role #1). Moral psychology is also employed to explain how persons now have acquired 
what sense of justice they have (role #2). By showing that Rawls’s just society can be 
realised and is stable, moral psychology is then subsequently used in the justification of 
Rawls’s theory of justice – first by showing that such a society is not futile (role #3), and 
second by showing that the society is comparatively more stable than leading rivals (role 
#4). The account of the psychological capacities of the moral person is used to place the 
limit on the scope of justice (role #5). And moral psychological facts are also likely to be, 
in some sense, constitutive of the nature of morality for Rawls (role #6). These roles are 
discussed throughout various chapters. What alterations occur to the overall place of moral 
psychology following Rawls’s later embrace of political liberalism is also discussed. The 
overall aim of the thesis is to produce an accurate exegesis on these matters, and in doing 
so indicate just how important moral psychology is within Rawls’s theory, but also to 
indicate, clearly and starkly, just how much more psychological and sociological 
investigation needs to be done in if the theory is to be substantiated, given Rawls’s own 
criteria. 
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Preface 
 
In the course of writing this thesis I have had a lot of help from the most wonderful people. 
I’d like to thank everyone who has helped me out over the years, but unfortunately, I’m 
afraid I will probably forget some of you. If we’ve spoken about my work – on this thesis 
and in philosophy generally – over the last few years, but you don’t appear here, then 
please email me, and I’ll try to get you added in. If not, please understand that you should 
be here. 
 Except in a few cases, these thank-yous are not arranged in any particular order. I 
mean to thank, for the most part, everyone as much as everyone else – the deeper thank-
yous will be obvious, I hope. I’m cutting no corners in what follows, and I personally 
would be being false if I didn’t try to convey here something of how I feel about you all. If 
you are not a fan of sentimentality, then please do feel free to skip over this (except for my 
examiners – please do read my thank-you to G.A. Cohen on p. xv). 
 I must first thank my Mam and Dad – Rob and Barbara Hetherington. I did not 
manage to procure any funding for this PhD. Their generous financial support has allowed 
me to study full time rather than part time.  
But much more importantly, along with my sister Becky, they have also been 
wonderfully supportive personally. In no way could I have got through this without them; I 
can’t imagine having a better family. 
I next thank my long-suffering supervisor, Dudley Knowles. When I started my 
supervision, I was a poor writer and an overly ambitious thinker. He has managed to cure 
me of the first problem, and has even managed to have some success with the second. He 
has also been a stalwart confident when I have gone through difficult times. We haven’t 
always agreed, and he still has questions which have gone unanswered. I only wish I will 
be able to, one day. 
My next thank you is a smaller one – to my second supervisor Alan Carter. For 
various reasons, we talked about my work little. But he presented me with a pressing 
question early in the development of my thesis. Answering this question was significant for 
the development of my position and for my eventual methodology. Alan has started a new 
life recently in St. Ives. Good luck to him. 
I must also thank my internal examiner Ben Colburn. Ben has not seen any of my 
written work, due to the critical position he is required to take upon it. But his puzzlement 
about what exactly I was arguing for in one of the first talks of mine he saw, and further 
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puzzlement, always combined with enthusiastic support, at later ones, was something of a 
shot in the arm at a crucial stage in the thesis. I am in no doubt that the thesis has achieved 
what level of rigour it has due to his insightful and sincere criticism and example. Keep it 
up – give me hell! 
Various other members of staff in the philosophy department have given me good 
advice over the years: advice which has built up. I acknowledge the best pieces of advice 
below, as well as I can remember them. Thanks to: Fiona MacPherson – you encouraged 
me to do the PhD when I was unsure, and reminded me, at a crucial moment many years 
later, that we cannot assume every problem can be solved; Nikk Effingham – you argued 
that your hand in front of you need not be a spatially extended. It was just the sort of thing 
I needed to hear argued at the time to get me to see just how much philosophy is about 
getting away from prejudice; Michael Brady – this thesis still has too many footnotes, but 
it would have had even more if I hadn’t heard one of your broadsides against them. Plus 
you made a comment about public ownership recently which was heartfelt, and helped me 
to extricate my mind from some bad mental company; David Bain – many a time in the 
pub you played devil’s advocate against the left (or that’s how I read it). I learnt from it; 
Stephan Leuenberger – you organised my viva, and were always supportive; Martin Smith 
– I turned up to your epistemology course, and I am sorry I didn’t stay for the whole thing. 
If I’ve picked up anything from your polite, insightful way with questions, I’m a lucky 
man; Chris Lindsay – Your down-to-earth dedication to teaching and to us graduate 
teaching assistants has helped me to love tutoring, plus you lent me some great Pere Ubu 
records; Gary Kemp – you have always conveyed to me just how important you view 
research into Rawls is. It kept me going, and maybe if I’d thought about it more, I could 
have kept my spirits up more through the tougher times; Adam Rieger – since taking up the 
head of department, and indeed before, it’s been obvious you’re on everyone’s side; Alan 
Weir – Alan, if I hadn’t taken your philosophy of language class, I think things may have 
turned out a lot worse. You have the most tremendous patience with other people’s ideas, 
and I’ve tried to have that as well; Victoria Harrison – whenever I’ve talked to you about 
how my work is going, you’ve always said excellent things; Sue Lock – You always 
seemed to view my excessively wide reading as an asset. Thanks for the encouragement 
for me to be myself! Jake Chandler – I remember talking over formal decision theories 
with you. I was suspicious then, but it’s good to know your enemy. And you yourself were 
the very opposite of one of those!; Paul Brownsey – Thanks for making tutoring as fun and 
rewarding as it was; Richard King – no one teaches patient exegesis like an ancient 
philosopher. I learned a lot; Anna Bergqvist – your time at Glasgow started too late for me 
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to benefit from your obvious talent, but hearing that other people found the last stretch of 
the PhD hard gave me the boost to get the job finally done. Richard Stalley – Richard, 
thanks so much for your little observations about Rawls over the years up until your 
retirement, and thanks ever so much for turning up to the political philosophy reading 
group since. I appreciate so much your persistent dragging me back down to earth to 
explain myself. 
The secretarial staff at the philosophy department have also been so helpful over 
the years, both for getting things done, and having a chat about anything other than 
philosophy! So thanks Susan Howell, Anne Southall, and Jane Neil. You’re all 
irreplaceable. 
I believe that I have had some of the best fellow postgraduates here at Glasgow that 
I can possibly imagine. The egalitarian and supportive atmosphere, which I believe anyone 
will find here (if they take the time to look for it, even a little), I feel I have been benefitted 
by to a degree I couldn’t begin to discern. 
My first thank-you must undoubtedly go to Robert Cowan. We both did our 
conversion masters together. We started our PhD’s together. You finished before me, but 
then, you always were the cleverer one. Thanks so much for innumerable conversations 
over the years – I only know so much as I do (particularly about metaethics) because of 
you. You also read over chapter 3 of this thesis – it meant a lot to me that you found it 
clear. These were the purple pasta days … 
I also owe a great deal to Stuart Crutchfield. Your nose for bullshit helped to keep 
me on the philosophical straight and narrow. I also couldn’t have got through without 
someone to talk Skronk with. 
Graham Peebles deserves a special mention. We had many long conversations 
about philosophy and about politics. They rarely overlapped, but I got a lot out of them 
anyway. 
I also need to thank Ioanna Patsiladou. You read over the introduction and first 
chapter of my thesis, and they are a lot neater because of it. You’ve also always been a 
sympathetic friend through the rough times – and hanging out with you has always cheered 
me up. 
John Donaldson – I’ve never quite met anyone who argues in the way you do. I’ve 
learnt a lot about philosophy from seeing how you approach it. 
Gareth Young I have now known for many a year. You’re turning out to me a fine 
philosopher, and sitting opposite you for a good year or so has undoubted enhanced both 
my philosophy, and my knowledge of beer. You’ll go far – get working! 
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Neil McDonnell will no doubt be one of the leading lights in metaphysics one of 
these days. But he also always believes in everyone else as well. You’ve got me to think 
again, and again, and again a great many times – I appreciate it. 
Chris Yorke – you were there for some very tough times for me. I’m still in your 
debt; thanks. 
Ariel Cecchi must surely be one of the nicest guys I’ve ever met. About a month in 
the department, and he offers to proof-read a chapter of my thesis, when it’s not even in his 
field. Thanks a great deal, Ariel – never put out that human fire. 
Carole Baillie – you’ve always had an ear when I’ve found the work (and my life!) 
tough, and you’ve always managed to remind me that to ultimately approach philosophy 
well, you’ve got to approach it slowly. I greatly appreciate your proof-reading of the 5th 
chapter – it improved it greatly. And you yourself will do great whatever you do. 
Giovanni Gellera has encouraged me in thinking that you can do good philosophy 
without skimping on the exegesis. Thanks for helping me to have a bit more faith in myself 
and my way of doing things. 
Umut Baysan – you obviously want to get to the bottom of things. As do I! You’re 
approaching your PhD in a perfect way, and I’ve appreciated your judicious comments on 
just about everything. 
Akiko Frischutt and I are both people who find it difficult to stop before every 
question has been answered. This is a dangerous habit in a philosopher, but it’s also a good 
one, and it is good to know someone who shares it. 
Andy MacGregor has some crackpot views – just like all the great philosophers! I 
have always appreciated talking to someone who is willing to go out on a limb. I must 
confess: I always wonder whether I’m half-convinced. 
Gavin Thompson as moved on from philosophy. But it’s always great to see you, 
and you’ve given me some good things to think about over the years. 
Stephanie Rennick – another person who kindly agreed to read a chapter of my 
thesis having only known me a few months. It was greatly appreciated. You’ll be another 
one who will go far. 
Renee Bleau – you’ve asked me some good questions over the last few years – 
one’s which take some guts to ask. As you’ve learnt more philosophy, they’ve become 
more focused. But never stop asking the hard questions – to me or anyone else. 
Chris Reid is certainly not an analytical philosopher. But he’s not a continental one 
either. It’s been good to bounce some audacious ideas of each other’s heads over the years, 
Chris. You have an eye for deep issues. 
xii 
 
Ben Wilson – though you decided philosophy wasn’t for you, I remember some 
great conversations about free will and society, which I certainly took something from. 
Beth Kahn – your enthusiasm was infectious, and you’re most certainly always on 
the side of the angels. 
Pat McDevitt, Alan Wilson – it was a pleasure reading through Raz with you, and 
facing all those stubborn questions as I tried to charitably read him each week. I learnt a lot 
from you guys, and I’m sure you will both go far. 
There have been many other people come through the doors of Glasgow and sit its 
two excellent masters courses. I’ve enjoyed the talks I’ve heard over the years – some of 
them immensely – and a great many more conversations with many intelligent and likeable 
people. So for any former masters students whose names I have not reproduced here – 
thanks for your contribution to the department, and I hope things went well for you all. 
I have attended only a small number of conferences over the years. I always left 
them thinking “I’ve got to stay in touch with all these guys.” In some cases, I have even 
managed it. I would first like to thank Mar Cabezas and Carmen Velayos, and Chris Mills 
and Joe Horton, who organised conferences at The University of Salamanca (2010), on 
moral philosophy and the emotions, and The University of Manchester (2011), on political 
philosophy, respectively, at which I presented talks. Regrettably, I have not found space 
for the material from these talks in this thesis, but reflecting on the issues has no doubt 
helped it. The conferences were also superb, guys.  
At said conferences, I remember enlightening conversations (at Salamanca) with 
the Late Peter Goldie, Chloë Fitzgerald, Melissa Stobie, Fabrice Teroni, Ulla Schmid, 
Stéphane Lemaire, Axel Seeman and Jesse Prinz, amongst others, and (at Manchester) with 
Andrea Sangiovanni, Amanda Cawston, Angie Pepper, Dean Redfern, Elizabeth Ellis, 
Felix Gerlsback, Garvan Walshe, Kimberley Brownlee (who I also spoke to about my 
thesis when she gave a paper at Glasgow recently – thanks for listening!), Liam Shields, 
Sabine Hohl, Sam Kukathas, Stephen Hood, and Yann Allard-Tremblay, amongst others. I 
can’t remember talking any philosophy with him, but I also had few pints and a nice 
breakfast with John Wright. 
I have also attended other conferences. Some people I met multiple times – I won’t 
repeat their names, I afraid. At an excellent workshop on Motivation and Global Justice in 
York, organised by Kerri Woods, I talked to Carol Gould, Lea Ypi, Katrin Flikschuh, 
Simon Hope, Sue Mendus, Alex Bavister-Gould, and Martin O’Neill, again amongst others. 
Simon I had already met at the Stirling political philosophy seminar, and at the Glasgow 
undergraduate philosophy society – I found the talk he delivered at Stirling on the 
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circumstances of justice very useful in the early stages of my PhD, and I was happy to find 
reason to cite it again here. Martin O’Neill I also remember was particularly interested in 
my project – thanks for that. 
I attended the festschrift for Hillel Steiner in 2009. I had good, though often brief, 
conversations there with Ian Carter, Jonathan Wolff, Eric Mack, Jethro Butler, and David 
Rhys Birks, amongst others. 
Also in 2009, I attended a conference in Manchester on the political philosophy of 
T.M. Scanlon. I got a lot out of talking to Waheed Hussain, Michael Otsuka, T.M. Scanlon, 
and a great many others this time (my memory is unfortunately really failing me here). 
I attended a conference on constructivism, in the same year I think, at which I 
talked to Andrew Williams about all that stuff – once again useful. 
Finally, right at the beginning of my PhD, I attended the annual Law and 
Philosophy conference at the University of Stirling, which was organised by Ambrose Lee 
and Piero Moraro. I remember good conversations with Alice Walla, Antony Duff, Daniele 
Mezzadri, Jesse Tomalty, John Horton, Katherine Brooks, Kent Hurtig, James Dempsey, 
Massimo Renzo, Raymond Critch, Rowan Cruft, Matt Matravers and Sven Braspenning. 
There are some acknowledgements which I would like to make to books I feel I 
have got a lot out of during the course of my PhD, but which I do not cite, or do not 
extensively cite, within the following thesis. I feel these volumes have shaped my thoughts 
and the way I go about philosophy as much as any conversations I have engaged in, or 
reflections I have had. So it seems fitting that they, and their authors should appear here. 
Hence I would like to thank Hillel Steiner for his An Essay on Rights, The Late Susan 
Hurley for her Natural Reasons, The Late Richard Wollheim for his On the Emotions, and 
The Late G.A. Cohen for his Rescuing Justice and Equality. 
I am especially sad that I have not made more room to discuss Cohen’s book. I had 
at one stage planned an entire chapter on it, but dealing with its arguments in depth would 
have simply taken away too much space which needed to go on more essential discussions 
(given the overall focus of the thesis – see the introduction). I also had the pleasure of 
meeting Cohen a few months before his untimely death – sat opposite each other on the 
meal at the second night of the Scanlon conference mentioned above. To my perception at 
least, we got along straight away, and I was extremely sad to hear that he had died. 
There are some final random names I would like to mention, before putting a lid on 
all this effusiveness (no doubt some readers are rolling their eyes – I’m sorry but I make no 
apologies).  
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Dagmar Wilhelm was a masters student here at Glasgow before my time. She pops 
back every now and again, and we always have a good chat. A very daring thinker. 
Paul Smith I know from Glasgow. Paul, you’re one of the most honest people I 
know, and you’ve often made me think twice about things, so thanks. 
Sarah Honeychurch was completing her PhD when I arrived. She attended my 
political philosophy reading group for years, put up with my overly pedantic reading 
manner, and in general taught me a lot and usually cut through the crap. Thanks for 
numerous chats over the years. 
Glen Pettigrove, Pekka Vayrynen, Claire Batty, Robin Le Poidevin, Thom Brooks, 
and Claire Chambers all visited the department, either to give a talk, attend a conference, 
or even stay for a few months. I remember talking about my thesis and doing my PhD with 
all of them. I’m very grateful – particularly to Glen. I feel there must be many more 
visiting academics I have talked to over the years, but I cannot recall them all now. 
Whoever you are, you all have my thanks. 
While I still lived in Edinburgh, prior to my masters, I was encouraged in 
philosophy by three great friends. Please step forward Dylan Wade, Phil Harris and 
Andreas Paraskevaides. Thanks for all your encouragement, and for telling me what to 
look out for. 
James Dowey I also know from Edinburgh. He has always been interested in my 
work, and always reminds me of the Keynesian saying that common sense now is often 
what a theorist first hit upon centuries ago. I wish I saw him, and all my other former 
flatmates in Edinburgh, more often. 
Andrew Wade I know from back home. Having recently come to the city, he, 
graciously and of his own free will(!), attended one of my final talks. I found the 
perspective from a brazen non-philosopher refreshing, and I still haven’t worked out how 
to properly reply. The same goes for all my other friends from Bishop Auckland who have 
expressed their puzzlement at my studies. I always counted what any of you said as as 
important as anything I got out a book. 
Andrew Holden is responsible for me getting into philosophy. For it was he who 
bought me that fateful copy of Bertie Russell’s The History of Western Philosophy for my 
birthday in the third year of my original degree (which was in geography). I never even 
knew a subject like this existed, and eventually, I wanted to pursue nothing else. He is one 
of my oldest friends, and my life would have been much different without him around. 
Finally: Cora, you’ve been a true friend through everything, and I can’t thank you 
enough.  
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All of these people have helped make this thesis what it is, and it would be a much 
poorer specimen without them. But the thesis is not dedicated to them, but to various 
relatives, both living and dead, who have supported me throughout. They are Eleanor 
Marianne Hetherington, Amelia Ade Whittaker, Jean McCombie, William Gordon 
McCombie, Marie Longstaff, and Kathleen Winn. I’m only as good a person as I am 
because I was brought up with all of you around. To an extent I will never know, I owe to 
you what moral sense I have.  
 
Addendum: I would further like to thank Jonathan Wolff for his diligent and good-
humoured examination of this thesis. 
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Abbreviations of Rawls's Works 
 
I use the following abbreviations for Rawls's books throughout the thesis. For full 
references, please see bibliography. 
 
TJ  A Theory of Justice 
PL  Political Liberalism 
CP  Collected Papers 
LP  Law of Peoples 
LHMP  Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy 
JF  Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 
LHPP  Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy 
 
References are given in the format LHMP, p. 100, except in the case of A Theory of Justice, 
which are given in the format TJ, p. 477/418 or TJ, pp. 50—51/44—45 where the first 
number(s) refers to the page number(s) in the original edition, and the second to the 
respective page(s) in the revised edition. When the passage is absent in the revised edition, 
a second number will be absent, and vice versa. 
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Introduction 
 
The part of the book I always liked the best was the third, on moral psychology. 
         John Rawls 
 
 John Rawls was arguably the greatest political philosopher of the 20th century, and 
a daunting figure even in moral philosophy. He believed that both subjects could only 
progress by the development of systematic and integrated theories, and the breadth and 
depth of his work is a testament to his pursuit of this conviction. Rawls's own theory 
contains numerous separate elements. Designed to fit together as a whole, a marked 
number of them have nevertheless been individually influential. This thesis focuses on the 
major element of the theory which has perhaps received the least attention: Rawls's moral 
psychology. 
 Was this comparative neglect warranted? In a word, no. First, it is obvious that 
Rawls thought the topic of moral psychology was important. The amount of attention he 
gave to it is enough to say this. The majority of the third part of A Theory of Justice – his 
key work – is concerned with moral psychology and related issues. In the passage 
containing the line I opened with, Rawls tells us that moral psychology was the area of his 
work that he most wanted to develop after the publication of Theory, but that replying 
conscientiously to his many critics eventually took him down a different path.1 
 Second, though Rawls's work on moral psychology has not been extensively 
commented on, I feel it has had a wider influence than has been recognised. In the work of 
Rawls's many students, what is going on is often illuminated by considering Rawls's work, 
frequently through his reading of the great historical philosophers. And often the influence 
is on issues within moral psychology.2 Furthermore, debates in contemporary philosophical 
moral psychology have often taken Rawls as their point of departure.3 
 Third, and most importantly, what Rawls has to say about moral psychology is 
important, and one can learn generally from his approach. In particular, he has a very clear 
sense of what roles moral psychology should play in moral philosophy more generally. 
This can be found in the very way he structures his moral theory — Justice as Fairness. 
                                                          
1 This passage is from a set of unpublished remarks “My Teaching”. See Freeman (2007a), p.6—7  
2 The students in question include Christine Korsgaard, Sibyl Schwarzenbach, Thomas Scanlon, and 
Henry Richardson 
3 See, for instance, important work by Thomas on self-respect, (1977—78), (1978), (1995), and by 
Deigh (1982), (1983) and Taylor (1985) on guilt and shame. 
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 This thesis focuses for the most part on this latter aspect of Rawls's moral 
psychology: the various roles moral psychology ‘plays’ within Justice as Fairness. I see 
there being three sides to the study of moral psychology in Rawls. One is the study of the 
content of the psychology – the content of the actual psychological claims made by Rawls 
in describing his picture of the society of Justice as Fairness. Another is the study of the 
relevance of psychology within Rawls's more general methodology in moral philosophy, 
which incorporates his well-known method of reflective equilibrium. This has been 
recently elaborated on in depth by John Mikhail, going on to form the basis of an 
contemporary research programme linking cognitive science, psychology and philosophy.4 
 The third is the study of the roles that moral psychology plays within Rawls's 
normative theory — in particular in the setting up of the original position, and the 
argument from within it. It is this aspect of moral psychology within Rawls which my 
thesis focuses on. If my overall conception of the roles of moral psychology within Rawls's 
theory is sound, then I believe this work can help to properly orientate the study of the 
moral psychological content of Justice as Fairness. We will be able to appreciate its full 
richness, more precisely identify what problems exist for it, and which of these problems 
represent wider problems for the theory. It may also, in addition, contribute to the research 
programme instigated by Mikhail. 
 Before starting on the discussion of Rawls on moral psychology in chapter 1, there 
are a number of preliminary matters which are best considered in this introduction. At the 
end, there will be a brief summary of the coming chapters. 
 
1. What is moral psychology? And how does Rawls understand this term? Roughly, we 
can say that moral psychology is the study of the thoughts and behaviour of human beings 
which make them moral beings. What these aspects are, how they are related to and 
interact with one another, and how they relate and interact with the other aspects of 
ourselves I take to be the fundamental issues in the field. I aim for this characterisation to 
be extremely capacious. Notice, then, that none of what I have said commits me to any 
particular views about the structure of the aspects of ourselves which make us moral 
creatures. The moral aspects of ourselves are not presupposed to be unified in any 
particular way, or to any particular degree. The idea that the moral aspects of ourselves are 
unified reaches its apogee with the traditional idea of the moral sense: a discrete moral 
module in the mind, often claimed to be found in the writings of the sentimentalist 
tradition in moral philosophy. This idea is most likely a psychological fiction, but I do not 
                                                          
4 See Mikhail (2011) 
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aim to enter into the debate at this level.5 However, for convenience I do want a general 
term to cover the aspects of human beings in virtue of which they are moral creatures. 
Moral sensibility seems to me the best, suggesting as it does a general care, concern and 
responsiveness to moral matters in both thought and action.6 Moral sensibility I shall 
understand to be something which is realised in ourselves. When taking about those 
aspects of us which make us moral beings both realised and nascent, I shall use moral 
psychology. These distinctions will be elaborated and reiterated in later chapters.  
 If that is what moral psychology is, how do we study it? There are two broad 
disciplines that attempt this: philosophical moral psychology, and empirical moral 
psychology. Philosophical moral psychology focuses on conceptual analysis and 
philosophical abstraction. It often relies to a great degree on introspection and intuition, 
and often makes use of literary examples or the invention of picturesque scenarios. It is 
(usually) concerned to elucidate and defend folk-understandings of moral psychology. 
Empirical moral psychology is a branch of psychology as an academic discipline. It 
focuses on quantifiable experimental results, and it often has less time for introspection 
and folk-concepts. These very broad characterisations must be understood to be caricatures. 
They are increasingly out of date. Recent years have seen both moral psychologists and 
philosophers paying more attention to each other than ever before, combined with an 
explosion of genuine cross-disciplinary work.7 
 Some much for a sketch of moral psychology as it stands. How does Rawls stand 
as regards to it? Rawls was pioneering in seeing the value and importance of modern 
empirical psychological research to the moral philosopher, though the material he relied 
upon was restricted (unavoidably, given his wider ambitions and commitments). Aspects 
of his own moral philosophy itself have in turn been influential on many research 
programs in the contemporary field.8 However, Rawls's approach to moral psychology is 
still largely in the manner of a philosopher. One notable aspect, diverging from at least 
some contemporary philosophical work, is Rawls's breadth and systematicity. As with all 
his work, with Rawls's moral psychology you get a full package. You won't get 
engagement with precise theoretical debates, but everything will be covered in some form. 
In this, I see Rawls as closer to the great historical philosophers, and their approach to 
                                                          
5 On questioning the idea of a unified moral sense, see Flanagan (1991), pp.266—267. For recent 
developments, see Cushman, Young, and Greene (2010), but also see Mikhail (2011)  
6 My way of setting up things here has benefited from Wren (1991), esp. chapter 1. 
7 For a sample through the past 20 years, see May, Friedman, and Clark (eds.) (1996), Sinnott-
Armstrong (ed.) (2008), and Doris and The Moral Psychology Research Group (2010) 
8 See, for example, Gibbard (1982), Mikhail (2011), Hauser, Young and Cushman (2008), and 
Roedder and Harman (2010). 
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moral psychology, than many contemporaries. 
  In this thesis I shall not make extensive use of the contemporary empirical 
literature in my assessment. The element of Rawls's theory on which I am focused does not 
call for this. I believe that we need an outline of the roles that moral psychology plays 
within the structure of Rawls's theory prior to engagement with its content, and it is in 
assessing the content that empirical data would have obvious importance. I also believe 
that philosophical and exegetical engagement must come prior to thorough empirical 
engagement in order for a philosopher to do the best by both disciplines (though not that 
they can ultimately do without it). Hence, in view of its principle subject matter, and my 
own current expertise, I have put aside empirical reports and studies for this thesis. 
 
2. Rawls's thought developed greatly over his career. Did his moral psychology change 
with it? Given the controversy over the differences, or lack of them, between the earlier 
and later Rawls, it seems wise for me to say something at this outset.9 
 I believe that neither the substance nor the roles of moral psychology undergo any 
fundamental alterations in the course of Rawls's career. There's some change, but the 
essentials display a great deal of continuity: from the earliest presentation in the article, 
“The Sense of Justice”10, through to the elaborations in A Theory of Justice, then Political 
Liberalism, and beyond. What changes there are I shall indicate at relevant times 
throughout the thesis. 
 However, as everyone knows, there is a fundamental change between the position 
Rawls advances in Theory and that advanced in Political Liberalism. The theory of justice 
defended in the original book is put forward as a comprehensive moral theory, or at least 
the kernel of one.11 In the later book, this theory is transformed into a specifically political 
theory.12 I need a methodology for coping with this change throughout the thesis.  
 The one I propose is this. For the first four chapters, I bracket the material which is 
specifically used to develop the idea of a political conception of justice. But I otherwise 
make use of material from the later works. Not all this later material demands to be kept 
and treated strictly separately, because not everything in Rawls's later work stems from 
trying to describe the idea of a politically liberal regime. For each addition or modification, 
we can ask “Can I imagine Rawls introducing this new material even if he hadn't embraced 
political liberalism?” As it turns out, the answer is “yes” for most of it. In the fifth chapter, 
                                                          
9 Examples of articles that attempt to defend the outline the continuity of Rawls's thought include 
Wenar (2005) and Estlund (1996). Articles which make the case against include Barry (1995). 
10 CP, chapter 5  
11 PL p.xvii 
12 See PL, pp.12–13  
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I then discuss the idea of a political conception of justice. I attempt to see just what 
implications this has for the preceding discussions of moral psychology. The sixth chapter 
then follows. The position I wish to defend there is best discussed presupposing the 
introduction of the idea of a political conception to the subject of Rawls's moral 
psychology, and in addition the focus of the chapter represents an appropriate concluding 
topic.  
 As well as making use of material from the later works, I will also make use of 
Rawls's lectures on the history of moral philosophy and political philosophy. The same 
exegetical approach seems warranted. The ideas of the past philosophical greats were 
readily incorporated by Rawls into his own philosophy.13 It would be overly cautious to 
discount such a resource. I should note that I shall primarily attend only to Rawls's own 
lectures on these writers, and not the writers themselves. Whether Rawls is correct or 
incorrect in his examinations is not of central importance. We are concerned with the ways 
in which his own understanding of these authors’ doctrines might help us to understand his 
theory. 
 
The necessary preamble is out of the way. Below follows a summary of the coming 
chapters. Each of these chapters is composed of one or more numbered sections. Many of 
these sections are composed of further subsections, and a few of these subsections have 
further subsections themselves. Sections will be indicated throughout the text in the 
following way: section 5. Subsections will be indicated throughout the text in the 
following way: subsection 5.2. The more traditional section symbol, §, will be reserved for 
referring to Rawls's work, as he uses it extensively.  
 
Chapter 1: The Roles of Moral Psychology: This chapter will introduce the position and 
roles that moral psychology plays within Rawls's theory, elaborating on why Rawls 
introduces a moral psychology at all, and why in such depth. 
 
Chapter 2: Moral Psychology and Justification: This chapter examines the role that moral 
psychology plays in the justification of moral principles from the original position. More 
specifically, it investigates an ambiguity in Rawls's account of this role, which may have 
significance for the outcome of the argument.  
 
Chapter 3: Moral Psychology as Constitutive: This addresses whether, as some writers 
                                                          
13 See Samuel Freeman's foreword to LHMP, p.xi—xix. 
6 
 
have claimed, moral psychology plays some kind of foundational or constitutive role in 
Rawls's theory. Addressing two of these writers, I argue that it does not play a foundational 
role. I agree it does play a constitutive role, but not in the ways that some have claimed. 
 
Chapter 4: The Conception of the Moral Person and Moral Psychology: This chapter 
presents, in its minimal details, the character of the moral person in Rawls's theory. This 
represents the basic starting point for any assessment of Rawls's wider psychological 
claims. 
 
Chapter 5: Moral Psychology in Political Liberalism: Rawls's transformation of his theory 
from a comprehensive to a politically liberal one might be thought to have followed from 
problems with aspects of his moral psychology. It might be thought to lead to alterations in 
how his moral psychology is to be conceived. My aim here is figure out how to assess 
these claims. To do this, I reconstruct Rawls's reasons for revising his theory, and observe 
how moral psychology within his theory subsequently fares. 
 
Chapter 6: The Scope of Justice and Moral Psychology: This chapter analyses Rawls's 
various accounts of the scope of justice, and defends one of these accounts against the 
others as most morally defensible, assuming a contractualist theory, and as also the most 
fitting with his psychology. The end of the chapter then highlights further problems which 
nevertheless remain with Rawls’s position. 
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Chapter 1: The Roles of Moral Psychology 
 
 This first chapter proceeds as follows. In section 1, I look back to Rawls’s 
introduction of a moral psychology into his theory in the earliest articles presenting Justice 
as Fairness. Section 2 then presents Rawls's theory more generally, as it was eventually 
developed. Following from this, Section 3 describes the different, overlapping roles that 
moral psychology plays in Rawls's theory. 
 
Section 1: Moral Psychology in the Early Rawls 
 
Imagine you think you know the requirements of morality. Now imagine you know 
what would have to be the case, psychologically, for people to act in accordance with the 
requirements of morality. Morality says: you should act this way. Moral psychology says: 
people can act that way. But suppose not everyone agrees that what you think are the 
requirements of morality are the requirements of morality. How are you going to decide if 
you're right or they're right? So imagine you hit upon this: to develop an account of what 
justifies your requirements of morality, rather than the others. This account may also 
include psychological statements. Put together these two normative elements, and two 
psychological elements, and you will have something you might want to call a theory of 
morality. Maybe you'll want to add to it later, but for now let's just leave it be.  
A remarkable element of Rawls's earliest formulation of Justice as Fairness14 – his 
moral theory – is that the psychological element which corresponds to the justificatory 
aspect of the theory is in important ways distinct from the psychological element which 
corresponds to the requirements of morality. The psychology which is appealed to in the 
justificatory aspect of the theory is not put forward as a moral psychology. It need not even 
be put forward as a genuine theory of human psychology at all. Nevertheless, it plays a key 
role in the early justification of Justice as Fairness. Once this role is completed, however, 
we are left with the question of whether we ourselves – normal human beings – can be 
moved by the requirements of morality which have been defended. For this, we need a 
separate account of moral psychology. 
  Justice as Fairness, from its earliest presentations, included a moral psychology. 
The early articles I am about to discuss are “Justice as Fairness”, and “The Sense of 
                                                          
14 I write Justice as Fairness as a proper name (capitalised) throughout the thesis. Note this is not 
Rawls's practice, and I have not altered quotations by him. 
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Justice”.15 I begin with the general argument found within these early papers in order to 
present the introduction of a moral psychology into Rawls's philosophy in its earliest and, 
we might expect, simplest form. Observing the structure of his account at this early stage 
should help to get a clear view of why it was necessary for him to produce a moral 
psychology, and of the particular issues it was designed to address. From such a starting 
point, we should also be able to pick up on whatever additions and alterations he later 
made to his account. 
 The best way to understand the overall argument in “Justice as Fairness” is to see 
that Rawls's primary aim is to point out the deficiencies of the conception of justice found 
in classical utilitarianism, whatever that theory's other virtues. Utilitarianism  
 
assimilates justice to benevolence and the latter in turn to the most efficient 
design of institutions to promote the general welfare. Justice is a kind 
[read:variety] of efficiency [which is applicable given certain conditions].16  
 
Elsewhere, Rawls puts forward his earliest statement of his two principles of justice in this 
article, but his general approach does not depend on these being precisely correct. As he 
makes clear, they simply need to be representative of a certain family of principles which 
acceptably represent individuals’ freedom and equality within shared institutions.17 Now, 
assuming certain circumstances, institutions embodying such principles may be able to be 
derived from the principle of utility. This was the approach of liberal utilitarians, such as 
Mill.18 But Rawls proposes a different derivation of the principles: one which procures 
them more directly, and which holds out better hope of explaining the importance we 
attach to justice,19 and the force of the feelings associated with it,20 without simply 
appealing to intuition.21 
 He asks us to consider what kind of principles mutually self-interested and rational 
persons, roughly equally situated within shared practices, would agree to in order to 
generally assess claims against those practices, knowing that they themselves must commit 
to any principles they propose and which are accepted.22 Rawls's claim is that the 
                                                          
15 See CP, chapters 3 and 5 
16 CP, p. 64. I have added the text in the square brackets, which I take to make clearer Rawls's 
meaning here. This shall be my standard practice throughout the thesis.  
17 See CP, p. 48 
18 See Mill (1863) chapter V 
19 See CP, pp. 59, 67 
20 CP, p. 68 
21 CP, p. 52 
22 See CP, pp. 52—55 
9 
 
principles we come up with through reflection on such a thought-experiment will to some 
degree correspond to the kinds of principles we intuitively think of as principles of justice. 
The requirements imposed in the hypothetical scenario on the self-interested and rational 
persons are those of fairness — hence we are able to account for the intuitively appealing 
idea that fairness is “the fundamental idea in the concept of justice”.23 Overall, this 
contractarian24 conception of justice is thought to be superior to the utilitarian one from the 
perspective of supporting, explaining, and defending our everyday understanding of the 
importance of justice, and its association with fairness.25 
 However, the proposed hypothetical scenario only delivers us a derivation of the 
principles of justice for institutions.26 The individuals within the scenario are purely self-
interested, and it is stressed that their psychology is at best a truncated version of ours.27 
How actual persons will act when faced with the demands of the endorsed institutions in 
particular cases cannot to be derived solely from the features of the hypothetical 
contractors. In the original presentations of Justice as Fairness, the individuals within the 
scenario are only “required” to make a commitment in advance due to possessing roughly 
equal power and ability, and their being uncertain about what the future might bring. This 
situation forces restraint in the name of their own self-interest.28 With such an origin, the 
commitment made cannot be expected to motivate such self-interested individuals on all 
occasions, particularly if it ever happens that rough equality no longer obtains. The 
expression of a general commitment to principles of justice does not imply a commitment 
to the requirements of those principles in particular circumstances. Rawls makes this very 
clear in “The Sense of Justice”.29 
 Having derived the content of principles of justice for institutions by reference to 
the agreement of mutually constrained and self-interested agents, Rawls now has need for a 
separate account of how actual persons could come to be motivated by those principles 
directly in particular circumstances, in potential contradiction to their own self-interested 
desires. Hence the account of the moral psychology of the sense of justice: describing its 
                                                          
23 CP, pp. 47, 59 
24 It has become common to distinguish between “Contractualism”, meaning moral theories which 
make use of the notion of a social contract, but which place moral limitations on that contract, and 
“Contractarianism”, meaning moral theories which make use of a social contract, but which do not place any 
moral limitations on the contract, and hence only embody prudential considerations. I have little use for this 
additional piece of jargon. Throughout the thesis, I use contractarian and contractualist interchangeably. See 
section 2 and subsection 15.1 for further elaboration on the idea of contractualism. 
25 CP, pp. 71—72 
26 CP, pp. 47—48, 63. See also pp. 99—100.  
27 CP, pp. 56—57 
28 See CP, pp. 53—54  
29 CP, pp. 99—100. The idea is also presented, though less prominently, in “Justice as Fairness”: see 
pp. 56—57, 61—63 
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development, its relation to other sentiments and attitudes, and the sense in which it 
expresses the principles of justice for individuals.30 This developmental account is 
stipulated to be purely hypothetical – it may be that the precise development described 
would never occur. But something like it, and the relationship it suggests between our 
sense of justice and other sentiments, is taken to be plausible and compatible with the 
analysis of justice being presented.31 From combining the account of the principles for 
institutions, the account of the sense of justice, and the account of the duty of fair play, the 
principles for individuals are obtained.32 
 I shall comment briefly on why Rawls appears to have taken the approach that he 
did. To defend his two principles of justice, he wanted to avoid appealing directly to our 
intuitions. This would be to fail to engage with utilitarian rivals on their own level: to do 
this requires that we develop some kind of deeper justificatory theory to explain and fit 
those intuitions within a broader system. More particularly, he wanted to be able to 
incorporate two key insights. One is that justice presupposes competing interests that 
people will be willing to press on one another, and which must be arbitrated.33 The other is 
that people are motivated by considerations beyond mere personal advantage to settle such 
arbitrations — even in their own case, though admittedly often to a lessened degree.34 One 
way to characterise his strategy is the following: presume everyone's self-interest first – 
which motivates the need for justice, after all – then place restrictions on such persons such 
that their institutions will be fair between such claims. In keeping the account of the virtue 
of justice out of the way at first, we make sure that we are addressing the central concern 
of justice, and not simply writing an edifying discourse on the just. Once the requirements 
of justice are set, we can then be sure to get an appropriate picture of the just person. It 
happens that, on this view, the sense of justice turns out to be something which almost 
everyone can be expected to possess to a sufficient level.35 This is taken to be a serious 
advantage for the theory. I don't see how to be sure that these were the exact considerations 
which went through Rawls's mind, but they do seem to make good sense of the texts. 
 The need to accommodate the observation that justice concerns the arbitration of 
conflicting claimants, where neither is willing to back down through personal attachment, 
leads Rawls to derive the principles of just institutions by sole reference to self-interested 
agents facing each other within fair conditions. The need to account for our concern and 
                                                          
30 See CP, pp. 100—112 
31 CP, pp. 100, 115 
32 Putting together CP, pp. 59—63 and 112—116 
33 CP, pp. 56—57 
34 CP, pp. 62—63, 110—112 
35 CP, pp. 112—113 
11 
 
attachment to justice itself is only then addressed, through proposing a moral psychology. 
The set up is fairly straight forward once it's understood, and why there is a separation 
between the derivation of principles and the account of the sense of justice is clear. Over 
the years, however, things were to become slightly more complicated... 
 
Section 2: The Structure of Justice as Fairness 
 
 Justice as Fairness, in its full and final complexity, is more difficult to summarise. 
One way to review its structure is to proceed from the structure of A Theory of Justice, 
referring to discussions from Rawls's other works when necessary or helpful.36  
 Part One of Theory presents us with the statement of the principles of justice,37 a 
specific group of arguments for them, and the arguments for the methodology which 
underpins the whole approach.38 The role 39 (fair arbitration of claims within shared 
institutions — further elaborated in subsection 3.3)40 and subject (the basic institutional 
structure of a single society)41 of justice, and the circumstances which make it possible and 
necessary that justice obtain – the circumstances of justice42 (see section 7) – are presented 
in order to set up the discussion, as they were in “Justice as Fairness”. Intuitive 
considerations in favour of the principles of justice are first put forward.43 But the main 
argument for the principles consists in deriving them from the original position.44  
 To develop the original position, formal constraints on the concept of right are first 
introduced. Rawls gives five such constraints: universality, generality, publicity, ordering 
of claims, and finality. It is inessential to discuss each of these now. Some of them I will 
return to. It suffices to say that they are all conditions described as intuitively morally 
reasonable to impose on any conception of justice — justice being just one virtue within 
The Right, or rightness, in general.45 These formal constraints, however, do not themselves 
                                                          
36 Rawls summarises this structure for us at TJ, pp. 579–580/507–508. I am not alone in starting from 
this structural overview, and claim no originality for it: see Freeman (2003) pp. 279–280, (2007b) pp. 145—
146 
37 TJ, pp. 60—65/52—56 
38 TJ, pp. 46—53/40—46 
39 I introduce Rawls's terminology in italics throughout this section. Note that italicised words in other 
sections are not necessarily Rawls's terminology. 
40 TJ, pp. 4—6/4—6 
41 TJ, pp. 7—11/6—10 
42 TJ, pp. 126–128/109—112. As will be outlined the section 7, this is not quite the right way to 
characterise Rawls’s understanding of the circumstances of justice. 
43 TJ, pp. 65—83/57—73. This is noted by Brian Barry (1989) pp. 213—234 
44 TJ, chapter 3 
45 See TJ, pp. 130–136/112–118. Note that these are not called formal constraints in that they follow 
logically or conceptually from the concept of right. Rawls states he wants to avoid that question. They are 
simply described as reasonable constraints. 
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serve to sufficiently narrow the range of principles we might adopt. 
 The idea of the original position is developed to generate the further constraints. 
The original position is Rawls's ultimate development of his idea of placing self-interested, 
rational choosers within a situation which forces them to conform to the constraints of 
fairness. In Theory, we are the choosers, as placed behind a veil of ignorance. A veil of 
ignorance conceals from us any knowledge of our eventual places in the subsequent 
society, or of our individual native and acquired abilities and propensities. We instead only 
know the general facts of human psychology, and that as a society we face the 
circumstances of justice.46 In later publications, Rawls re-characterises the inhabitants of 
the original position so as to make them each a representative of a single free, equal, 
rational and reasonable person (see section 8) living in a just society.47 The parties in the 
original position are no longer specified simply to be rational and self-interested. This 
would leave their possible interests undetermined. Instead, (see chapter 4) the parties are 
interested solely in protecting the interest that those they represent have in being free, 
equal, reasonable and rational persons.48 This characterisation has the advantage of making 
it clear why the persons in the original position can be expected to be motivated only by 
self-interest. If we ourselves were to have a veil of ignorance cast over us, why would we 
be expected to be suddenly unmoved by our existing sense of justice? 
 The inhabitants of the original position are aware that any decision they come to 
must be able to be kept by those they represent. This is because the agreement is to be final, 
i.e. meet the finality requirement. The reason for this requirement is that the chosen 
principles of right are to govern the fundamental arrangements of the whole of society, and 
substantially determine the life-prospects for all who live within it.49 Given the agreement 
is a one-off, there will be no reason to make an  agreement that cannot be kept, as at least 
some of the interests which are meant to be protected by the agreement will not actually be 
protected, and will have no future chance of being protected. Because of this, the 
agreement made and the reasoning for it makes heavy reference to the facts of human 
nature (see subsections 4.3 and 6.1).50 
 Principles are then derived from considering the choices of the inhabitants of the 
original position. These principles are no longer simply the principles of justice for 
                                                          
46 TJ, pp. 136—142/118—123 
47 See PL, pp. 24—25 
48 See CP, p. 312, PL, pp. 73—74. The importance of this revision is stressed in the introduction to the 
revised edition of Theory: see p. xiii. See also CP, pp. 417—418. 
49 TJ, p. 13/11—12 
50 See TJ, pp. 137—138/119, 175—177/153—155 
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institutions, but also include the basic principles, duties and virtues for individuals.51 In 
addition, the principles of right in general are also chosen in the original position.52 I shall 
not elaborate all the various moral principles which Rawls derives from the original 
position.53 But I shall put down the two principles of Justice for institutions which Rawls 
derives from the original position, for any moral or political philosophers who have been 
incommunicado since 195754 (I shall also have reason to refer to them in later discussions). 
 
a. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic 
rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; 
and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to 
be guaranteed their fair value. 
 
b. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are 
to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the 
least advantaged members of society.55 
 
Here also is the duty of justice which applies to all free and equal, rational and reasonable 
persons. It has two components.  
 
first, we are to comply with and to do our share in just institutions when they 
exist and apply to us;  and second, we are to assist in the establishment of just 
arrangements when they do not exist, at least when this can be done with little 
cost to ourselves56 
 
 The original position is representative of the fact that Justice as Fairness is a variety 
of contract theory.57 Contract theories attempt to lend justification to moral principles and 
precepts by showing how those moral principles would be those agreed to by agents 
                                                          
51 On duties, see TJ, pp. 108—117/93—101. On the virtues, see TJ, pp. 433—439 
52 TJ, p. 333/293 
53 See TJ, pp. 333—340/293—299, 342—350/301—308 
54 “Justice as Fairness” was published in 1958 
55 PL, pp. 5—6. See also PL, p. 291, JF, p. 42. Note these are revised statements of the basic liberties 
following PL, lecture VIII, which replied to criticisms in Hart (1975). 
56 TJ, p. 334/293—294. See also pp. 115/99, 474/415  
57 TJ, pp. 11―13/10–11, 15–16/14–15 
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situated with respect to each other in relations conducive to “informed, uncoerced”58 and 
binding agreement. In Rawls's theory, the situation modelled is of free and equal rational 
agents being constrained by fair or reasonable conditions.59 Rawls's hope is that the 
original position is the best contractarian procedure which can be used by a contract 
theory, and that, when it is specified correctly or adequately, it selects just one set of 
principles from those available, or at least indicates that one set has more going for it than 
the others.60  
 I myself distinguish between contract theories, and contractarian procedures. This 
is based on the thought that contract theories are moral theories which incorporate 
contractarian procedures  as part of their structure, and employ them in the justification of 
moral principles. But in a contract theory, justification need not be conceived to proceed 
solely from a contractarian procedure. In Rawls it does not, as shall shortly be noted. 
 The use of a contract theory, and its particular specification, is based on the 
consideration of fundamental ideas which, on reflection, appear to underlie the political 
and social conflicts we currently acknowledge.61 The theory developed, though it employs 
some highly abstract ideas, aims to engage with the real conflicts and problems actually 
faced.62 Faced with social division and disagreement regarding what our values would 
have us do, Rawls proceeds on the assumptions that (1) our values might include shared 
values, and hence that the conflicts of value or interest in society may not stretch right 
down to the very bottom and (2) common ground may hence be able to be found, if we 
investigate carefully and sincerely.63  
 The fundamental ideas are normative concepts and conceptions. They tell us how 
we should be and should act, and reflecting on them is meant to guide our actions and 
correctly orientate our thinking.64 For Rawls, a concept specifies “the meaning of a term,” a 
                                                          
58 The phrase comes from Thomas Scanlon's work. See Scanlon (1998) p. 153. I take it that all 
contract theories can agree to this wording, differing in what they think people being informed and uncoerced 
requires. 
59 TJ, pp. 12–13/11–12, 19/17. Fairness is the concept emphasised in Rawls earlier papers and Theory, 
reasonableness is emphasised in Rawls's later papers and books. The two concepts are distinct, but they are 
closely related. Reasonableness is discussed in depth in subsection 8.2 
60 TJ, pp. 121–122/104–105 
61 Rawls's fundamental ideas are set out in TJ, §1–4, but what they are, and what it even means to call 
something a fundamental idea, is presented much more explicitly in JF, pp. 1–2, 5–14, 18–26. See also PL pp. 
4–5, 8–9, 15–22, 43–46. Rawls's later political liberalism requires further fundamental ideas. He specifies 
these at PL, p. xvi–xvii and 43 
62 See PL, p. 43—46 
63 The idea that the justification of moral and/or political theory, if possible, proceeds on the basis of 
shared values and background assumptions, admittedly which may have to be clarified and interpreted, is 
defended in TJ at pp. 580–583/508–511. The assumption is presented vividly at the very start of CP, chapter 
16, pp. 304–305, JF, pp. 1–2. See also PL, p.43–46. 
64 PL, pp. 8–9, 11–15, and also 43–46. For a particularly explicit presentation of Rawls's 
understanding of how political philosophy might guide our thought and action, see JF, pp. 1–6. 
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conception is a specification of a concept so as to include “the principles required to apply 
it,” and “idea” is a general term covering both concepts and conceptions (see further 
subsection 3.3).65 These ideas do not arise from nowhere. They are explications of values 
and commitments we are already taken to have, or at least which we can, through 
reasoning, brought to have through reflection.66 Rawls's work is not addressed to those 
who do not or could not rationally come to recognise these values and commitments. 
 As Rawls's work progresses, he begins to talk less about theories of justice, and 
more frequently about conceptions of justice. I think that he views conception as a looser 
word than theory. The latter suggests a level of systematicity and rigour not required in 
examples of the former. I shall refer equally to Rawls's theory of justice and Rawls's 
conception of justice, choosing whichever word seems most fitting and clear at the time. 
 One central normative idea, which I shall mention again now, is a conception of the 
person (subsection 3.1) as a free, equal, rational and reasonable being.67 In the earlier work, 
reasonableness is not mentioned when personhood is characterised, and people are only 
described as free, equal and rational.68 But later comments make it clear that this concept 
was always present implicitly.69 
 Finally, all the various components of our theory so far assembled – our principles 
of justice, our formal constraints and the version of contract theory we derive the principles 
from, and the fundamental normative ideas that underwrite our contractarian device – 
should also be tested against the requirements of the reflective equilibrium methodology, 
often informally known as reflective equilibrium.70 This is likewise true of the components 
yet to be put in place in Parts Two and Three of Theory.  
 I understand the method of reflective equilibrium roughly this way: to justify a 
moral theory, we should engage in the comparative examination of the various distinct 
moral theories and conceptions available to us, refining and developing them in order to 
render their differences vivid, and then should assess them against our considered moral 
judgements and attitudes, which can be similarly revised, to see whether any one theory 
wins out on due reflection. Upon reaching such a state, our moral judgements are in 
                                                          
65 See PL, p. 14 fn 15, and TJ p. 5/5. Fundamental ideas need not only be normative. Some, such as the 
first subject of justice being the basic structure, and the original position, are primarily or partially introduced 
for methodological or theoretical purposes. See PL, p. 14 fn 16. 
66 PL, p. 45 and TJ, pp. 21–22/19, 587/514 
67 See, for example, PL, pp. 18—19, 29—35, 48—54, JF, pp. 18—24 
68 For example, TJ, pp. 252, 574/503 
69 See, for example, PL, pp. 25 fn28, 53 fn7 
70 TJ, pp. 46–48/41–42, plus also CP, pp. 286–289. I say informally, because strictly speaking 
reflective equilibrium is not the name for the whole of the methodology, but only for the end point the 
methodology aims for – one in which our theory and principles, and our considered judgements are in 
equilibrium, and in equilibrium due to our reflection. 
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equilibrium with each other and our chosen theory, and they are in equilibrium on the basis 
of due reflection (hence the name).71 I comment very briefly on this methodology in 
subsections 3.5 and 5.1 below, but largely put the examination of it aside. A thorough 
description and critical assessment of this methodology would take a lot of space, and 
would be misplaced given the focus of this thesis.72 
 The initial stage of Rawls's theory, found in Part One of A Theory of Justice, lays 
out the claims and assumptions of that theory found at its most abstract levels: both 
normative claims and others. The later parts serve to introduce more and more concrete 
considerations. These are used to verify whether the theory fits with our considered 
judgements on due reflection, or else revises and extrapolates those judgements in 
acceptable ways.73 I shall later try to elucidate the relationship between the fundamental 
ideas, and the development of the rest of the theory in terms of the notion of specification 
(subsection 5.2). Right now, I'll mention that the fundamental ideas should not be 
understood as foundational ideas, if this is taken to mean that the rest of the theory entirely 
rests on them as a foundation.74 Rather they are simply the most abstract ideas within the 
theory – more particular ideas and more concrete data have an equally important place.75 In 
saying this, I do not want to rule out the possibility that certain aspects of Rawls's theory 
are indeed foundational. It has been observed that it is unclear whether Rawls commits 
himself to a thorough-going coherentism, or whether what he says is compatible with some 
kind of moderate foundationalism.76 I believe my thesis can say what it needs to say 
without resolving this issue 
 The elaboration of the theory from its most abstract elements onto concrete 
institutional, social and psychological conceptions is an essential part of the justification of 
the theory. Justification is said to stem from “everything fitting together into one coherent 
view” (see further subsection 3.5 below).77 The abstract level of the theory possesses only 
provisional justification. The full justification is conditional upon the development and 
defence of a more concrete conception of the society which would enact the principles of 
justice, and a concrete conception of the psychology of the members of that society. 
 Part Two of Theory is concerned with interpreting how the principles of justice 
could be realised in institutional form. The aim of this part is to show that we can conceive 
                                                          
71 TJ, p. 20/18 
72 Though I have substantial disagreements, the writer whose interpretation of Rawls on the method of 
reflective equilibrium is closest to my own is Scanlon (2003). 
73 See TJ, pp. 579—580/507—508 plus also p. ix/xix, 95/81, 192/167—168, 195/171 
74 For example, JF, p. 31. 
75 For example, PL, p. 45 
76 For this debate, see, for example, articles by DePaul (1986) and Ebertz (1993) 
77 Ibid. p. 579/507. See also p. 21/19 
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of institutions which fit some acceptable interpretation of the principles. Key moral and 
political concepts found within the principles, such as 'basic liberties', remain too vague 
and ambiguous when it has not been specified how they might be instantiated in concrete 
institutions.78 If we cannot articulate the relevant institutions, we may be forced to 
conclude that the principles are simply poorly formulated, or that the fundamental ideas 
underlying them are empty or inapplicable. At the end of Part Two, we have the bare but 
adequate bones of the institutional structure of the society of justice as fairness, including 
the rights and duties for individuals.79 
 But that we can conceive of a set of practices and institutions which match up to the 
principles and conceptions is still not sufficient for the full justification of the principles. 
To see this, we first need to distinguish between the description of just institutions, and the 
realisation of those institutions. In describing an institution we are describing “an abstract 
object,” in other words “a possible form of conduct expressed by a system of rules.”80 The 
abstract object may or may not have a realisable counterpart. Describing a system of rules 
does not tell us whether and to what extent people can act in accordance with those rules. 
Hence, at this stage, we are only describing things normatively. When it comes to 
defending these institutions, Rawls requires that we do not rely only on normative 
assertions. We must also consider background empirical theories from the human sciences 
and humanities: in general, facts about human nature and psychology.81 At certain points in 
Part Two, (and in Part One: see section 4) he does this quite explicitly.82 But these 
scattered considerations and presumptions Rawls employs do not amount in themselves to 
a full moral psychology capable of defending the realisability of the society so far sketched. 
Instead, they presuppose one. We need to present a sufficiently complete account of the 
character of the people who would live their lives under such institutions. If it cannot be 
plausibly argued that human beings could maintain such institutions if they were set up, 
                                                          
78 On the topic of the basic liberties, see TJ, pp. 201—251/176—220. To see how seriously Rawls took 
the idea that moral conceptions must be able to give a viable institutional interpretation, observe his response 
to objections from Hart (1973) in PL, lec. VIII (see also TJ, p. /xii) 
79 See TJ, pp. 114–117/98–99, 333/293, 337–340/297–299   
80 TJ, p. 55/48 
81 Psychology is just one particular discipline within the human sciences and the humanities, each 
having their particular domain. A theory of institutions needs to attend to not only psychology in this sense, 
but also sociology, history, political science, economics, geography and perhaps even human biology. Rawls 
indicates the relevance of most of them at various points in his theory. See, for example, references to the 
relevance of history (TJ, pp. 200/175–176, PL pp. 231–240), economics and political economy (TJ, pp. 258–
259/228–229, 265–274/234–242), political science (TJ pp. 223–234/196–206) and human biology and 
evolutionary theory (TJ, pp. 502–504). This attitude fits with his general non–reductionist sympathies in 
moral theory. See TJ, pp. 577–578/506–507, and PL, pp. 86–88. For simplicity, I shall generally simply talk 
about psychological facts and theory. For the purposes of this thesis it is unnecessary to engage with the 
problems of the status of and relationships between the different human sciences and humanities. 
82 See discussions on need for a legal system (p. 240/211), political economy (p. 260/230) and civil 
disobedience (p. 387/339–340). 
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then our theory remains unjustified overall. 
 Part Three of Theory takes up the task. The shape of the institutions required by 
justice is already in place. What needs to be defended is that, growing up and living under 
such institutions, people will be motivated and will act so as to sustain them. Their 
developed moral inclinations, in particular those associated with their reasonableness, one 
of the most important of which is the sense of justice,83 must be strong enough to win out 
against any opposing motivations which would lead to the corruption of the justice of the 
institutions if unchecked.84 If Rawls successfully argues for this, he will have argued that 
the institutions realising the principles of justice are sustainable, and hence that a just 
society meeting the criteria of the principles of justice is possible over time. The principles 
of justice argued for in Part One, and the theory in general, will then be justified.85 The 
argument Rawls presents in Part Three to secure the justification of the principles of justice 
is commonly called the stability argument, or the argument from stability. I shall follow 
this convention. 
 The moral psychology found in Theory is similar in most respects to that found in 
“The Sense of Justice”, and is maintained in roughly the same form throughout the rest of 
Rawls's career,86 though the requirements of Political Liberalism do, as noted in the 
introduction, lead to some alterations. Alterations in both the role and content of the moral 
psychology, from the earlier philosophy to the later, will be addressed throughout 
subsequent chapters. I shall often distinguish between the comprehensively liberal and 
politically liberal periods of Rawls's work as earlier and later, except where otherwise 
indicated. I shall from now on call the account presented in “The Sense of Justice” and 
“Justice as Fairness” discussed in section 1 the earliest philosophy  
 With all the pieces of Rawls's theory in place, the just society defended is what 
Rawls calls a well-ordered society. The notion of a well-ordered society is one of the 
fundamental ideas of Rawls's theory. He defines it as a society in which (1) everyone 
accepts, and knows that everyone else accepts, the same conception of justice (2) the 
shared institutions of that society, which constitute its basic structure, conform to and are 
known to conform to that conception of justice (3) people are motivated by their shared 
conception of justice to maintain their just institutions and act justly towards one another.87 
                                                          
83 For other aspects of reasonablness, see PL, pp. 83, 223—225. Virtues of rightness in general are 
found at TJ, pp. 466—467/408—409, 472/413, 478—479/419. The categories of rightness and 
reasonableness obviously overlap in some way, but I shall not explore this matter. 
84 See TJ, pp. 454–455/398–399. 
85 TJ, pp. 567—577/496—505 
86 See JF, p.196 fn17 
87 See TJ, pp. 4–5/4–5, 453–455/397–398, PL, p. 35, JF, pp. 8–9, CP, pp. 233, 324 
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Because of their shared knowledge of the conception of justice, a well-ordered society’s 
conception of justice is public, and its principles conform to the publicity condition placed 
on the choice in the original position via the concept of right. Public justification is 
available to all in the well-ordered society, which gives the relevant and objective reasons 
for why the society is arranged in the way that it is, rather than some other way (see further 
subsection 11).88 Different conceptions of justice entail different well-ordered societies — 
the well-ordered society of Justice as Fairness is just one example.89 But, by definition, in a 
well-ordered society, the principles of justice which organise the society are public, and 
not esoteric.90 
 This completes my sketch of Justice as Fairness. I have not tried to include 
everything. In particular, the important alterations which occur with the advent of Rawls's 
political liberalism are not introduced here, but rather in subsection 12.1. As I said in the 
introduction, however, I will include and discuss later material which is compatible with 
Rawls's earlier comprehensive liberalism. 
 
Section 3: The roles of moral psychology  
 
 In outlining the structure of Rawls's overall theory, I have touched on the roles that 
moral psychology plays within it. There are six such roles. I do not think that they have 
ever all previously been separated out.91 I view doing so as essential to any thoroughly 
systematic account of Rawls's moral psychology. In what follows, these six roles are 
introduced in turn. In the rest of the thesis, the third and fourth roles are discussed in 
chapters 2 and 5. The sixth role is discussed in chapter 3. The first and second roles are 
discussed in chapters 2, 4 and 5. The fifth role is the subject of the whole of chapter 6. 
Before I begin, however, I need to make some terminological distinctions surrounding the 
term “moral psychology”. 
 
                                                          
88 The different levels of public justification are outlined and discussed at PL, pp. 66—71. That the 
reasons given are objective in some appropriate sense is specified at TJ, pp. 516—520/452—456 and PL, pp. 
110—112, 115—116, 119—121. 
89 TJ, pp. 454—455/398 CP, pp. 232—233 
90 An esoteric conception of justice is one which must be kept non-public and secret in order to operate, 
given human psychology. Sidgwick (1907) pp. 489—490 proposed that Utilitarianism would be best served, 
in most circumstances, by keeping the knowledge that society is organised according to the doctrine secret.  
Rawls rejects esoteric morality at TJ, pp. 133/115, 454/398 
91 Various authors indicate an awareness that Rawls's moral psychology plays multiple roles in his 
theory. See, for example, Krause (2008), p. 35 (though note Krause erroneously believes that Rawls has 
actually restricted himself to one role). Balwin (2008) p. 251 makes a similar error – see subsection 5.2 
below.  
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3.1 Rawls's moral psychology, moral psychology, human nature, personhood 
 
  Rawls presents us, in “The Sense of Justice”, chapter 8 of A Theory of Justice, and 
elsewhere,92 with a moral psychology. It is the moral psychology of Justice as Fairness. It 
occupies a distinct section of his presentation of Justice as Fairness: the argument for 
stability. 
 But we may also want to talk of our moral sensibility, moral psychology, 
psychological facts, and the facts of human nature more generally. In addition, we want to 
know how these relate to Rawls's conception of the person. Distinguishing between these 
will aid our exposition generally.93 I shall distinguish these terms in the following way. 
 
The Person: I earlier mentioned Rawls's conception of persons or people as free, equal, 
rational and reasonable. Rawls describes this as a normative conception of the person. 
There are several things to be emphasised about such conceptions. First, a normative 
conception of the person “is to be distinguished from an account of human nature as given 
by natural science and social theory”94 (see further subsection 5.2). Second, Rawls 
understands his conception of the person to be a normative conception. There are many 
different normative conceptions of the person. They can be “legal, political, moral, or 
indeed philosophical or religious, depending on the overall view to which [the conception] 
belongs.”95 Different societies may contain quite different conceptions of the person, 
different moral theories endorse or promote different conceptions,96 and, depending on the 
conceptions in question, a single human being may realise several of them at once. On 
Rawls's view, a person, or moral person as he often says, is a human being (it is assumed) 
who is either capable of being free, equal, rational and reasonable, or who has realised 
these characteristics. I use “person” or “people” to refer to persons in the sense of Rawls's 
conception, and to use “human being” for persons more generically considered. This is 
often awkward: Rawls himself does not consistently make this distinction, and in addition, 
sometimes debates make things hard to phrase in these terms. But this is preferable to 
                                                          
92 PL, pp. 81—86, JF, pp. 195—198, CP, pp. 445 
93 I do not claim that my stipulations of how I shall use these terms matches perfectly onto all the 
times that Rawls employs them. I have chosen them in order to be able to express all the distinctions I think 
need to be expressed in discussing his work. For times when Rawls himself mentions these broader terms, 
see, for example, TJ pp. 46/41, 137—138/119, PL pp. 86—88, CP p. 321—322 
94 PL, p. 18 fn20. See also pp. 86—87, JF, p. 19, CP, pp. 321—322 
95 PL, p. 18 fn20. 
96 CP, pp. 297—299 
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simply using “person” rampantly.97 
 
Rawls's Moral Psychology/The Moral Psychology: The specific moral psychology referred 
to in this subsection's opening paragraph I shall call either Rawls's moral psychology, 
Rawls's psychology, or the moral psychology. It includes three components. These are (1) 
an account of the moral character or sensibility of human beings who realise the normative 
ideal of the person in Justice as Fairness, (2) an account of how this sensibility relates to 
the rest of the person's non-moral psychology such that the moral sensibility can have 
sufficient control over the rest of the person's character if the person so wills, and (3) an 
account of processes of psychological development whereby people acquire such a moral 
sensibility. It is the psychology that complements the normative conception of the person 
just outlined. It inheres in, and is realised to some adequate level by, members of the well-
ordered society. Moreover it is a psychology which, Rawls claims, human beings have the 
capacity to realise. In other words, Rawls hopes that human beings are able to form a well-
ordered society. Perhaps even we ourselves may be such moral persons and have already 
realised this psychology to some extent. As I shall ultimately outline it in later chapters, 
this psychology will incorporate some material from outside the passages and article 
referred to above (see subsection 13.1). But these bodies of text will remain at its core.  
 
Human Psychology/Human Nature: The psychological facts, and the facts about human 
nature, I shall use as interchangeable terms (except briefly in subsection 3.5 below). By 
them, I mean the broader core body of facts about human beings. This nature includes, so 
Rawls argues, the moral psychology, or else psychological dispositions and structures 
sufficiently similar to those postulated by that psychology to vindicate Justice as Fairness. 
Also included are many other facts about human beings more generally. Obviously, not 
every fact about human beings is a fact about human nature or psychology. The fact that 
human beings live on Planet Earth is not, for instance. Moreover, there are many different 
discourses and subjects which are applied to human beings. I take it there is no need for me 
to discuss these issues here.98 The facts about human nature are the facts which are 
considered by the members of the original position, as was noted in section 2. 
                                                          
97 Rawls notes that we should also distinguish between human beings, and persons as the term is 
employed in the philosophy of personal identity and the philosophy of mind (PL, p. 31 fn34, CP, pp. 296—
297). Any normative conception of the person is narrower than this latter notion of the person, and the class 
of human beings is distinct from both. Rawls postulates that any account of personal identity will under—
determine what normative conception(s) of the person we should adopt, though he does not claim the two 
areas of debate are completely independent (PL, p. 31 fn34, CP, pp. 299—302). I do not employ this added 
distinction in the text, as it would make for unnecessary complexity. 
98 For a brief comment on these matters, see fn68 above 
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Moral Psychology/Moral Sensibility/Moral Nature: Finally, moral psychology represents a 
subset of the facts about human nature. But it is unnecessary to identify moral psychology 
in general with Rawls's moral psychology, and there is no indication that Rawls believes 
this is required.99 Rawls's psychology needs to be adequate for the task of defending his 
moral theory. But what can be properly called moral psychology in general need not be 
identified with his moral psychology in order for his theory to be justified.100 People may 
be moral people, despite not having realised anything much like the psychology of Justice 
as Fairness — they can be moral in the light of a different, recognisably moral conception 
(see also comments under “1.” in the introduction). Possession of a realised moral 
psychology is equivalent to possessing what I have earlier called a moral sensibility. A 
moral psychology, whether it is realised or not, might also be called a moral nature. It is 
obvious that all these terms have slightly different connotations, but I take it that I can get 
by without spelling them out. 
 Now, here are the roles. 
 
3.2 Roles #1 and #2: Defence and explanation of psychological realisability and 
stability 
 
 The most prominent role (role #1) which Rawls's moral psychology plays in his 
theory is to argue that the principles and ideals he proposes can be psychologically realised 
by human beings in circumstances the same or sufficiently similar to ours, and are 
psychologically stable. As I said at the outset of section 1, for any theory a key question to 
ask is: when the normative claims of a theory telling us what human beings should be like 
are put forward and defended, can corresponding psychological claims also be put forward 
and defended, allowing us to say that human beings can be like that, and under what 
conditions?101  
 In Rawls's theory, for the most part, the moral psychology is set the more specific 
task of showing that when human beings have been brought up under the just institutions 
of the well-ordered society, they come to psychologically realise the normative conception 
                                                          
99 This is clear from his allowing other moral conceptions and respective psychologies. See TJ, p. 
500/437—438, CP, p. 296, PL, p. 87 
100 See, for example TJ, p. 578—581/506—509  
101 For self—clarification here, I am indebted here to Flanagan (1996), pp. 20–22 and Flanagan, 
Sarkissian and Wong (2008), pp. 10–11 
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of the person, to some sufficient degree, and sustain this status over time.102 I say “for the 
most part”, as this role of moral psychology is expanded in the later politically liberal 
period. There it is employed in order to argue that human beings might be able to attain a 
well-ordered society starting from our current historical position in less just liberal 
democracies.103 These two tasks can both be taken to be addressing the same, more general 
question: can human beings realise and sustain the well-ordered society of Justice as 
Fairness, under favourable conditions? 
 There is a lot more to be said about what this realisation consists in, and what 
amounts to it being sufficient. The psychological realisation of a conception of justice is 
obviously not simply a matter of forming the right beliefs, but also acquiring 
corresponding motivations. Indeed the story is even more complicated when told in full, 
requiring reference to sentiments, emotions, psychological developmental principles, and 
other more complex attitudes and traits.104 
 The phrase “favourable conditions” has been introduced. It should be briefly 
explained here. It may be that a well-ordered society is actually impossible for us to realise 
in our world. This might be for several reasons. Rawls assumes that a certain level of 
material well-being is required in order to be able to sustain the basic institutions of liberal 
democracy.105 Our world may, conceivably, lack the resources to allow this. It should be 
noted that this may at best indicate that not all societies can be well-ordered. Rawls, 
however, thinks that the necessary material conditions are actually quite minimal, and that 
they most likely can be met all over the world.106 Furthermore, however, the course of 
history might be such as to prevent a well-ordered society from coming about. Hostile, 
unjust international relations may simply make this impossible. Or it may be that the 
history of each individual country, and the political culture it has bequeathed, means this 
cannot be achieved.107 
 All three of these examples, however, rely on human beings facing unfavourable 
conditions. Because of this, they still allow that human beings, under favourable 
conditions, would be able to achieve a well-ordered society. Rawls is interested in the 
possibility that the realisability or stability of the well-ordered society could be inevitably 
undermined by human nature itself, through the sense of justice being incompatible with 
                                                          
102 JF, p. 181. See also TJ, pp. 144/124, 455—458/398—401, 461/404, 496—498/434—436, PL, pp. 
140—142, JF, p. 88—89, 184—185, CP, p. 233—234, 294, 479.  
103 See PL, pp. 86 fn34, 158—168, JF, pp. 192—195 
104 See TJ, chapter 8 in general 
105 TJ, p. 542/474—475 
106 LP, p. 106 
107 See, for example, JF, p. 4, LP, pp. 127—128 
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broader human nature. 
 For Rawls, the realisation of the moral psychology corresponding to the normative 
ideals and principles of Justice as Fairness must be compatible with the persistence over 
time of the institutions of the well-ordered society, and the persistence over time of that 
moral sensibility itself. The moral psychology must not only be realisable but stable. The 
moral psychology can fail to be so by being incompatible with the rest of human nature. 
The moral psychology of Justice as Fairness may be realisable, but it may happen that the 
other aspects of human psychology will inevitably undermine that sensibility over time. 
Human nature is then incompatible with the long-term realisability of the moral 
psychology. It should be noted that I have used human nature and incompatibility very 
loosely here. 
 Before moving on, a difference can be noted between the reasons stressed by Rawls 
for presenting the moral psychology in A Theory of Justice, and in “The Sense of Justice”. 
In the former, it is clear that the need is to examine the prospects for the stability of the 
society of Justice as Fairness. But, while this concern is present in “The Sense of Justice” 
as well,108 the greater focus in that paper seems to be on explaining the sense of justice 
which we ourselves are taken to already possess (role #2).109 Explanation is a role of moral 
psychology distinct from defence. Giving an explanation of this sentiment presupposes that 
we already have this sentiment to some degree.110 This idea is present in A Theory of 
Justice: that whole work also presupposes the existence of a sense of justice in persons.111 
But the concern with the defence of stability of a just society appears to have become more 
pressing for Rawls by the time he came to write his first book. This concern only grew of 
course, and contributed to the revisions of his philosophy found in Political Liberalism 
(see subsection 12.1). To summarise, moral psychology plays the roles of defending the 
realisability and stability of the well-ordered society, but also plays the less ambitious role 
of explaining our possession of a moral sensibility. 
 These two roles seem perfectly compatible, and do not cover the same territory. 
Explaining how it is that we ourselves come to be moved by a sense of justice does not 
amount to a defence of the viability, never mind stability, of a well-ordered society. It is 
this that Rawls takes to be the pressing task from Theory onwards. 
 A final comment. I have spoken here of the stability of a well-ordered society over 
time. But Rawls means something more specific by stability than simply the persistence of 
                                                          
108 CP, p. 104—105, 106 
109 See the “second question” posed by the paper, and addressed, on CP, pp. 96, 99—100, and 110—
112  
110 CP, pp. 96—97 
111 TJ, pp. 46/41 
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the institutions of a well-ordered society due to adequate motivations. The well-ordered 
society cannot be stable simply in virtue of its members being animated by any old reasons 
and motivations. Rather, a well-ordered society is stable because its members are moved 
by reasons of the right kinds — reasons of justice and reasonableness which are part of the 
public conception of justice governing the society. When this happens, the society is said 
to be stable for the right reasons.112 This aspect of Rawls's conception of stability will be 
largely set aside until section 11.  
 
3.3 Roles #3 and #4: Justification of principles, through avoiding futility and 
arbitration 
 
 Whether certain principles of justice are likely to yield a stable society can be 
conceived to be independent of the soundness of those principles. At the extreme, we can 
think that whether principles of justice can be realised and stable in the institutions and 
character of a society, and hence be matched to a psychology which meets role #1, or even 
whether they can be realised by human beings in any circumstances at all, is irrelevant to 
the correctness of the principles. It is amongst the most natural concerns in the world to 
want to demonstrate that human beings can live up to the standards and ideals we set 
forward. But if we come to believe they cannot, and if in addition we deny that “Cannot” 
implies “not-ought”, we may judge that we should retain the standard in question.113  
 Rawls, however, argues that the realisability and stability of proposed conceptions 
of justice are relevant to the correctness of those conceptions. Both realisability and 
stability are necessary requirements for a conception of justice to be justified. Hence, when 
a moral psychology is capable of playing role #1, and defending realisability and stability, 
it also play the two justificatory roles: roles #3 and #4.  
There are two justificatory roles because there are two aspects to any justification. 
First, any conceptions of justice which are impossible (or which can be expected to be 
impossible under any foreseeable conditions) for human beings to meet to some sufficient 
and society-wide degree must be discarded.114 A moral psychology which corresponds to 
our theory of justice, and which is capable of being defended as realisable and stable at a 
                                                          
112 See PL, pp. xxxvii, 142—144,  
113  This is the position argued for by G.A. Cohen in his Rescuing Justice and Equality, particularly in 
chapter 6. As indicated in the preface, I will do little in this thesis to arbitrate between Cohen's and Rawls's 
respective positions. 
114  TJ, pp. 455/398. This also follows from the claims on pp. 159—161/137—138. 
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society-wide scale, can be said to allow our theory to meet the goal of avoiding futility.115 
Justification through futility-avoidance is role #3 that moral psychology plays. 
Furthermore principles of justice which, if implemented in institutions, appear to be more 
likely to generate motivational support from the human beings living under them should be 
preferred to those less likely, all other things considered.116 Moral psychology can hence 
play the role of tie-breaker, and arbitrate. This is role #4 for moral psychology to play. 
 I'll make some brief comments here: first on concepts and conceptions of justice, 
and justification, and then on moral psychology and justification in Theory and in the 
earlier papers. The first is that Rawls does not say that conceptions of justice which fail to 
be realisable at all are therefore not conceptions of justice. He appears to hold back from 
this, saying potentially weaker things such as “however attractive a conception of justice 
might be on other grounds, it is seriously defective if ... it fails to engender in human 
beings the requisite desire to act upon it”117 and “a strong point in favour of a conception of 
justice is that it generates its own support.”118 What determines that something is a 
conception of justice is that it can be seen to be an elaboration of our concept of justice. In 
section 2 I described the difference between concepts and conceptions. For Rawls, all those 
who understand the concept of justice recognise the need for enacting principles which 
ensure that “no arbitrary distinctions are made between persons in the assigning of basic 
rights and duties and ... the rules [of society and its institutions] determine a proper balance 
between competing claims to the advantages of social life.”119 Rawls does not think that a 
writer such as Plato did not have the concept of justice. Plato's conception of justice still 
fits the characterisation just given. Rather, it is simply that Plato's position is ultimately 
unwarranted – for its unworldliness as much as for other features.120 
 My final remark in this section, unrelated to the previous few paragraphs, is that the 
issue of justification does not appear to be amongst the concerns of “The Sense of Justice”. 
There, the moral psychology is presented in order to answer certain questions about the 
nature of justice.121 There is no mention of it being used in order to defend Justice as 
Fairness against any other view.122 
 
                                                          
115  As suggested by Rawls's language at JF, p. 185 
116  TJ, pp. 456/399, 498/439 
117  TJ, p. 455/398. My emphasis 
118  TJ, p.177/154 
119  TJ, p.5/5 
120  LHPP, pp.3—4 clearly recognises the “Platonic View” of political philosophy, whilst also rejecting 
it. See also TJ, p. 454/, which rejects Plato’s idea of the noble lie, which violates the publicity condition (see 
section 2 above). 
121  CP, p. 96, 99—100 
122  This is also noted by McClennen (1989) p. 7 fn10 
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3.4 Role #5: Determining the scope of justice 
 
 One role of Rawls's moral psychology present at all times in his career is the role of 
determining who is owed justice, and to what extent. Human beings capable of developing 
a sense of justice – and later also a capacity to develop a conception of the good – are 
owed justice, and they are owed justice equally.123 These two capacities are in later work 
referred to by Rawls as the two moral powers, and they are elements of our capacity to be 
reasonable, and rational, respectively.124 They are examined in more detail in subsection 
4.2, and section 8. The capacity for a sense of justice, and the capacity to develop and 
revise a conception of the good, act as criteria for being included within the scope of 
justice.  
 Hence a fact about our psychology is appealed to in order to determine which 
individuals are owed justice.125 This idea needs to be explained properly. What gives the 
criteria for determining who is owed justice is the normative conception of the person, and 
the drum which will be repeatedly beaten in subsection 5.2 is that normative conceptions 
are not the same as psychological facts (or for that matter psychological conceptions). 
Rather, a fact about human nature is appealed to in order to identify which individuals are 
owed justice given the stated criteria.  
 It may be wondered whether moral psychology should really be said to have a fifth 
role in Justice as Fairness on the basis of this. For it seems that psychology is simply 
indicating which particular individuals principles of justice apply to. It is, in this role, not 
determining anything of their content. Isn't this simply a matter of the application of the 
theory? But then, why should that discount this role from being a genuine role as regards 
the theory. Being a practical theory, we want to be able to know when and where it is 
applied. Given the method of reflective equilibrium, we may also be led to revise our 
theory when we see the practical results of it actually being applied. 
 Finally, as chapter 6 will investigate, the details of whether these two powers are 
necessary and/or sufficient to be owed justice change between different periods of Rawls's 
work. To begin with, the possession of or the capacity for a sense of justice is necessary 
and sufficient to be owed justice. By the end, this has been weakened to a sufficient 
criterion, and, on a certain reading still to be specified perhaps not even that. 
 
                                                          
123  See CP, p. 96, and subsequently (and with addition of the capacity to develop a conception of the 
good) TJ, p. 505/442, and then CP, p. 333 and PL, pp. 18—20 
124  See CP, p. 312 and PL, pp. 18—19. See also TJ, p. 505/442, where the moral powers are defined, 
but are only referred to as “capacities”. 
125  TJ, pp. 462/404—405, 505/442, 507—508/443—444  
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3.5 Role #6: Constitution 
 
 Certain writers have suggested that Rawls views his moral psychology as playing 
what is often called a constitutive role in his theory.126 They deny that human psychology 
is restricted simply to indicating the realisability and stability of a society organised 
according to the principles of justice, or to playing some role in the justification of the 
principles. They may even claim it has a wider role than determining the scope of justice. 
Instead, in some further sense, moral psychology, as an aspect of human psychology, is 
constitutive of morality as a whole. 
 However, what exactly is meant when someone says that moral psychology plays a 
constitutive role in a theory is ambiguous. In this thesis I am going to address one clear 
sense of “constitutes”. The most obvious thing that someone may mean when they say that 
moral psychology plays a constitutive role in Rawls is that they mean constitutive in a 
metaphysical sense. The claim would be about the status of morality — that morality is 
solely an aspect of human psychology, and that a correct moral theory is hence a theory 
about a particular aspect of moral psychology. Morality is part of the world solely in virtue 
of there being human psychological facts in the world. This is the thesis clearly held by 
expressivists and certain other naturalists.127 
 Beyond this sense, it may well turn out that what is meant by saying that moral 
psychology plays a constitutive role can be collapsed into the previous roles we have 
outlined. Alternatively, perhaps there is some more subtle sense of “constitutes” which is 
applicable and which I have missed. This further issue will not be addressed. 
 The view that Rawls views moral psychology as constitutive of morality in the 
sense just given – that morality is nothing over and above an aspect of human psychology 
– is incorrect. But depending on how we interpret Rawls, the claim may be correct in a 
more restricted sense. Different aspects of Rawls's theory, on the face of it, seem to pull in 
different directions regarding this issue.128 I believe that these apparent tensions can most 
likely be resolved. That resolution would produce an account of the lion's share of Rawls's 
metaethics. But I do not present such a resolution in this thesis. Instead, in chapter 3, I 
simply argue against two readings of Rawls which are mistaken on this matter. Here, 
however, I note the different elements of Rawls's theory which are relevant to this 
question. 
                                                          
126  For example, Raz (1982) pp. 186—189, Baldwin (2008), Krause (2008) pp. 28—37 
127  I shall not take it to be essential for me to outline these metaethical categories here. The curious 
should look to  Miller (2003) 
128  This is argued by Fraser (2007) 
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 Rawls may hold that moral psychology plays a constitutive role in his theory in 
virtue of his view, introduced in section 2, that no part of his theory should be taken to be 
foundational. If we assume the theory literally describes the morality of the society of 
Justice as Fairness in all its elements, and part of the theory is psychological theory, then 
part of (the) morality (of that society) will be constituted by psychological facts. Or at 
least, this may be one possible outcome of a thorough understanding of the coherentist 
element of Rawls's theory. 
 Alternatively, we may think, on the basis of Rawls's constructivism, that moral 
psychology actually plays no constitutive role in Rawls's theory. Constructivism is not 
discussed within the main body of this thesis, though I have attached an appendix so that 
the reader might know what I take to be the rudiments of Rawls's position (see Appendix 
I). Constructivist views see moral principles as being produced by our practical reason. 
The reason why this may be incompatible with moral psychology playing a constitutive 
role is that the account of our practical reason may not be able to be reduced to an account 
of an aspect of our psychology. This is not to hold that our practical reason is not, in some 
sense, part of human nature. The thought is rather based on the idea that accounts of 
practical reason, and accounts of human psychology, are distinct theories which are not 
reducible to each other. That Rawls endorses this kind of non-reductionism is explained in 
subsection 5.2.129 We get the further conclusion that moral psychology does not play a 
constitutive role when we assume that, the content of morality is worked out purely by 
practical reason, and hence practical reason represents the foundation of morality.130 
 I believe this may represent a distorted reading of Rawls's view of the relationship 
of constructivism and psychology. It is true that Rawls holds that our theories of practical 
reasoning and our theories of moral psychology cannot be reduced down to one another. It 
is also true that he defends a Kantian position which holds that to attempt to found morality 
on “the special psychological constitution of human nature” is a form of heteronomy, 
whereas constructivist views are distinguished by the fact that morality is linked to our 
autonomy.131 But it does not appear to be the case that moral principles are developed 
purely by reference to our practical reason. They are also developed by reference to the 
other aspects of human nature, which includes our psychology more generally.132 The 
                                                          
129  Non-reductionism and reductionism regarding different sciences, concepts, properties etc. is another 
thing I do not feel to be my job to discuss. See Miller (2003) chapters 8 and 9 for reductive and non-reductive 
naturalism in metaethics. 
130  Krause (2008) p. 35—36 appears to hold this interpretation of Rawls. The general view may be 
broadly correct, but  most of her details certainly are not. 
131  See CP, p. 345. 
132  Observe, for instance, his response to an objection made by Schopenhauer to Kant on behalf of 
Rawls's constructivism: PL, pp. 104—107, CP, pp. 318—319 
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whole determination is thought to represent the autonomous determination of principles.133 
On closer examination, then, it may be that autonomy in a constructivist conception is 
perfectly compatible with psychological facts being partially constitutive of morality.  
 Finally, it is unclear just how Rawls's constructivism links to his coherentism — 
yet another piece to the puzzle which would need to be solved.134 As I have said, I do not 
attempt to resolve these issues within this thesis. But these brief comments hopefully serve 
to show that what role, if any, moral psychology plays in the constitution of morality for 
Rawls is an involved question. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
133  See Rawls's comments on the interdependence of conceptions of practical reason and the 
constructed principles. Constructing principles of justice presuppose that the conceptions, and practical 
reason itself, are embodied in some way (PL, pp. 107—108). See Appendix I for further elaboration on these 
tricky ideas. 
134  As noted above, Fraser (2007) notes this possible tension. Relevant discussions include PL, pp. 95—
97 
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Chapter 2: Moral Psychology and Justification 
 
This chapter focuses on two of the roles of moral psychology in Rawls's philosophy linked 
to justification. These are the roles of arbitration, and avoiding futility. These are described 
in greater detail in Section 4 below, which comprises the whole of the chapter. This section 
also highlights an internal contradiction, or at least ambiguity, in Rawls's account of where 
moral psychological considerations enter into the account of the argument from the 
original position. This contradiction or ambiguity is of significance for that argument, and 
all similar ones.  
 
Section 4: Justification: The Place of psychological considerations in the 
Original Position 
  
4.1 Two interpretations of the place of moral psychology in justification 
 
 The two roles of moral psychology in justification are (1) demonstration that 
futility can be avoided for a given conception of justice, and (2) arbitration between 
different conceptions of justice. Moral psychology does not play both of these roles 
throughout the whole of the argument from the original position. That argument is split 
into two parts.135 I give an initial sketch of them here. Their full complexity will be 
elaborated throughout the chapter. 
 
          In the first part, each party in the original position chooses between the principles of 
justice, on the basis of how well they protect the fundamental interest their representee has 
in being a free, equal, rational and reasonable person. In making this judgement, the parties 
take account of various psychological facts in order to assess, with regards to each 
proposed set of principles, whether the fundamental interests of their representee are 
provided for by those principles. The parties need to reach agreement on the set of 
principles in order to move onto the second part of the argument. In the second part, the 
parties as a group consider whether the society organised according to the previously 
chosen principles of justice would be stable. To do this they consider various psychological 
                                                          
135 TJ, pp. 144/124, 530/464, JF, pp. 88—89, 180—181. The fact that the argument is split into two 
parts is referred to in PL, pp. 140—141, along with a reference to I:3.6 in the same book. However, PL does 
not contain such a section, and I can find no section in the first lecture in that book which seems to obviously 
correspond to this topic. 
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facts. If the society corresponding to the principles turns out to be unstable, then they must 
return to the first part of the argument. 
 
 Moral psychology does not play both of its justificatory roles in both parts of the 
argument. In the first part, it plays both its arbitrating role, and its role in deciding whether 
a conception of justice avoids futility. In the second part, it does not play the arbitrating 
role, but only the role of avoiding futility. I shall not defend this account of the distribution 
of the roles of moral psychology here. Rather, at points throughout the chapter I shall 
indicate why it appears to be the correct reading.  
 I now introduce the contradiction or ambiguity in the set-up of the original position. 
The contradiction or ambiguity I am concerned with is over which psychological facts are 
considered in each part of the argument (I shall explain why I refer to it as a contradiction 
or ambiguity in time). There are two interpretations suggested by the text. On one 
interpretation, one key group of the psychological facts (which ones will be highlighted 
shortly) are introduced to the original position argument in the first part of that argument. 
On the other interpretation, this key group of psychological facts are introduced in the 
second part of the argument. 
 I will outline both interpretations briefly in this subsection. To begin the exposition 
of the contradiction or ambiguity, I first briefly outline the notion of rationality as 
employed in Justice as Fairness. I then also outline the so-called “special psychologies”. 
These are the common emotional dispositions and more general attitudes that are, for the 
most part, irrational for persons in the well-ordered society to feel or be moved by. I 
explain why we should start with these topics. This constitutes subsection 4.2. In 
subsection 4.3, I then reintroduce into the discussion the two separate roles of moral 
psychology in the argument from the original position, and give a short reminder of why 
they are present at all. In subsection 4.4, I briefly flag up the first entry of moral 
psychological consideration into the argument from the original position. I note that there 
are severe problems in interpreting what exactly is going on here. But I do not explore 
further. Finally, the ambiguity or contradiction in Rawls's account of the role of moral 
psychology in the argument from the original position is then laid out and argued for in 
subsection 4.5, and its significance highlighted. 
 To orientate the discussion, I first summarise the two different interpretations of the 
argument which are on offer. 
 
Interpretation #1: The argument from the original position is split into two parts. In the 
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first part, the parties only consider the rational and reasonable interests of the members of 
the well-ordered society, who are also presumed to have an interest in possessing a sense 
of self-esteem or self-respect (see further sections 8 and 9). Psychology is considered in 
order to find out whether human beings are capable at all of being moved by such interests, 
and how such motivations might come about. Given this information, the parties each 
consider whether their representee could be expected to abide by each of the prospective 
conceptions of justice, and with what probability. The second part then considers 
motivations which are irrational when one has self-esteem, such as spite and envy. It then 
also considers to what extent acting justly can be viewed as rational outside the veil of 
ignorance and within the well-ordered society – whether acting justly and one's good are 
congruent in such a setting. In the first part of the argument, moral psychological 
considerations are appealed to in order to avoid the contract being futile and to arbitrate 
between different conceptions of justice. Specific full moral psychologies, each 
complimenting a different proposed conception of justice, are presented, i.e. different full 
moral psychologies are developed which complement the principles of Justice as Fairness, 
which complement the principle of utility, and so on. These are compared in order to try to 
discern which conception, assuming any are stable at all, would be more likely to generate 
its own support from generation to generation if its institutions were to be realised in 
favourable conditions. One set of principles of justice is chosen on the basis of all this. In 
the second part of the argument, with the moral psychology of the chosen conception of 
justice to hand, it is considered whether, given such a psychology and background 
institutions, reactive and, it is assumed, irrational motivations and attitudes will not occur 
to such an extent that they threaten the stability of the society over time. Arbitration is not 
a concern in this second part of the argument. 
  
Interpretation #2: As above, except that the development of the various specific full moral 
psychologies in the light of the available facts about human psychology, and their 
comparison as regards stability over time, is moved to the second part of the argument. 
They are hence developed in the same part of the argument within which the special 
psychologies are considered. If psychological considerations are employed in the first part 
of the argument – it is clear that they are, in some sense (see subsection 4.4) – then they are 
of a much more limited nature. Again, however, as in the first interpretation, arbitration 
and avoiding futility are both concerns in the first half of the argument, but arbitration is 
not a concern in the second. The full comparison of the psychologies, then, does not play a 
role in arbitrating between the various conceptions of justice. 
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 The key difference between the two interpretations is the placement of the 
development and comparison of full moral psychologies corresponding to the different sets 
of principles of justice. Does this development and comparison occur in the first part of the 
argument, or the second?  
 I here remind the reader what a full moral psychology consists in. This was 
outlined in subsection 3.1, and how such psychologies are developed will be further 
outlined in subsection 5.2. There it was said to consist in (1) an account of a fully 
developed moral sensibility, (2) an account of the development of such a moral sensibility, 
and (3) an account of how that moral sensibility is related to the other aspects of a person's 
psychology. Rawls's moral psychology is an example of such a full moral psychology.  
 I note one modification of use made necessary by the subject of this chapter. A 
significant part of (3) is the development of an account of how the fully developed moral 
sensibility of persons in the well-ordered society relates to the special psychologies. But 
where the consideration of the special psychologies enters into the argument from the 
original position is not what is at issue. On both interpretations, this occurs in the second 
part of the argument. Hence, when I refer to the full moral psychologies corresponding to 
different conceptions of justice, I should not be taken to be referring to the relationship 
between a fully developed moral sensibility and the special psychologies for this chapter. 
This alteration of my standard usage is only needed for this chapter. Following this 
chapter, I drop this alteration, and when talking of Rawls's moral psychology, or moral 
psychologies more generally, should be taken to be using the characterisation given in 
subsection 3.1. 
 To repeat then, Interpretation #1 holds that the development of the full moral 
psychologies, and their comparison, occurs in the first part of the argument from the 
original position. Interpretation #2 holds that this development and comparison occurs in 
the second part of the argument. To make the case for distinguishing between these two 
interpretations is a lengthy task – I ask the reader to bear with me. 
 
4.2 Rationality and the special psychologies 
 
 The parties in the original position are described as rational choosers, who are 
concerned to secure the fundamental interests of those they represent – the members of the 
well-ordered society. The members of the well-ordered society are taken to have 
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fundamental, higher-order interests136 in being free, equal, rational and reasonable persons. 
They have an interest in realising both the moral powers, and being able to pursue a 
conception of the good. Amongst their other interests is also an interest in possessing self-
respect. In the well-ordered society, these interests are met, and hence the members of such 
a society can be said to have a certain corresponding character. This character will be laid 
out in sections 8 and 9. To assess how these interests can be met, the parties in the original 
position rely upon their ability to rationally choose. 
 The account of rationality used in Justice as Fairness I have not yet outlined. It will 
be briefly introduced here. With the account of rationality to hand, we can begin to 
introduce the account of the special psychologies, and then begin to assign the many 
aspects of the original position argument to its first and second parts. 
 The parties in the original position are assumed to be rational in the sense “familiar 
in social theory.”137 Rawls's discussion here might suggest that the sense of rationality 
meant here is means/end rationality, of the kind often ascribed to Hume. There is more to 
be said. For one, we need some kind of account of what means/end rationality is. Second, 
Rawls's account is actually slightly more complex than this “familiar” account. I try to get 
a little more precise on exactly how Rawls understands rationality in subsection 8.1. For 
now, we can say that though Rawls does not need to be read to accept the standard 
means/end account of rationality, nevertheless his account of rationality is extremely 
capacious. In particular, it does not place any limitations on the possible ends or interests 
which rational persons may have. In this respect, it is precisely like the means/end model. 
 One assumption Rawls incorporates into the original position which departs from 
the familiar idea of rationality is that the rational choosers in the original position are not 
subject to the special psychologies.138 But what are these psychological attitudes? Such 
psychologies include inclinations towards envy,139 jealousy, grudgingness and spite,140 
attitudes towards risk and uncertainty,141 postures of domination and submission,142 and so 
on. In saying the parties are not subject to these attitudes, what is meant that they are not 
moved by them, and furthermore they are not even aware of them. Initially, knowledge of 
the special psychologies is behind the veil of ignorance. This means the parties are not 
                                                          
136 PL, p. 73—77 
137 TJ, p. 143/124. See Rawls's accompanying footnote for his understanding of “social theory.” See 
also JF, p. 87 
138 TJ, p. 143/124 
139 TJ, pp. 143—144/123—124, 530—533/464—467, JF, pp. 87, 181 
140 TJ, pp. 533—534/467—468, JF, pp. 87, 181 
141 TJ, p. 530/464, 541/474, JF, pp. 87, 106—107, 181 
142 TJ, p. 530/464, 541/474, JF, pp. 87, 181 
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aware that human beings are subject to such motivations.143  
 Now it does not seem that such motivations can always be assumed to be irrational, 
given how capaciously Rawls understands rationality. And indeed, for certain persons in 
certain unfortunate circumstances, Rawls thinks they are not.144 What unites the special 
psychologies is that they can be taken to be collectively disadvantageous vices for persons 
who, as Rawls thinks of it, are assured of their own self-respect and self-esteem (note: this 
is not to say these attitudes cannot also often be irrational for those who lack self-esteem 
and self-respect).145 In general, the special psychological attitudes are only good for those 
whose conceptions of the good, or plans of life (see subsection 8), include desires to react 
against another's good without any additional benefit to themselves. In Theory, Rawls 
assumes that the parties think of those they represent as “mutually disinterested,” having 
only an interest in “their own plan of life which is sufficient for itself” such that “they have 
no desire to abandon any of their aims [so that] others [will] have less means to further 
theirs.”146 This is taken to be the hallmark of a lack of a secure sense of one's own self-
respect and self-esteem.147 Assuming a person possesses self-respect and self-esteem, if 
they are also afflicted by and/or act on the special psychologies, they themselves derive no 
benefit from this, and are most likely to be made worse off. In addition, things are most 
likely going to be made worse for others.148  
 There is more to be said here. It is not clear that you can make a straight inference 
from the fact that someone desires to injure another person's good for no additional benefit 
to themselves (beyond satisfying that desire) to the fact that the person lacks self-esteem or 
self-respect. It is also not quite clear where the interest of the members of the well-ordered 
                                                          
143 TJ, p. 530/464, JF, p. 88 
144 TJ, p. 534/468. This may seem to be at odds with comments on p. 178/155, which state that “it is 
clearly rational for men to secure their self-respect” and that “self-respect is not so much a part of any 
rational plan of life as the sense that one's plan is worth carrying out.” This second comment seems in error 
— it is inconsistent itself with the claim that it is rational to secure self-respect. Regarding the first comment, 
we have two options. One is to say that this statement is simply inconsistent with what Rawls says overall. 
The other is that Rawls is using the term “rational” loosely to mean in most circumstances rational. Why this 
is so will be made clear in subsection 8.1 This is most likely given TJ, pp. 400—403/351—354 
145 There are two ways in which the special psychologies may be disvaluable to those who lack self-
respect and self-esteem. Lacking self-respect and self-esteem does not necessarily lead to the special 
psychologies and reactive attitudes being part of our good. Hence to act on them may bring even those who 
lack self-worth no benefit. Also, those who lack self-esteem and self-respect, and who do see the special 
psychologies as part of their good, may yet be led into disaster by following, or even just having, their 
begrudging feelings.  
146 TJ, p. 144/124—125, though the texts there talks as if the parties were the members of the well-
ordered society and already have self-esteem. This isn't quite the right way to put it, in light of the later 
modifications of the set up of the original position which I indicated in section 2 above. 
147 TJ, pp. 535—536/469. For Rawls's account of self-esteem, see pp440/386—387, and for the best 
account of self-respect, PL, pp. 318—319. Famously, A Theory of Justice does not distinguish between these 
two attitudes, as was observed in Thomas (1977—1978) and Sachs (1981). Recent discussions of Rawls's 
latter account of self-respect and self-esteem include Eyal (2005), Doppelt (2009), and Zink (2011). 
148 See TJ, pp. 144/124—125, 532/466, 534/468 
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society having self-esteem and self-respect comes from. In certain circumstances, it can be 
rational to act on special psychologies which are meant to be evidence for a lack of self-
esteem and self-respect. So having self-esteem or self-respect can't be something which is 
universally rational (given Rawls's account of rationality). It might be the case that the 
importance of self-respect and self-esteem can be established on the basis of an aspect of 
the freedom of persons. Part of being a free person, in the later philosophy, is said to be to 
conceive of oneself as a “self-authenticating [source] of valid claims.”149 But I can see 
possible problems with this as well. I shall simply assume that, for one who possesses a 
sense of self-worth, it is irrational to spite another's good. 
 Given this assumption about the parties, the argument for the principles of justice is 
then divided into two parts, as previously noted. On both the interpretations above, in the 
first part, the special psychologies are ignored. The parties compare the various reasons in 
favour of different principles of justice available to them. One set is chosen on the basis of 
the overall balance of those reasons.150 In the second part, the veil of ignorance regarding 
the special psychologies is lifted. The parties then consider whether the chosen conception 
of justice will be stable, in the light of what is known about the standing human disposition 
to express the special psychologies.  
 Also considered in the second part, specifically as regards the question of 
stability,151 is whether possession of a sense of justice is good for the individual in the 
well-ordered society. This is the question of congruence between the Right and the 
Good.152 I briefly introduce this issue here. The question of congruence is whether justice 
is a good thing for the Just: more precisely it is the question of whether there is congruence 
between the perspectives of the Right and the Good in the well-ordered society.153 Samuel 
Freeman sets up the problem this way: “There are two ideal perspectives in Rawls's 
[theory]: the original position and deliberative rationality. The former provides the 
foundation for judgements of justice [and right more generally]; the latter provides the 
basis for judgements regarding a person's good.”154 The perspective of the Right is 
modelled by the original position, and the perspective of the good is modelled by 
deliberative rationality (on this last idea, see subsection 8.1). If congruence obtains, then, 
from the perspective of deliberative rationality the possession of a sense of justice will be 
                                                          
149 PL, p. 32, JF, p. 23, CP, pp. 330—331 
150 TJ, pp. 121—125/105—108, /159, JF, p. 95. 
151 See TJ, pp. 567/497, JF, pp. 184 and 198 together, PL, p. 140 fn7. Of course, in what ways the well-
ordered society is good for an individual is of independent interest even apart from stability. 
152 See TJ, pp. 398—399/350, 513—514/450—451 
153 See TJ, pp. 397—399/349—350, 513—514/450—451, 567—568/496—497 
154 Freeman (2003) p. 284 
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recognised as a good. Rawls attempts to argue that congruence would indeed obtain in the 
well-ordered society.155 He does not investigate whether congruence obtains in any other 
circumstances. 
 
4.3 The two justificatory roles reintroduced 
 
 I will now reintroduce to the discussion the two roles of moral psychology in 
justification. This subsection will briefly recall the two ways in which moral psychology 
plays a justificatory role in contract theory.156  
 In contract theory, moral psychology has the role of showing how a certain 
conception of justice avoids futility because of the nature of the original position as a 
contractarian device. The choice in the original position is a collective agreement, and “for 
an agreement [in the original position] to be valid, the parties must be able to honour it 
under relevant and foreseeable circumstances. There must be rational assurance one can 
carry through.”157 The parties, being rationally self-interested, will simply not agree to 
principles when there is no prospect of stability. This follows from the finality condition 
(section 2). They are aware they are making the choice for the entirety of their 
representees' lives. When moral psychology plays this role, the concern is with certain (or 
near-certain) instability. 
 Moral psychology can also play an arbitrating role when all other considerations 
are tied. It may be that there are different conceptions of justice all of which are able to be 
stable under favourable conditions. It may be the case that the other considerations 
favouring them are roughly equal, or else there are good reasons on all sides and the choice 
is difficult to make. It may also be, however, that one of the conceptions is more likely to 
be stable than the others. Faced with such a choice, the parties would favour that 
conception.158  
 Note the relationship between the two roles. Moral psychology can first screen out 
                                                          
155 TJ, pp. 570—575/499—503 
156 At one point Rawls comments that “in assessing conceptions of justice the persons in the original 
position are to assume that the one they adopt will be strictly complied with” (TJ, p. 145/126). This may 
seem to tell against moral psychology being analysed to have the roles of futility-avoidance and arbitration. 
Perhaps moral psychology simply has a single, more demanding role — stability guaranteeing. However, this 
remark simply reflects that the parties are aware they are selecting principles for ideal (strict compliance) 
theory (see TJ, pp. 8—9/7—8, and see also subsection 15.5 D). They will choose these principles knowing 
that human nature is such as to have a sufficiently good chance of the members of the society following them, 
given favourable conditions. Hence, aside from psychological considerations and the influence of fortune, 
they simply assume they will be strictly complied with. This is confirmed by TJ, p. 245/215—216. See also 
JF, p. 88—89 which explicitly says that sufficient stability is what the parties aim for. 
157 TJ, p. 175/153. See also pp. 145/125—126, 176/153, and JF, p. 103 
158 TJ, p. 498/436 
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those principles certain to be unstable. It can then go on to indicate, of those remaining, 
how likely their prospects for stability are.159 
 
4.4 Initial employment of moral psychological considerations: Arguments from 
the strains of commitment  
 
 Let's turn to how moral psychology is first introduced in its two justificatory roles 
in the course of the original position argument. I begin with arguments which are 
principally found in §29 of Theory, but also elsewhere.160 This appears to be the first place 
in which psychological considerations play a role in the argument from the original 
position. But interpreting this section is extremely complex. I simply list some of the 
knotty aspects of Rawls's discussion here before moving on to discuss the central 
ambiguity or contradiction we are concerned with.  
 On both of the interpretations given in subsection 4.1, most of the arguments in 
section §29 are in the first part of the argument from the original position. But this is not 
the case for all (see the next subsection). It is difficult to discern what exactly ties the 
arguments together. Rawls simply entitles them “Some Main Grounds for the Two 
Principles of Justice”, and writes that they “employ the conditions of publicity and 
finality.”161 Some of them do not actually employ psychological considerations, but merely 
appeal directly to the fundamental interests of the representees of the parties.162 To clarify: 
                                                          
159 Two further questions exist regarding the two justificatory roles, which I shall not be addressing 
here. The first is whether the two roles can definitely be distinguished. It might be thought that they can be 
collapsed into each other, and represented by a single judgement as to the likelihood of a particular set of 
principles of justice being able to be the public conception of justice of a stable well-ordered society. I accept 
this may be possible, but I nevertheless think these two roles, and the judgements corresponding to them, 
should be kept distinguished. This is because a judgement that a conception of justice is futile automatically 
leads to the rejection of that conception of justice, but a judgement that it is less stable than another 
conception does not, necessarily. Judgements about futility are judgements about absolute stability, whereas 
arbitrating judgements are comparative judgements of relative stability. The second issue I shall not explore 
in depth is whether Rawls's way of making comparative stability judgements is actually well founded. I 
believe in fact his arguments against utilitarianism in this respect are weak. In addition, I believe that Rawls 
general approach to comparing the stability if different sets of principles of justice is largely misguided. Non-
futile sets of principles of justice are both quite general and quite abstract. They allow a wide range of 
different particular societies which could meet them. Considering the relative stability of sets of principles of 
justice is unlikely to come to many determinate results – at a high level of generality and abstraction, non-
futile principles can be quite flexible and are capable of being specified in quite pragmatic ways (see further 
subsection 5.2). Any well-founded approach to making comparative stability judgements would have to make 
use of much more extensive empirical data. For arguments similar to those I would make on this issue, see 
Labukt (2009). 
160 See also JF, p. 102—103, 124—130 
161 TJ, p. 175/153. See also p. /155 
162 See TJ,  pp. 155—158 regarding which conception of justice best supports self-respect and self-
esteem. It is argued that Justice as Fairness does, but that Utilitarianism does so less well. But some of these 
arguments seem to appeal to each representee's personal interest in self-respect and self-esteem. This is 
different from appealing to the possible consequences of a wider lack of self-esteem and self-respect, which 
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the use of moral psychology in the justification of a certain conception of justice relies 
upon indirectly supporting those interests, by (1) showing that the society is stable, and 
further (2) showing that a person could expect that they or others would be more likely to 
comply with that stable society's public conception of justice, with resulting benefits for 
securing the person's fundamental interests. 
 Putting aside the arguments which obviously directly appeal to supporting the 
fundamental interests, there are two arguments remaining in the passages I have cited. 
They are the strains of commitment argument,163 and an argument for the stability-
enhancing properties of self-respect and self-esteem.164 
 The strains of commitment argument raises difficulties on examination. I am unsure 
about is whether it is actually meant to be an argument which employs psychological 
considerations in either of the two roles. Aspects of how it is phrased suggest it may 
simply be an argument which appeals directly to the interests of the parties' representees.165 
Even leading this aside, there are other complications. Rather than tackle this topic here – 
which would require considerable space – I leave the matter for another time. Similar 
issues surround the arguments based on self-respect and self-esteem. 
 I bring up these initial arguments employing psychology (or potentially employing, 
for some of them) for two reasons. One is simply to indicate they are there at this place in 
the argument. I do not believe they are simply part of the later arguments concerning the 
relative stability of different societies — or if they are this is unobvious. Instead, I believe 
they are meant to stand on their own. Why this matter is at issue, and why it is tricky to 
determine, should become clearer after reading the next subsection. The second reason 
follows from one of the general aims of this chapter: to elaborating just how complicated 
the employment of psychology within the original position argument is, and how it has not 
been fully examined in previous work. Nor, admittedly, is it in this one. But at least the 
distance still to travel has been illustrated. 
 
4.5 The ambiguity or contradiction in the place of moral psychology in the 
original position argument  
 
 In this section I highlight the ambiguity or contradiction in Rawls's account of how 
                                                                                                                                                                                
might be expected to lead to some members of the society not being sufficiently motivated by their sense of 
justice. As I note below, these latter kinds of arguments may also be present, but I do not explore this further. 
163 TJ, pp. 175—176/153—154 
164 TJ, pp. 178—179/155—156 
165 The discussion of the argument in JF, pp. 102—103, 128—130 in particular seems to support this. 
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psychology enters into and plays its roles within the argument from the original position. I 
first highlight three questions Rawls answers in the course of the argument from the 
original position. I note that Rawls is either ambiguous or contradictory about which part 
of the argument the first two of these three questions are answered. As noted in subsection 
4.1 above, there are two interpretations of what Rawls is saying here. I provide the textual 
support for both of the interpretations. I respond to some possible ways one might hope to 
quickly resolve things in favour of one of these rival interpretations, including an 
interpretation put forward by Samuel Scheffler. Having satisfied myself that this is a 
genuine issue, I highlight the impact that both interpretations will have on the rest of the 
theory, and then briefly indicate the wider issues raised about the place of psychology in 
moral theories. 
 There are three different questions involved in the stability argument. The first is 
whether persons growing up in the well-ordered society of Justice as Fairness would 
acquire a sense of justice. The second is whether, on the basis of that sense of justice, 
Justice as Fairness would be likely to be comparatively more stable than a utilitarian 
society (or some other society) supported by that second society's own distinct sense of 
justice. Answering these two questions amounts to outlining the full moral psychology of 
Justice as Fairness and other rival moral conceptions (noting the specification I made about 
the use of the phrase “full moral psychology” in subsection 4.1). The third question is 
whether the well-ordered society of Justice as Fairness will sufficiently limit the influence 
of the special psychological attitudes, and be in sufficient accordance with each person's 
conception of the good, so as to maintain its stability. Rawls is either ambiguous or 
contradictory about whether the first and second of the questions given here are answered 
in the first or in the second part of the argument from the original position. 
 Here is the evidence for the second interpretation. That the full moral psychology 
of Justice as Fairness is worked out in the second part of the argument is suggested by its 
placing within Rawls's books. It is placed in chapters explicitly described as being 
concerned with that part of the argument.166 In Theory, for instance, that the comparisons 
between the psychology of Justice as Fairness and other psychologies come in the second 
half of the argument is supported by Rawls's bald statement, at the end of the section on 
relative stability, that “we are in the second part of the argument.”167 This fits with another 
statement, made towards the beginning of his chapter, that “this argument from stability is 
                                                          
166 This is particularly explicit in JF, pp. 88—89, 103 fn26, 132, and 180. See also TJ, p. 504/441 
167 TJ, p. 504/441 
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for the most part in addition to the reasons so far adduced.”168 He also writes, in the section 
on relative stability, seemingly referring to the comparison of stability he has just 
conducted, that these comparisons “are not intended as justifying reasons for the contract 
view” as “the main grounds for the principles of justice have already been presented.”169 
This confirms the idea that arbitration is not a concern in the second part of the argument. 
If it were, then the comparisons presented could count as justifying reasons. 
 It may perhaps be thought these last comments refer not to the general comparison 
between contractarian and utilitarian psychologies, but to some brief speculations about the 
evolutionary origin of the sense of justice presented over the preceding two paragraphs, 
which are inserted into the discussion.170 But he continues that 
 
At this point we are simply checking whether the conception already adopted 
is a feasible one and not so unstable that some other choice might be better. ... 
I do not contend then that justice as fairness is the most stable conception of 
justice. ... The conception agreed to need only be stable enough.171 
 
Regarding the current exegetical question, however, there is no indication that this 
“checking” is limited to the comments about evolution. I believe it makes most obvious 
sense to see these comments as referring to the whole section, and potentially even to the 
whole of the chapter. I note that these comments also support the account of the 
distribution of the roles of moral psychology in the argument I gave at the outset to 
subsection 4.1. For they suggest that the comparison between Justice as Fairness and 
Utilitarianism made here in §76 of Theory is simply concerned with checking whether the 
chosen conception avoids futility. The aim is not to arbitrate between them. 
 These various passages constitute evidence for Interpretation #2. However, in the 
very same section, before proceeding onto the comparison, Rawls tells me that “a decision 
in the original position depends on a comparison: other things equal, the preferred 
conception of justice is the most stable one.”172 This suggests we are actually in the first 
part of the argument, and that the first interpretation is correct. And the phrase “other 
things equal” suggests the use of psychology for arbitration. As has been said: in the first 
part of the argument from the original position, the parties select a set of principles from a 
variety of options on the basis of an overall balance of reasons. But comparison of the 
                                                          
168 TJ, p. 455/398—399. My emphasis. 
169 TJ, p. 504/441. My emphasis. 
170 TJ, pp. 502—504/440—441  
171 TJ, p.504/441 
172 TJ, p. 498/436 
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different moral psychologies of these conceptions obviously presupposes that the 
psychologies are already worked out. So the first and second questions above are 
seemingly both to be considered in the first part of the argument. Only issues regarding the 
special psychologies,173 and the congruence of good and justice, are left aside. In addition, 
let me repeat a line quoted just now, but now including an additional, parenthetical 
comment: “this argument from stability is for the most part in addition to the reasons so far 
adduced (except for considerations presented in §29)”.174 When we turn to §29, we find 
the arguments for the stability of Justice as Fairness, and against the stability of 
utilitarianism. To support this, we also get a reference to §76 — the discussion of relative 
stability. Hence, the arguments in the earlier passage rely upon the moral psychology of 
Justice as Fairness being worked out. All this constitutes evidence for Interpretation #1 — 
that the moral psychology is developed in the first half of the argument, and is employed in 
both of its roles.  
 One suggestion for how to resolve the issue may be to hold that, in some sense, the 
earlier discussion relies on a more limited selection of moral psychological considerations 
than the later one. We would then be able to say that the full account of moral psychology 
is developed in the second part of the argument, and a limited selection of psychological 
considerations are taken account of in the first part. This would allow us to hold 
interpretation #2. Rawls's general language, in the passages quoted, suggests that the later 
discussion adds more to the argument than the earlier one, and this may be an explanation 
why. However, it is very difficult to work out exactly what is to go into this thinner 
account, and what is not. I myself have considered the following possibilities: (1) that the 
earlier passages assume that the members in the well-ordered society already possess a 
sense of justice, and only consider the development of the sense of justice in the second 
                                                          
173 There do appear to be certain places in the argument where the exclusion of knowledge of the 
special psychologies appears to be forgotten. For example, at TJ, p. 179/156 Rawls remarks that one reason 
for preferring a conception of justice is that it will support our self esteem if publicly known and thereby help 
us to avoid self-contempt, as this “leads to contempt of others and threatens their good as much as envy does.”  
But that self-contempt can lead to this attitude towards others is an example of a special psychology, as, by 
necessity, it is irrational for one who esteems themselves (note that the parties can know to avoid self—
contempt, as they can view it as one of the states that can arise when one lacks self-esteem, and they know 
about and are moved to secure self-esteem). I do not explore this, but is suggests that Rawls's understanding 
of the structure of his argument is even more confused that might earlier have been thought. Another 
discussion which may be taken to indicate a wider inconsistency in the original position argument is that of 
whether excessive envy would occur in the well-ordered society of Justice as Fairness. The discussion makes 
reference to earlier “points in connection with stability”, and his references include the discussion of relative 
stability (TJ, p. 536). Is Rawls here relying on his arguments against the stability of Utilitarianism? But this 
shouldn't be right. We are not meant to be evaluating Justice as Fairness vrs. Utilitarianism at this point. We 
are simply meant to be evaluating whether the conception of justice already chosen – whichever it is – is 
threatened by the special psychologies. I think the overall discussion suggests that Rawls is not making this 
mistake. He is simply making use of earlier arguments that his principles of justice support the self-esteem of 
the members of a well-ordered society. 
174 TJ, p. 455/398—399. My emphasis. 
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part of the argument,175 or (2) that the moral psychological considerations employed in the  
earlier passages are somehow “intuitive”, and do not rely upon the fully worked out moral 
psychologies of Justice as Fairness and other conceptions.176 But neither of these – even 
taken together – explain all the aspects of the text. Obviously, another possible 
interpretation is that the earlier argument is simply a condensed summary of the later one. 
But this, then, fails to resolve our difficulty. As I have shown, the later discussion appears 
to say conflicting things about where it plays its role in the argument. Yet another 
interpretation would be that psychological considerations play no role in the selection of 
principles in the first part of the argument. But then, why does the reference to §76 appear 
in §29 at all then? This idea seems to run against what Rawls says about the set-up of the 
argument in the original position in general.177 
 Another suggestion of how to resolve this interpretative problem may be this. The 
parties have already chosen their principles, and the corresponding moral psychology has 
been developed. It appears stable. But to check its stability further, we substitute for the 
two principles of justice some other principle(s) — the principle of utility, say. If, given 
our psychology and its psychological principles, the alternative conception seems to be 
drastically more stable, then the parties may be led to consider whether they have made the 
correct choice in the first part of the argument. This is supported by Rawls's comment that 
we are to check whether “the conception already adopted is ... not so unstable that some 
other choice might be better.”178 It may seem that this procedure is what is occurring over 
the relevant section in Theory. If so, our issue is resolved on the side of the second 
interpretation.  
 This suggestion is problematic in two respects. The first is that I am not even sure if 
it is coherent. If Rawls has already ascertained that his chosen moral conception can be 
paired with a suitable moral psychology, and hence the resulting well-ordered society will 
be “stable enough,” why should seeing that pairing alternative principles with his moral 
psychology would be a lot more stable lead him to judge that our chosen moral conception 
is actually futile? He is, after all, just meant to have shown that it is not! Either Rawls is 
thinking about arbitrating between different conceptions of justice here – but then 
immediately rendering such a comparison irrelevant when he announces that a conception 
                                                          
175 This is suggested by elements of the strains of commitment argument (TJ, p. 175—177/153—154), 
which I earlier put aside.  
176 I thought of this out of sheer desperation to make sense of the fact that Rawls tells us that the 
account of the development of the sense of justice and stability will provide us with reasons “in addition to 
the reasons so far adduced.” (TJ, p. 455/398) 
177 See, in addition to material just quoted, TJ, pp. 144—145/124—126, 156/135 158—161/137—139.  
178 TJ, p. 504/441 
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of justice only needs to be stable enough – or else has misunderstood the relationship 
between ascertaining whether a conception avoids futility, and determining whether it is 
relatively more or less stable than other conceptions. This is more evidence that arbitration 
cannot play a justificatory role in the second part of the argument. In short, the statement 
quoted seems confused.179 
 The second point against the suggestion made above is that, Rawls does not 
proceed in his comparison of the respective stabilities of Justice as Fairness and 
Utilitarianism simply by importing the principle of utility into his developed moral 
psychology. Rather, he first makes the comparison by altering his moral psychological 
laws themselves – and hence his developed moral psychology itself —and linking those 
laws to alternative moral principles.180 Certain structural features do persist in these new 
psychological laws. They are still based on a general psychological tendency to reciprocate 
(see Appendix II). But changing these laws basically amounts to putting forward a new 
moral psychology to accompany a different conception of justice. This is because a moral 
psychology always presupposes a certain set of moral principles which are being tested for 
their realisability and stability (Subsection 5.2 will make clear why this is so). Rawls then 
also contrasts a utilitarian moral psychology based upon psychological tendencies of 
altruism with Justice as Fairness's moral psychology, itself based on psychological 
tendencies of reciprocity.181 This also amounts to putting forward a new moral psychology, 
linked to a different conception of justice and based on different psychological tendencies.  
 Both of these comparisons require that more than one moral psychology is being 
developed in order to conduct comparisons of stability between different conceptions of 
justice. If only one psychology was being developed, modified, and tested for stability, 
then we could say that the initial decision of the parties had already been made in the first 
part of the argument, and that it did not include the comparison of the relative stability of 
different conceptions of justice and their complementary moral psychologies. The second 
interpretation would then be correct. But in general, we cannot say that a moral psychology 
remains the same moral psychology, whilst changing the moral principles which the moral 
                                                          
179 In fact, the point generalises as regards using comparisons of relative stability to support the non-
futility of conceptions of justice in general. Relative stability comparisons appear to be irrelevant when we 
are simply considering whether a conception of justice is stable to some minimal degree. If this is correct, 
and if we decide on the second interpretation of the argument from the original position, then this means that 
the discussion of relative stability is actually redundant, and Rawls can dispense with it. This may seem to be 
evidence for the first interpretation. But it is not, as Rawls did not recognise that he has made the mistake I 
have described here. Hence, even though containing an error, his text may still yield both these 
interpretations. Of course, we will want to resolve things one way or another ourselves on reflection. This 
wider matter I consider at the end of the subsection. 
180 See TJ, pp. 499—500/437 
181 TJ, pp. 500—501/437—438 
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psychology embodies. This is despite the fact that several moral psychologies can be based 
upon the same general psychological tendencies (see appendix II). Hence to make a 
comparison of relative stability, different moral psychologies need to be developed. But if 
different psychologies are being developed, it hence again becomes ambiguous as to 
whether they are being developed in the first or second part of the argument. 
 I have so far given the evidence for this contradiction and ambiguity in Rawls from 
A Theory of Justice. The original position argument is given again in Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement. Are things decided one way or another there? Again, elements tell in both 
directions. In support of the first interpretation, arguments referring to the later moral 
psychology are again employed in the first part of the argument.182 These appear similar to 
the arguments given in §29 of Theory. Against this, the section on relative stability in 
Theory is again referred to. He remarks that these are passages he would “not change 
substantially” and that it is “essential to see [its] role in (the second part of) the argument 
of the principles of justice as a whole.”183 It is unclear whether he would reform them to 
remove the lines I quoted above, which give rise to the second interpretation. Certainly I 
think this would be a substantial revision, given what I have said. In addition, Rawls at 
several places refers to the question of stability of the well-ordered society of Justice as 
Fairness being taken up in the second half of the argument, in such a manner as to leave it 
ambiguous as to whether the development of the moral psychology of Justice as Fairness is 
being postponed till then, or that it is simply the examination of the strength of the sense of 
justice against the special psychologies which is to be postponed.184 This is the section of 
the book in which the moral psychology of Justice as Fairness is again presented.185 
 Samuel Scheffler has argued in favour of Interpretation #1, in the course of 
highlighting how Rawls's various appeals to stability might be seen as attempting to 
validate the parties' use of the maximin rule in the original position. Considering and 
comparing such features of the well-ordered societies of Justice as Fairness and 
Utilitarianism “help to show that the choice confronting the parties has features that make 
reliance on the maximin rule rational.”186 To do this, Scheffler claims, requires that the full 
psychological considerations are able to be employed in the first part of the argument. 
                                                          
182 JF, p. 102—103, 124—126, 127, 132 
183 JF, p. 196 fn17. Note that remarks on pp. 186—187 regarding §76 should not be taken to be 
repudiating that section in Theory. They are simply being given as evidence that Theory regarded Justice as 
Fairness as a comprehensive rather than as a political conception of justice. Certainly Rawls's later political 
liberalism should not necessarily rule out relative stability comparisons, providing that it is set up in the right 
way so as to be confined to the development of a political conception of justice. See further subsection 14.1. 
184 See JF, pp. 88, 103 fn26 
185 See JF, pp. 195—198 
186 Scheffler (2003) pp. 434—435. 
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Only by “anchoring the parties' unwillingness to accept the sacrifices associated with 
average utility in a carefully elaborated moral psychology and a developed account of how 
a workable and efficient set of social institutions could avoid such sacrifices”187 can the use 
of the maximin rule by the parties seem more rational. To sustain this reading however, it 
must be “misleading when Rawls [states], at the end of his discussion of relative stability 
in [§] 76”188 the various comments I earlier displayed in order to give evidence for the 
second interpretation, e.g. those on page 504/441 of Theory. 
 I can see the appeal of the reading of Theory given by Scheffler here. But the 
comments Rawls makes cannot simply be dismissed. They are not simply misleading, but 
are fundamentally in contradiction with the interpretation which Scheffler is trying to 
defend. It is not obvious that the disparity is resolved in later works. We need to resolve 
things in some fashion. But I shall observe shortly that there are things to be said in favour 
of both interpretations. In addition, however, I might note here that Scheffler's attempt to 
provide a better buttress for maximin reasoning in the parties might still find some support 
given Interpretation #2. I have already indicated that Rawls undoubtedly does, in some 
sense, appeal to psychological facts in the first part of the argument within the original 
position – though I have noted that I am unsure quite how. The argument for maximin in 
Justice as Fairness, though still ambiguous in the ways I've indicated, is still much clearer 
than in Theory, and admittedly draws on many sources.189 Rawls also makes ready use of 
facts about the institutions of the well-ordered society, as found in Part Two of Theory. 
These may support the use of maximin reasoning in themselves (though I wonder whether 
examining how they fit into the whole argument might not raise similar problems to the 
ones we are having here).190 
 I remark on a final appeal which might be made to try to resolve the matter quickly. 
In subsection 5.2 I shall observe that Rawls believes that developing a moral psychology 
presupposes the moral principles which are being tested for their realisability. It may be 
thought that this decides things in favour of the second interpretation. For if the parties are 
meant to choose the principles provisionally in the first half of the argument, but their 
choice depends on a fully developed moral psychology which relies on those very 
principles which they are going to choose, then it seems that the argument is circular. This 
is not a problem, because, on the first interpretation, the parties are capable, in the first half 
                                                          
187 Ibid. p. 436 
188 Ibid. p. 436 fn8 
189 For a summary of the reasoning for maximin, see JF, pp. 97—100. Note also the surprising passage 
on p. 99 which states that “it is not essential for the parties to use the maximin rule in the original position.” I 
do not consider here the explanation Rawls goes on to give here. 
190 For example, see TJ, pp. 156/135, 158—159/137 JF, pp. 99—100, 115—119 
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of the argument, of developing moral psychologies for each of the conceptions of justice 
they are considering, and then considering which conception of justice should be chosen. 
The development of a moral psychology for a set of principles does not presuppose that 
those principles are the ones that have been chosen, though Rawls sometimes writes so as 
to suggest this.191 Yet more evidence, then, that his understanding of the structure of his 
own theory on this point is weaker than could be desired.   
 Finally, before considering how this issue may be decided, I pick up on an issue left 
aside from the very beginning of the section up until now. I have consistently said that the 
aim of this section is to highlight a contradiction or ambiguity in Rawls's account of the 
placing of moral psychology within the argument from the original position. The reason I 
have put things this way is that, while I am fairly confident that what we are facing here is 
in fact an internal contradiction in Rawls's theory, I am not utterly certain. I can see various 
possible paths which might just be able to bring some kind of coherence to the whole of 
what Rawls is saying here. However, the task of checking such a reconstruction is beyond 
me at this moment. If it were to succeed, this would mean that Rawls's text is simply 
ambiguous, in a way that Rawls's actual thoughts on this matter may not have been. I admit 
that, from what is said here, it is a slim hope. But I leave the task up to some more 
committed Rawlsian than I. 
 This completes my account of the internal contradiction, or ambiguity (as some 
lucky Rawlsian workhorse may one day discover). As I have already mentioned, this issue 
regarding the design of the original position is of significance once raised. Comparison 
between the merits of different conceptions in the first part of the argument is what leads to 
the initial choice of the principles of justice. In the second part, as Rawls says, the goal is 
simply to check that the chosen principles are sufficiently stable. The basic grounds have 
already been presented.  
 What happens if we discover that a rival conception could be expected to be much 
more stable if we happen to compare its moral psychology with that of Justice as Fairness? 
It will depend on whether the development and comparison of moral psychologies is 
included within the first or second part of the argument. If this task is included within the 
first part (interpretation #1), then obviously the deliberations of the parties could be 
altered, and they may come to a different decision. If it is included in the second 
(interpretation #2), then the greater stability of that rival conception gives us no reason for 
the parties to revise their decision, providing that Justice as Fairness is stable enough. 
 Just what interpretation we side with will determine the precise importance of both 
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moral psychology, and Rawls's moral psychology, within the justification of Justice as 
Fairness. Similarly with any other view we try to examine through the original position. On 
interpretation #2, Rawls's moral psychology plays a lessened role in overall justification. It 
merely plays the role of avoiding futility. On interpretation #1, it in addition arbitrates. 
 Are there any grounds to resolve this issue, or discern which of these options Rawls 
would have preferred? I will not investigate the matter fully here. But I will note what 
seem to be the major considerations. First, let's remind ourselves of the perspective from 
which the inhabitants of the original position are viewing the world of their representees. 
The parties are assumed to know only that the circumstances of justice exist (discussed 
further in section 7), and the general, commonly accepted facts about human nature and 
societies (discussed further in section 9).192 In both cases they are motivated to find 
principles compatible with the ideal of persons as free, equal, rational and reasonable. 
 Given this aim and these perspectives, should extensive comparisons between the 
different full moral psychologies of alternative conceptions of justice be part of the parties' 
initial choice of the principles of justice? Or should only some more restricted moral 
psychological considerations, which perhaps assume a sense of justice in society (to try 
applying my ideas for interpreting Rawls from earlier), be brought to bear at this stage?  
 Against including the full comparisons in the first part of the argument is the idea 
that conceptions of justice should only be compared as regards how well they realise the 
ideal of a well-ordered society populated by free and equal, rational and reasonable people. 
If a conception of justice appears to meet this ideal adequately, given a specification made 
by reference to human nature (see subsections 5.2 and 9.2), and more so than others, then 
why extensively consider its stability comparatively? As noted, some limited moral 
psychological considerations could be made in the first part of the argument, and these 
could play an arbitrating as well as a futility-avoidance role. So to choose this option is not 
necessarily to reject comparing the stability of conceptions of justice altogether. The 
original position is not set up so as to pick the most stable conception at the cost of all 
other criteria. The selected conception need “only be stable enough.”193  
 In opposition to this, it may be that the conception chosen, though adequately likely 
to be stable, is actually, to some significant degree, less likely to be stable than some other 
conception which was selected against in the first part of the argument. Perhaps this 
alternative conception of justice which was knocked out because it gave an acceptable, but 
overall less agreeable specification of the fundamental interests of the representees of the 
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parties? The balance might have been shifted, however, if the full comparative stabilities of 
the two conceptions had been available for the parties to judge in the first part. 
 It should be noted that deciding this issue takes on yet more complication when we 
consider how we are to understand the parties employing their knowledge of human 
psychology. In Theory, Rawls stipulates that there are “no limitations” on the “general 
laws and theories” the parties have access to.194 But he also notes that as “a conception of 
justice is to be the public basis of the terms of social cooperation” it hence “seems 
reasonable to say that other things equal one conception of justice is to be preferred to 
another when it is founded on markedly simpler general facts, and its choice does not 
depend on elaborate calculations in the light of a vast array of theoretically defined 
possibilities.”195 In later work, this theme is developed: “the general beliefs of social theory 
and moral psychology relied on by the parties in order to rank conceptions of justice must 
be ... suitably common”196 only being those “familiar from common sense” including “the 
procedures and conclusions of science, when these are well established and not 
controversial.”197 This is all related to the publicity condition, and the idea of public 
reason,198 in liberal democracy (for more see section 11).  
 All in all, resolution is of obvious importance. On Rawls's theory, the outcome of 
the original position is meant to determine the principles of justice. The decision made 
reverberates throughout the theory. For example, what more precise way psychological 
stability considerations are allowed to be taken into consideration will alter how 
demanding those principles are to be.  The principles we derive also alter what count as 
ideal and what count as non-ideal situations and behaviour (see subsection 15.5 D). 
 This is enough to indicate that there is more to be said on these issues. Once the 
matter is more fully considered, we may find we do not want to side with either 
interpretation. Instead, we may wish to put forward a new version of the original position, 
or some similar device. But assuming that our new argument has a similar structure, the 
same issue will reappear. All that is required is that we believe that (1) principles of justice 
or right are to be derived from both moral presuppositions and psychological facts, (2) 
there are multiple possible sets of principles which meet the minimal criteria stemming 
from our fundamental moral ideas and psychological assumptions, and (3) given such 
minimal criteria, neither psychological feasibility considerations or moral considerations 
alone should then obviously determine the overall result of the derivation. 
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197 CP, p. 324. See also PL, pp. 67 and JF, pp. 89—90. 
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 This is an issue regarding which committed advocates of the original position (or 
something like it) must decide. It will most likely concern other contractualists. Similar 
issues might arise for ideal observer theories. Regarding the original position, several 
authors have attempted to argue that stability considerations are actually the key to 
understanding the force of Rawls's argument from the original position,199 or developing a 
more compelling one.200 Similarly, those who would criticise Rawls's arguments based on 
stability need to be clear on what positions are available to Rawls or a committed 
Rawlsian.201 And if one accepts that, on either interpretation, the arguments from the 
perspective of the original position against utilitarianism are sound, different conceptions 
of justice exist, waiting to step up onto the canvas.202  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Moral Psychology as Constitutive 
 
This chapter aims to assess the arguments of two writers who claim that Rawls's moral 
psychology plays a wider constitutive role in his theory than any of the interpretations 
canvassed in subsection 3.5 suggest. Section 5 comprises the whole of the chapter. After a 
                                                          
199 Scheffler (2003) pp. 434—436 I have already mentioned. See also, for example, Freeman (2007a) 
pp. 180—188, 195—197, (2007b) pp. 90—90, Pogge (2007) pp. 117—119, 137—138, and Zink (2011) 
200 For example, Okin (1989) pp. 238—249, which I view as a revisionary interpretation of the original 
position, against Okin herself (nothing hangs on this here). McClennen (1989) proposes dropping the original 
position in favour of Rawls's argument as it was originally proposed in “Justice as Fairness”, which he 
believes can be made to work on the basis of stability considerations. The question here would be: assuming 
this argument works as regards the general realisability of something like Rawlsian liberal egalitarian justice, 
how do we then arbitrate between the various compatible liberal egalitarianisms on offer, and what role will 
our initial argument from stability play in them? 
201 E.g. Labukt (2009) 
202 For example, Richardson (2006) employs the original position in an attempt to arbitrate between 
Rawls's principles, and use of a primary goods metric, and Martha Nussbaum's capacities metric, and 
accompanying principles for a basic social minimum. The outcome of any such venture, and our assessment 
of it, will obviously depend on how we set up the original position regarding the matter I have raised. 
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brief introduction, it critically appraises the exegeses of Rawls's work by two authors – 
Joseph Raz and Thomas Baldwin. 
 
Section 5: Constitution: Moral Psychology as Constitutive of Justice as 
Fairness 
 
 In subsection 3.5, I introduced the possibility that moral psychology plays a 
constitutive role in Rawls's theory. I noted that whether moral psychology does play a 
constitutive role is a complicated question. These and other issues relating to Rawls's meta-
ethics are important. But I shall not be investigating them here. My aim is to show that the 
claims of two writers regarding the status of moral psychology in Rawls's philosophy are 
incorrect. I believe it is perfectly possible for me to achieve this aim without resolving 
these further issues.  
 I claimed earlier that moral psychology may play a partially constitutive role in 
Rawls's theory. But several authors have argued that either that (1) moral psychology is 
constitutive of the entire theory, and Rawls's theory can perhaps be completely reduced 
down to psychology, or (2) if moral psychology cannot be constitutive of the entire theory, 
perhaps nevertheless the theory holds that morality is founded upon psychological facts. I 
shall not be discussing the work of all such writers here.203 Instead, I restrict my focus to 
two — Joseph Raz, and Thomas Baldwin. 
 In subsection 5.1, I argue that Joseph Raz's interpretation of Rawls's theory as 
representing “the internal constitution of our moral sense” rests on a misinterpretation of 
the commitments of the method of reflective equilibrium. Second, in subsection 5.2, 
Thomas Baldwin has argued for a decisive break between the earlier and later Rawls, such 
that his moral psychology plays a foundational, constitutive role in his later work. I hold 
that Baldwin has misunderstood admittedly difficult passages in Rawls about the 
relationship his theory holds to the human sciences.  
 
5.1 Raz on our moral sensibility as morality and the reflective equilibrium 
methodology 
 
 Our moral sensibility is a part of human nature. It could be further held that our 
moral sensibility is constitutive of morality — accounting for why morality is a feature of 
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our world. Raz, in effect, claims that this is Rawls's position. In claiming this, he 
misapplies the distinction I previously made in subsection 3.1 between our moral 
sensibility, and our moral psychology more generally. What Raz's claim should be is: 
Rawls's position is that our moral psychology is constitutive of morality. I will briefly 
outline what goes wrong in Raz's account in this regard. But my chief interest in Raz's 
claims doesn't come from this mistake, but from Raz's more general argument that Rawls 
holds that our moral sensibility is constitutive of morality. This, I hold, is a product of 
Raz's mistaken interpretation of the reflective equilibrium methodology. In Raz's hands, it 
may seem that this methodology commits us to moral psychology being constitutive of 
morality. But this is not the case, as I shall show. 
 I first take up the minor mistake about moral sensibility and moral psychology. I 
then follow on to the more serious mistake about the reflective equilibrium methodology. 
 Raz's article204 is concerned with the interpretation and critique of Rawls's 
reflective equilibrium methodology. In the course of finding the most charitable and 
philosophically strongest interpretation, Raz finally comes to interpret Rawls as holding 
that a theory of morality – as developed by the reflective equilibrium methodology – is a 
theory of “the internal constitution of the moral sense.” By internal constitution of the 
moral sense, Raz is clear that he means only part of what I have called moral sensibility, 
and certainly not what I have called moral psychology more generally.  
 We give an external account of our moral sensibility when we take a completely 
third personal stance on the attributes of that sensibility, and its development. When we 
give an internal account, by contrast, we are confined to an “insider's view”205 of our moral 
sensibility. We are to bring to mind, through personal reflection, our own considered 
judgements regarding a wide variety of moral theories, and examine the results obtained by 
others who have done the same. We do not need to consider entirely third-personal, 
psychological theories of how moral sensibility develops, is sustained, or is damaged or 
destroyed. Nor do we need to consider third-personal accounts of the behaviour associated 
with this sensibility – including both behaviour a person may be aware of themselves first-
personally, and behaviour they may not. Not only are theories of morality theories of the 
internal constitution of our moral sense, but morality is the internal constitution of our 
moral sense (I assume Raz isn't talking loosely when he says this). Morality is hence a set 
of judgements and beliefs, or other attitudes, as articulated and understood by the persons 
who have them, and does not include any psychological or biological explanations relating 
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to the formation of those beliefs or attitudes.206  
 Though Raz is right to emphasise that the final court of appeal in the reflective 
equilibrium methodology are our considered judgements, from our own perspective, on 
putative theories and principles,207 Rawls would not accept Raz's divide between the 
internal and external theories of our moral sensibility. For one, his considered judgements 
do not exclude judgements on findings from psychology and the other human sciences.208 
Furthermore Raz's distinction draws an excessively crisp line between the philosophical 
and psychological approaches to moral theorising. I indicated in the introduction that such 
an understanding of the two disciplines is out of favour in many circles. Whatever we may 
think of that trend, Rawls would have at least some sympathy with it. He thinks it is 
important to say something about how, for example, “one's experiences in infancy” relate 
to “one's views about authority.”209 But Raz places these firmly within external theories of 
our moral sensibility. Most charitably, we should amend Raz's view. I will now take him to 
say that Rawls's theory is that morality is constituted by our moral psychology as a whole. 
 But Raz's view of Rawls's understanding of the status of morality, of Rawls's 
methodology, and the relationship between the two, is inaccurate. Raz holds that Rawls's 
method of reflective equilibrium is best interpreted as committing him to the idea that 
morality is constituted by our moral psychology. But this rests on a faulty reconstruction. 
 That Rawls thinks this is suggested to Raz by the way Rawls begins his exposition 
of his method in Theory: 
 
Let us assume that each person beyond a certain age and possessed of the 
requisite intellectual capacity develops a sense of justice under normal social 
circumstances. We acquire a skill at judging things just and unjust, and in 
supporting these judgements by reasons. Moreover, we ordinarily have some 
desire to act in accord with these pronouncements and expect a similar desire 
on the part of others... 
 
Now one may think of moral philosophy ... as the attempt to describe our 
moral capacity; or, in the present case, one may regard a theory of justice as 
                                                          
206 Ibid. pp. 186—187 
207 See Scanlon (2003) p. 141—143, 147—149. To this conclusion, Scanlon's cites TJ, p. 46/41 ,49/, 
and CP, p. 288. But also see JF, pp. 31—32.  
208 Daniels (1979) pp. 22—26 and (1980) pp. 48—51 are accurate on this point. See TJ, p. 50—
51/44—45, 578—579/506—507 
209 Raz (2003a) p. 187 
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describing our sense of justice.210 
  
Raz cites the last sentence here as evidence, but quotes no further material at this point.211 
He thinks this is enough, as by this stage in the article, Raz has already presented three 
different interpretations of Rawls's view. He's found them all wanting philosophically. 
Hence, charitably, he's struck on this reading as the strongest. We need to look over what 
Raz has already written earlier in the article to understand why he was led to see the 
“internal constitution” interpretation as the only viable interpretation. 
 It is inessential for us to consider Raz's first two interpretations. They have obvious 
problems, and Raz is right to reject them. In addition, they have little connection to moral 
psychology in Rawls.212  Raz's third interpretation is that the method of reflective 
equilibrium is to be used as a heuristic tool to sharpen our understanding of the range and 
structure of people's considered moral conceptions. Reflective equilibrium involves the 
consideration of a wide number of different moral conceptions against one's own moral 
judgements (section 2). Rawls suggests in “The Independence of Moral Theory” that the 
resolution of various debates within metaethics regarding the ontological status and 
epistemology of morality could be illuminated by investigating the similarities and 
differences between different people's judgements on moral theories and conceptions when 
they have reached a state of (wide)213 reflective equilibrium. For example, Rawls holds that 
“it is natural to suppose that a necessary condition for objective moral truths is that there be 
a sufficient agreement between the moral conceptions affirmed in wide reflective 
equilibrium, a state reached when people's moral convictions satisfy certain conditions of 
rationality.”214  
 Raz stresses here the distinction Rawls makes between the task of trying to reach 
reflective equilibrium ourselves – and hence being reflectively settled (or as reflectively 
settled as possible) in our normative judgements – and adopting the role of “an observer, so 
to speak, who seeks to set out the structure of other people's [and our own] moral 
conceptions and attitudes.”215 In the latter “the procedure of reflective equilibrium does not 
                                                          
210 TJ, p. 46/41. My emphasis.  
211 See further Raz (2003a) p. 186 
212 See Raz (2003a) pp. 181—183 
213 Rawls distinguishes between wide and narrow reflective equilibrium at TJ, pp. 49—50/43, CP, p. 
289, JF, pp. 30—31, PL, p. 8 fn8. Narrow reflective equilibrium is achieved when we formulate principles 
which are in line with our considered moral judgements. Wide reflective equilibrium requires us to bring to 
bear a full range of moral conceptions and theories and the arguments and justifications for them against our 
considered judgement. Throughout the thesis, I have assumed the wide reflective equilibrium methodology 
whenever talking about judgement on due reflection. 
214 CP, p. 290. For further supporting considerations, see p. 287, and TJ, p. 51—52/45  
215 CP, p. 288. See Raz (2003a) p. 184—185 
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assume that there is one correct moral conception [to be found]. It is [then], if you wish, a 
kind of psychology and does not presuppose the existence of objective moral truths.”216 
These two different deployments217 of the reflective equilibrium methodology might be 
called the normative use and the psychological taxonomy use.218 They are employed for 
different goals. With the first use, we aim to develop our own normative outlook. With the 
second use, we investigate prospects for the resolution of various metaethical issues – such 
as the ontological status of morality, moral epistemology, the nature of moral reasoning, 
etc. – through an understanding of the diversity, or lack of diversity, between the 
conceptions people are willing to affirm on due reflection. Raz admits he doesn't really see 
how the latter idea might work.219 But in any case, when the reflective equilibrium method 
plays this second, heuristic role, it cannot simultaneously (Raz thinks) be concerned with 
the truth or correctness of the various positions assembled in its psychological 
taxonomy.220 
 What Raz thinks is needed for this method to get anywhere is to make the 
connection between the taxonomy of moral conceptions and the constitution of our moral 
psychology. For if we assume that morality is constituted by the moral psychologies of 
human beings, then “knowing the structure of moral systems which survive the test of 
reflective equilibrium, and knowing their number and degree of similarity, may help 
determine whether or not morality as a whole or any part of it is a biological species—
uniform phenomenon.”221 With this assumption, the methodology hence helps resolve at 
least one recognisable metaethical debate (objectivity vs. subjectivity) and also yields a 
normative theory or theories. Or at least it would do so if the assumption were sufficiently 
sound to yield these things. Raz thinks it is not.222  
 Raz's negative conclusion is not my concern. My objection to Raz is that his 
interpretation runs against the basic theme of the discussion of reflective equilibrium in 
“The Independence of Moral Theory” – a theme implicit, at least, in A Theory of Justice. 
This is that the reflective equilibrium methodology is a methodology. As the methodology 
it is, it aims to be non-committal between most of the different metaethical theories 
                                                          
216 CP, p. 289—290. Note, this is not to imply that the first use of the method presupposes the existence 
of objective moral truths. What determines a person's view on this matter when employing the method in its 
first use will simply be the judgement they themselves come to regarding the metaethical debate about the 
ontological status of morality. 
217 Neither writer is especially clear in specifying which use they are assuming as regards their 
particular discussions of the reflective equilibrium methodology. 
218 Scanlon (2003) calls them the “deliberative” role and “descriptive” role respectively. See pages 
cited in fn4 above. 
219 Raz (2003a) p. 184 
220 Ibid. p. 185—186 
221 Ibid. p. 186 
222 Ibid. p. 189—196 
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regarding morality. If this is true, then it cannot be that any of the particular metaethical 
theories is presumed by Rawls with the reflective equilibrium methodology. 
 Various comments from Rawls support the idea that the method of reflective 
equilibrium is meant to be simply a methodology. As seen, in one role it can be employed 
on the assumption that we are not yet in a position to resolve various metaethical debates 
by focusing solely on metaethics. It is often overlooked that Rawls's view in “The 
Independence of Moral Theory” is not that we should all stop doing metaethics, but that we 
should consider the possibility that progress in certain areas may be predicated on 
advances in normative ethics.223 Few results in either normative theory or metaethics are 
ruled out, even ones in contradiction to Rawls's own considered views: “one's moral 
conception may turn out to be based on self-evident first principles.”224 But this could only 
be the case if the reflective equilibrium methodology was a methodology for approaching 
both ethics and metaethics. 
 The passages cited up to now may all be interpreted likewise. For instance, the 
longer, indented quotation from A Theory of Justice says that moral philosophy starts from 
the description of our moral sensibility. But this is perfectly compatible with arriving at 
either realism or anti-realism, or a subjectivist or objectivist etc. metaethic.225 The 
statement that agreement in ideal wide reflective equilibrium seems a natural requirement 
for objectivity similarly decides nothing as regards the realism/anti-realism debate, 
amongst others.226 
 Raz's mistake is perhaps to have been too charitable, by his own lights. He 
indicates that he takes “the internal constitution of our moral sense” reading to be the more 
promising philosophically. But this is simply not Rawls's view. Rawls genuinely did think 
that developing comparative moral theory using the method of wide reflective equilibrium 
                                                          
223 CP, p. 302 
224 CP, p. 289. Such a position contradicts TJ, p. 159—160/137—138, 578/506, which should be taken 
as Rawls's considered view, not presuppositions of his methodology. 
225 For references to material explaining these terms, see Appendix I. 
226 Scanlon's account of reflective equilibrium may also attribute false metaethical presuppositions to 
the reflective equilibrium methodology. He is careful to observe that the reflective equilibrium method does 
not presuppose a resolution to whether morality is objective or subjective: Scanlon (2003) pp. 145—146, 153. 
But he also states that “Rawls holds that ... considered judgements about morality and justice need not, in 
order to have the importance claimed for them, but the results of our causal interaction with independently 
existing moral properties or entities” (p. 146). He is correct that Rawls's constructivism commits him to this 
view (see Appendix I). But, on my reading, the method of reflective equilibrium should not presuppose 
constructivism or any similar kind of anti—realism, or even the kind of quietism which Scanlon himself 
seems to favour (See Scanlon (1998) pp. 55—56, 59—64 . For emphasising that Scanlon can be read as some 
kind of quietist, I am indebted to an excellent keynote talk, “Scottish Constructivism”, given by Andrea 
Sangiovanni at the Brave New World graduate conference in 2011). Rather it may lead to any of these, but 
may also lead us to view our considered judgements as the product of causal interaction with independently 
existing objects. I note that Scanlon's discussion leaves it ambiguous as to whether he sees Rawls's 
constructivist commitment as interior or exterior to the method of reflective equilibrium. 
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could help to resolve long-standing metaethical issues. But it does not seem that Raz really 
takes this seriously. He writes that the heuristic use of the method has “little or no value in 
validating any moral view” seemingly because it makes so few assumptions about what is 
to count as validating a moral conception.227 From a psychological taxonomy of moral 
conceptions by itself, he believes, we get can get nothing normative. Rawls agrees, and 
Raz indicates that he knows Rawls agrees.228 But Raz does not appear to take at all 
seriously the possibility that the development of a wide reflective equilibrium in moral 
theory, even in this austerely psychological manner, may indicate 229 which direction to 
take in resolving epistemological and ontological issues, given the results in the 
metaethical debate so far. Or more importantly, Raz does not appear to take seriously the 
fact that this is what Rawls thought — for better or worse. Raz hence looked around for 
some further foundations or assumptions in the background which were to do the work of 
grounding the whole methodology. But there simply weren't any in place. Nor should there 
need to be any at the strictly methodological level of reflective equilibrium. Your general 
methodology in moral philosophy may urge you to resolve metaethical matters first, or 
normative matters first, or, as Rawls's does, to suspend judgement to some extent on both. 
But if it presupposes a solution to such topics, then it is at the very least a less—than—
general methodology.230 
 Here are some final comments on this discussion. First, my arguments here address 
only one aspect of Raz's assessment of Rawls's methodology. I do not take myself to have 
addressed the many criticisms which Raz raises against that methodology, at least not 
directly. Nor have I commented on why Raz's own methodology, so far as I understand it, 
may have led him to take the approach to Rawls that he did, nor the value of this 
alternative methodology.231 But in summary, Raz's account of “The Claims of Reflective 
Equilibrium” (the title of Raz's article) postulates at least one mis-ascribed claim. The final 
claim Raz identifies – that the method of reflective equilibrium reveals the structure of our 
moral psychology, and hence the constitution of morality – is at odds with the aims the 
reflective equilibrium approach must keep to in order to remain a methodology. 
                                                          
227 So I interpret Raz (2003a) pp. 185—186 
228 Raz (2003a) p. 184 
229 Rawls never implied anything more than this. See CP, p. 302 
230 This is not to say that your methodology can make no presuppositions at all. Methodologies I 
understand to be something like your basic philosophical orientation combined with your basic philosophical 
tool-kit. One of the problems I have heard raised about Scanlon's interpretation of reflective equilibrium is 
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Rawls's methodology (which I interpret differently from Scanlon) though somewhat more robust, is still too 
empty. But this is a worry for another time and place. 
231 In the Raz article discussed, I think comments on pp. 181, 188, and 193, which essentially cast 
doubt on the possibility of morality having the shape of a moral theory such as Rawls's, are particularly 
characteristic of Raz. See further general themes throughout Raz (1984).  
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5.2 Baldwin on Rawls's two accounts of moral psychology 
 
 Thomas Balwin's recent article “Rawls and Moral Psychology” attempts to develop 
an account of the changing role of moral psychology throughout Rawls's work. Whilst I 
have argued that the psychology plays multiple roles, Baldwin's ultimate conclusion is that 
the later Rawls holds moral psychology to be “foundational”232 to his theory. This is not 
quite to make moral psychology constitutive of Rawls's theory. But it is to make it 
fundamental. I contend that this claim rests on a series of subtle misreadings of Rawls's 
work. What Baldwin describes Rawls as describing as his moral psychology in his later 
work is actually just his normative conception of the person. Rawls in fact uses the term 
“moral psychology” in roughly the same way throughout his work. Baldwin's claim that 
moral psychology plays a foundational role rests on a misunderstanding of just what is and 
isn't that psychology. I first recount Baldwin's interpretation below. Following this, to 
prepare to answer Baldwin's interpretation, I highlight six ways in which conceptions of 
justice and the discipline of psychology interact in Rawls. I then move on to argue against 
Baldwin's position. 
 I have said that Baldwin takes the earlier Rawls and the later Rawls to mean 
something quite different by the phrase “moral psychology”. But this is not quite precise 
enough. More accurately, the alteration, which is especially prominent in Political 
Liberalism, is traced back to “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory”.233 So the 
distinction is really between the majority of what I have called the early Rawls, and the end 
of that earlier period together with the later period. 
 The earlier sense of moral psychology is said to be exemplified by the account in A 
Theory of Justice. Moral psychology is “the psychology of the moral sentiments, [dealing] 
with an aspect of the normal development of human beings, and therefore belongs within a 
comprehensive account of human psychology.”234 This psychology is, admittedly, 
introduced to the theory “specifically in order to help with the problem of stability.”235 But 
Baldwin further claims that for Rawls “our psychology itself is affected by the moral value 
of the context in which we grow up and live”236 such that “the development of the moral 
sentiments is contingent upon the moral character of [our society].” However, a “complete 
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234 Baldwin (2008) p. 249. See also p. 252. To this conclusion he cites TJ, pp. 489—490/428—429, and 
§74 in general. 
235 Baldwin (2008) p. 251 
236 Baldwin (2008) p. 248. He cites TJ, pp. 491—492/430—431 
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understanding of human life ... has to make room for our moral sentiments. ... Hence 
Rawls's early work encourages the prospect of a unified explanatory approach to human 
psychology which embraces both natural and moral psychology.”237 Rawls's early 
approach offers the prospect of seeing moral psychology as a branch of psychology in 
general, whilst maintaining that even if “understood only as part of the psychological 
theory” moral psychology must make reference to “moral notions”.238  
 The later Rawls of Political Liberalism, by contrast, uses “the expression 'moral 
psychology' in a rather different way from that in which he had used it in TJ, as a way of 
capturing 'a certain political conception of the person and an ideal of citizenship'.”239 To 
argue for this, Baldwin cites a passage in which Rawls talks of the moral psychology being 
“drawn from the political conception of Justice as Fairness” rather than “originating” from 
“the science of human nature.”240 Baldwin holds that “largely similar accounts of the 
conception of the person” are found in “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory”. So the 
shift is not restricted to Rawls's political liberalism. He recognises that this earlier article 
“does not make much use of the phrase 'moral psychology' to describe this conception of a 
person” but that “the phrase does occur at least once with this use.”241 In Political 
Liberalism it is “routinely”242 described as such. Such a moral psychology is meant to 
capture a conception of the person which is furthermore “central to moral and political 
theory.”243 On this understanding, moral psychology plays a “foundational role”244 and is 
hence a “philosophical moral psychology.”245 Rawls wishes to put distance between “the 
[philosophical] psychological assumptions inherent in his moral philosophy”, and “natural 
psychology, the empirical science of human nature.”246 The “prospect for a unitary ... 
human psychology which embraces both natural and moral psychology” from the early 
Rawls is hence “not sustained.”247 
 Against Baldwin's claim, I hold that Rawls's moral psychology is roughly the same 
thing throughout his career. It is a moral psychology developed to complement his 
conception of justice. In the earlier philosophy, though it is informed by empirical 
psychology in general and potentially may be included within it, the moral psychology is 
                                                          
237 Baldwin (2008) p. 252 
238 TJ, p. 491/430, cited at Baldwin (2008) p. 248 
239 See Baldwin (2008) p. 249, quoting PL, p. 87 
240 PL, p. 86 
241 Baldwin (2008) p. 249. The “use” referred to is at CP, p. 346 
242 Baldwin (2008) p. 249 
243 Ibid. p. 250 
244 Ibid. p. 251 
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first and foremost a part of a moral theory. In the later philosophy, things are the same (see 
further section 13). The moral psychology is never the same thing as the conception of the 
person, contrary to Baldwin's reading.  
 I have two tasks. I need to argue against Baldwin, as he's in error, regrettably. But 
Baldwin's mistaken exegesis is such as to leave it open whether the position he rejects is 
correct. So I need to argue for this reading on its own grounds. I start with this second task. 
I shall illustrate that my own reading is correct for the earlier philosophy. I shall then move 
on to show the same for the later philosophy. Together, these two discussions will show 
the continuity in what Rawls means by “moral psychology.” I will then show how Baldwin 
has misread the material. 
 Again, before setting out on this discussion, I attempt to bring some kind of 
direction to the proceedings. I here outline six respects in which moral conceptions can 
interact with empirical psychology to develop their respective moral psychologies. Where 
these six connections can be seen in Rawls work will be indicated throughout the following 
discussion, rather than here. 
 
#1 Human psychology permits but doesn't dictate moral conceptions: As Rawls writes 
“human nature and its natural psychology are permissive: they limit the viable conceptions 
of persons and ideals, and the moral psychologies that may support them, but do not dictate 
the ones we must adopt.”248 Human psychology on the whole allows the moral 
psychologies corresponding to a number of moral conceptions to be realised. 
 
#2 Empirical psychology helps specify conceptions and principles: empirical psychology 
plays a part in the task of specifying and developing our moral conceptions and our 
understanding of the associated principles. 
 
#3 Moral psychologies can under-specify the relevant empirical psychology: It is 
permissible for a moral psychology, when included within a moral theory and hence 
playing the role of complementing and supporting a certain moral conception, to 
incorporate less detail and exactness than is required in psychological science. 
 
#4 Moral psychologies can optimistically interpret empirical psychology: To some extent, 
where there is some doubt over empirical psychological results (or even common sense 
observations) with intuitively pessimistic ramifications, when developing moral 
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psychologies which are to complement our moral conceptions, we can interpret such data 
optimistically, or bracket them, so long as we can give an argument as to why they might 
be eliminated or mitigated in more ideal social conditions, or indicate that the pessimistic 
reading of the data might be a misreading or else is not conclusive. 
 
#5 Empirical moral psychology ultimately depends on moral theory: After some point, 
progress in general empirical moral psychology depends upon progress in moral theory in 
general, through the laying out of the deep structure of the various moral conceptions that 
are recognisable in people's moral sensibilities 
 
#6 Moral psychology is non-reducible to non-moral empirical psychology: Moral 
psychology makes use of moral concepts which cannot be reduced to non-moral ones. This 
is the case for moral psychology as found within moral theory, and as found within 
psychological theory.249  
 
I now outline my general reading of Rawls's early philosophy. I shall first return to the 
earliest discussion of moral psychology – “The Sense of Justice.” In A Theory of Justice, 
the emphasis shifts, and more detail is added. 
 I noted in section 1 that in “The Sense of Justice”, Rawls stipulates that the 
psychology he puts forward is “purely hypothetical.” He does not “claim that it represents 
what actually takes place.” His aim instead was merely for it to be “reasonably plausible 
and to include in it only those psychological principles which are compatible with our 
conception of ourselves as moral beings.”250 Of the six connections that exist between 
empirical psychology and moral conceptions, concern with #2 and #3 is manifestly present. 
The moral psychology is developed in order to help address two philosophical or at least 
partially psychological questions: what criteria determine the scope of justice, and why are 
people moved to act justly?251 In answering these questions, the moral psychology is being 
used to specify aspects of a prior conception of justice — the structure of the article, and its 
relation to the earlier “Justice as Fairness” bear this out. That the psychology is put forward 
only as reasonably plausible, and most likely idealised, indicates it is knowingly 
underspecified when contrasted to the requirements of empirical psychological science. 
 I've here employed the notion of specifying a conception. This idea was referred to 
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in section 2. This, and the notion of under-specification, will perhaps be unfamiliar, so they 
need to be explained. When we specify an idea or conception, we take an idea which is to 
some extent vague, imprecise, or abstract to begin with, and look for ways in which to 
sharpen it and make it more precise. Rawls is obviously aware of the idea, and incorporates 
it into his understanding of rational deliberation.252 This sharpening need not proceed 
entirely a priori, but can attempt to appeal to a wide range of concrete empirical examples 
and theory, and personal experience. It need not be assumed that specification involves the 
uncovering of existing but hidden sharpness, determinacy or a more precise shape of the 
concept or idea we are considering: this is a substantive and contestable issue regarding 
specification, conceptual analysis, and the relationship and distinction between the two. 
The topic relates to the concept/conception distinction discussed in section 2 and 
subsection 3.3. But it is distinct. Conceptions might be considered to be specifications of 
concepts. But conceptions themselves can also be further specified – this occurs, for 
instance, with Rawls's conception of the person (see below, and also sections 8 and 9). In 
general, I believe this notion fits well with the approach Rawls appears to advocate for the 
development and justification of moral conceptions. 
 To give an example of specification, suppose I am committed to promoting 
international justice, most particularly, for whatever reason, as regards Africa. Let's assume 
this is expressed by a general principle “Promote Justice for Africa.” I at first apply this 
principle whenever I vaguely hear of anything which intuitively sounds like it might help 
Africans. So I give money to aid charities when I receive flyers showing starving African 
children, I sign petitions to have past colonial crimes recognised, I buy music by African 
artists, etc. I see all of this as supporting the nebulous aim “Promoting Justice for African.” 
One day, however, I hear a African-American talking about how he believes it is 
demeaning that justice for Africa is always promoted by means of showing pictures of 
starving African children – as if the adults in Africa weren't important as well, and what's 
more, were simply charity cases. I realise that my previous actions may not have all 
actually been pursuing my stated aim. Maybe working out how to “Promote Justice for 
Africa” is actually quite a tricky task. I hence begin to gather more factual data, to learn 
African history, to try to discern which charities or campaigning organisations are actually 
the most effective, and are the most compatible with showing the people I wish to help 
proper dignity. I still subscribe to my original principle. But it is now in a much more 
highly specified form, and its content will have become more fine-grained than it once was. 
  Under-specification, by contrast, proceeds in the opposite direction. We remove 
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precise detail from a quite determinate conception or theory to leave only enough as to 
meet our needs, or else deliberately cease to incorporate further empirical information 
beyond a certain point. Abstraction is a form of under-specification on this understanding. 
These two activities can both be employed in developing the same theory. One 
hypothetical route Rawls may have taken to develop his theory, we might think, was to 
begin by abstracting from our political culture and tradition to find its fundamental 
normative ideas, and then attempt to specify these ideas in a theoretical and systematic 
way.253  
 To return to picking out the relations between empirical psychology and normative 
conceptions in Rawls's work, in A Theory of Justice, Rawls's account incorporates all six 
relations outlined earlier. He writes that he “want[s] the psychological account of moral 
learning to be true and in accordance with existing knowledge.”254 The later account in 
Theory appears to be more concerned with the strictly empirical psychological truth of the 
moral psychology than the earlier account. This is born out by the richer references to 
empirical psychology found in Theory.255 Such a concern is more important, once we see 
the success of our overall theory as more heavily reliant on the defence of stability. Hence, 
this account is concerned with #1.  
 The added detail also plays its role in specifying the conception of justice Rawls is 
developing (#2). As should be clear from the accounts of justification in section 2, 
subsection 3.3 and section 4, developing a moral psychology which complements a 
conception of justice is essential. Such justification also leads to the specification of a 
conception of justice in the light of facts about human nature. Such a specification will 
encompass the fundamental moral conceptions, and illustrate how they will be 
psychologically embodied (see further subsection 9.2). The principles of justice and right 
in general are also further specified.256 
 As in “The Sense of Justice”, in A Theory of Justice Rawls indicates that the moral 
psychology does not have to meet all the standards of empirical psychology to do its work: 
                                                          
253 For this understanding of specification, I am indebted to Richardson (1994) esp. chapter IV. 
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254 TJ, p. 462/404 
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11. I do not enter into these complexities here. 
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it can under-specify (#3). 
 
It is impossible to take [all] the [empirical psychological] details into account; 
I sketch at best only the main outlines. One must keep in mind that the purpose 
of the following discussion is to examine the question of stability and to 
contrast the psychological roots of the various conceptions of justice. ... Unless 
the psychological account is defective in some way that would call into 
question the acknowledgement of the principles of justice rather than the 
standard of utility, say, no irreparable difficulty should ensue. I ... hope that 
none of the ... uses of psychological theory will prove too wide of the 
mark.”257  
 
There are multiple points within the account which indicate the tactic of optimistically 
interpreting human nature (#4). See, for example, comments regarding Freud's theory of 
moral development, both in the account of the development of the sense of justice,258 and 
in the discussion of the special psychologies.259 I leave aside further comment on this 
theme till section 7. 
 Theory also argues that moral psychology, even when considered as a part of 
empirical science, ultimately depends on Moral Theory, and the systematic articulation of 
our moral conceptions (#5).260 This is a serious claim, not least because it is more 
obviously directed at empirical moral psychologists than moral philosophers. I believe that 
the full implications of this idea may not yet have been fully worked out, though good 
headway has been made by those empirical psychologists and empirically minded 
philosophers who are broadly sympathetic to Rawls's conception of the relationship 
between moral theory and empirical psychology.261 But this topic is too far removed from 
the interests of this thesis. From #5 follows the weaker commitment, #6. Rawls highlights 
his non-reductionism later in the book, and sees the progress made in developing a 
substantive theory of justice as his best evidence for it.262 
 In summary, the early Rawls's moral psychology is developed primarily to 
complement his conception of justice. This does not prevent it from being incorporated 
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into empirical moral psychology in general, however, and it is not framed to prevent this. 
 All this is roughly compatible with what Baldwin says about moral psychology in 
the early Rawls in ways I will not outline. I warn anyone looking over this material that 
Baldwin is tremendously imprecise in the way he uses the term “psychology”.263 He does 
not clearly distinguish between human psychology, moral psychology, moral sensibility, 
and the psychology of moral development as I have done. 
 I now move on to moral psychology in the later Rawls (including “Kantian 
Constructivism in Moral Theory”). The same six interactions between empirical 
psychology and moral theory are again admissible. 
 I have already quoted relevant material supporting #1 when I stated #1 initially. #6 
is affirmed in the same discussion: Rawls's comment that as a “normative scheme of 
thought”, Justice as Fairness “is not analyzable in terms of ... say, the family of 
psychological and biological concepts”264 is perfectly general, and should not be read so as 
to be restricted to Justice as Fairness as a political conception. Rawls's presentations of his 
moral psychology in his later work are much briefer than that in A Theory of Justice, so 
under-specification by the lights of empirical psychology is still obviously fine (#3).265 
What I have called Rawls's optimistic approach to interpreting psychological data (#4) 
specifically as regards political liberalism will not be discussed in this thesis. But it is 
undoubtedly present.266 
 #2 is the idea that empirical psychology plays a role in specifying our moral 
conceptions. Rawls remarks in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement that he would not 
“change ... substantially” much of the moral psychology developed in A Theory of 
Justice.267 The permissibility of the use of empirical psychology is complicated in the later 
philosophy by the strengthened requirements of public justification (section 12, subsection 
13.2). But I believe it can still be employed. Hence empirical psychology can still be seen 
to be helping to specify moral conceptions in the later philosophy (subsection 13.1). 
 On the idea of #6 – the thought that much progress in empirical moral psychology 
depends upon our systematic understanding of the various moral conceptions – there is not 
much indication of Rawls himself developing this line of thought. The idea may be 
excluded from political liberalism, given certain facts about the public culture of the well-
ordered society in question (see further subsection 13.2). But the requirements of political 
                                                          
263 For example, see the use over Baldwin (2008) p. 248—249 
264 PL, pp. 87—88 
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liberalism do not impact on the question of whether this idea can be part of Rawls's later 
philosophy — understood to be wider than Justice as Fairness developed as a political 
conception.268 For this claim is primarily addressed not to the reasonable citizens of a 
liberal democracy, but to academic psychologists. It urges them to pay more attention to 
moral theories, and their structural features and differences – or perhaps better, to 
collaborate with philosophers in doing this.  
 I hence hold that there is, at least, much continuity, from A Theory of Justice 
onwards, between Rawls's understanding of what ways empirical philosophy can interact 
with our moral conceptions, in the development of moral psychologies which are to play 
their various possible roles in moral theories. 
 We can now examine Baldwin's claims for a discontinuity in Rawls's earlier and 
later use of the term “moral psychology”. First, Baldwin's text is ambiguous between 
whether he thinks that the later Rawls presents a moral psychology which is to accompany 
his normative conception of the person, or whether he thinks that in the later Rawls the 
normative conception is the moral psychology. The first reading is supported by Baldwin 
talking, in the passages quoted above, of the moral psychology “capturing” the conception 
of the person.269 If this is his reading, then he and I have no disagreement, because Rawls 
(both early and late) does present a moral psychology to accompany and help specify, and 
so “capture” his conception of the person. However, this interpretation would not sustain 
the distinction Baldwin draws between the earlier, merely “stabilising” role of the moral 
psychology and the later “foundational” role in any way he wants. 
 Overall, Baldwin's article reads as if he means to identify the conception of the 
person with the moral psychology, or at the very least that he hasn't recognised the 
difference between a normative conception being a psychology, and a psychology being 
developed to accompany a conception. Once this distinction is made, it seems very clear 
that the conception and the psychology must be two different things. A normative 
conception is a body of beliefs or propositions which carry normative content. To go into 
the possible ontology of concepts and conceptions would be a distraction here. But 
whatever we say, a normative conception will undoubtedly be a different thing than a 
psychological conception, simply in virtue of the fact that one concerns what is normative 
(properties, mental states etc.) and the other concerns what is psychological. The only way 
to deny this would be to hold that the normative is reducible to the psychological. I have 
already observed that Rawls denies this is the case, and Baldwin is sympathetic with this 
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position.270 
 How does Baldwin come to this mistaken interpretation? The problems start in his 
reading of §II:8 of Political Liberalism. His basic mistake is to fail to distinguish between 
the elements of Rawls's position which follow from his political liberalism, and those 
others which follow from his more general philosophy. Baldwin observes the title of the 
section – “Moral Psychology: Philosophical not Psychological” – and quotes the following 
passage 
 
This completes our sketch of the moral psychology of the person. I stress that 
it is a moral psychology drawn from the political conception of justice as 
fairness. It is not a psychology originating in the science of human nature but 
rather a scheme of concepts and principles for expressing a certain political 
conception of the person and an ideal of citizenship271  
 
Baldwin reads this to mean that the moral psychology is (now) a scheme of normative 
concepts and principles relating to the conception of the person. But the moral psychology 
should rather be understood to be a scheme of psychological concepts and principles which 
are used to accompany (“express”) a political (normative) conception of the person. As I 
have illustrated, Rawls believes that to be justified, any normative conception needs to be 
accompanied by a moral psychology which defends the realisability and stability of that 
conception. But this psychology is not the same as the normative scheme which it is 
employed to defend (see earlier comments in subsection 3.5). 
 What is confusing matters here is political liberalism. As will be outlined in chapter 
5, any aspect of a politically liberal conception of justice needs to be drawn solely from the 
public culture of a well-ordered (or near well-ordered) liberal democracy. This is what 
prevents such a political conception's moral conception from being drawn from the science 
of human nature in general. Not all aspects of psychological science are admissible in the 
public culture (see subsection 13.2). Hence, not all aspects of psychological science can be 
used in developing a moral psychology to accompany the normative conceptions and 
principles of a political conception of justice. 
 Note that, putting aside such a restriction, there is still a sense in which a moral 
psychology designed to accompany and defend a certain conception of the person can be 
said to be “drawn” from that conception and not the science of human nature. But this is 
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for the now familiar reason that such a psychology is to be part of a moral theory, and as 
part of a moral theory, it can be under-specified by the demands of a full psychological 
theory (#3). The same psychological claims which make up such a “philosophical” moral 
psychology can be included within an empirical moral psychology. Indeed, they can be 
even when those psychological claims are part of a political conception. But what cannot 
occur is that psychological claims which are outside the bounds of public reason are 
included within the moral psychology of a political conception of justice, which must be 
necessarily formed within the bounds of public reason (for these ideas, see subsections 11, 
12.1 and 13.2) 
 Baldwin also claims that “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory” can be read to 
identify the conception of the person and the moral psychology. But the one use in the text 
of the term “moral psychology” can only be read in his way if you are already trying to 
force that reading. 
 
A more complex conception of the person ... together with a suitable moral 
psychology, is simply unnecessary.272  
 
The “together” here is enough to indicate that the conception and the psychology are 
different things, as Baldwin seems to, inconsistently, realise. As for Rawls “routinely” 
describing his conception of the person as a moral psychology in Political Liberalism, I 
simply deny that this is the case. Even if it at times appears that he does – and I've not 
found any clear examples – it should now be clear why this would be mistaken on general 
philosophical grounds, and on the whole an uncharitable reading. 
 Baldwin has one direct argument for his interpretation 
 
An easy way to bring out the difference [between moral psychology playing a 
stabilising or foundational role] is to take the case of Rational Intuitionism. 
According to Rawls, the sparse moral psychology implicit in Rational 
Intuitionism is primarily one which ascribes to persons a capacity for 
knowledge of moral principles and a capacity for motivation by this 
knowledge (PL, p92). It is obvious that this moral psychology does little to 
show that it is in a person's interest to act in accordance with this motivation; 
but it was that task which was to be assisted by moral psychology in its 
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stabilising role.273 
 
My first point, easily made, is that talk of moral psychology playing a foundational role is 
misleading, absent evidence to the contrary. Rawls's theory, as he conceives it, does not 
have genuinely foundational elements. It has fundamental elements, but by this he means 
simply “most abstract”. This was noted in section 2. Secondly, the passage trades on the 
idea that the role of moral psychology in Rational Intuitionism is different than in Justice 
as Fairness in its original formulation. But moral psychology does not have only one role 
in Rawls's work. From what is written above, the moral psychology of Rational 
Intuitionism, to use the distinctions made in section 3, will solely play roles #1 and #2, of 
defending, or perhaps even just explaining, the realisability of the conception of the person 
as motivated moral knower (as we might call them). But moral psychology has this role in 
Justice as Fairness as well. It is true that it has further roles, and that it is unclear whether 
these roles need also be present in all versions of rational intuitionism. But the plurality of 
roles of moral psychology in Justice as Fairness is enough to show that no simple 
dichotomy between moral psychology playing foundational or stabilising roles is accurate. 
 Baldwin's article is mistaken on a number of other exegetical points, but for the 
most part these, and the pseudo-problems he develops for Rawls and then solves, can be 
cleared up easily once this basic error is laid out.274 I shall not take on this task myself. 
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Chapter 4: The Conception of the Moral Person and Moral Psychology 
 
This chapter is concerned with Rawls's account of the moral person, and its relation to the 
psychology of the members of the well-ordered society of Justice as Fairness. Section 6 
introduces the chapter, and indicates its central ambition. Section 7 then prepares for the 
introduction of Rawls's conception of the person by discussing the circumstances of justice 
— clarifying this important topic along the way. Section 8 outlines the basic features of 
Rawls's conception of persons as free, equal, rational and reasonable. Section 9 then 
presents the completed picture of persons in the well-ordered society, drawing upon 
sections 7 and 8, and then discusses the relationship between human psychology and this 
conception. 
 
Section 6: Developing a Moral Psychology 
 
 I begin by reviewing some of the discussions which have occurred over the 
previous three chapters. I then summarise what I hold to be the best approach to 
investigating Rawls's moral psychology. This is to sketch the character of his moral person 
in its barest outline. All this occurs in subsection 6.1. Subsection 6.2 then introduces an 
initial key distinction for the way I am going to conduct the proceedings – the distinction 
between first- and second-order interests or ends. 
 
6.1 Minimal ambitions 
  
 Rawls presents us with two linked moral conceptions: (1) persons as free, equal, 
rational and reasonable, and who are (2) living in a well-ordered society. He then develops 
a construction procedure which is to model the practical reasoning of such persons, in 
order to derive principles for how such persons would organise their society. This takes the 
form of a hypothetical situation of contracting, in which representatives of free and equal, 
rational and reasonable persons are to contract together to devise principles to protect the 
fundamental interests of their representees, assuming favourable conditions obtain (section 
2).  
 In order for such a contract to be made, the parties in the original position need to 
be sufficiently assured that the terms of the contract will be abided by. Hence, they attend 
to the facts of human psychology, in order to see which principles of justice will be 
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realisable and sufficiently stable at a society-wide scale. The conception of justice which 
best meets the representees fundamental interests, in part through having the best chance of 
being stable, is the conception judged to be justified overall (section 4). 
 However, whilst developing a moral psychology which corresponds to certain 
moral principles, the very same moral psychology can play a role in specifying the moral 
principles and developing their content. The moral psychology developed also presupposes 
the moral conception of persons as free, equal, rational and reasonable, and specifies how 
this is to be embodied in the members of the well-ordered society (subsection 5.2). 
 This chapter is concerned to outline the central aspects of the conception of the 
person in the well-ordered society. I remind the reader here of the restrictions of my 
discussion already put down. I have forsworn the use of extensive empirical data, and 
debates whose resolution relies on such data will be unable to be decisively settled. This 
might be thought to be a weakness of my discussion. However, I believe it to be a 
necessary precursor to the judicious use of empirical data to sketch a theorist's fundamental 
normative ideas in their most minimal details. 
 Outlining Rawls's ideal of personhood requires us to be as careful to indicate what 
is excluded by that ideal as what is included. I want to indicate which aspects of the 
account of the persons in the well-ordered society are elements which follow from Rawls's 
underlying normative conception of the person, and which parts follow from his 
assumptions about human nature. Given Rawls's assumptions, the normative conception of 
the person is something which must be realisable and compatible with human nature 
(subsections 3.2, 3.3). But the relationship between normative and psychological claims is 
different in these two aspects of his theory. The normative conception of the person is a 
non-revisable standard which human beings need match up to (as is the conception of the 
well-ordered society, I feel). The rest of the normative content of the theory – the 
principles of justice, the account of institutions, and the full moral psychology of the 
members of the well-ordered society of Justice as Fairness – is specified with reference to 
human nature, and hence can be revised in the light of human nature. 
 Once we have a clear picture of what is implied purely from the conception of the 
person (together with the conception of the well-ordered society — see section 2 and 
section 11), then we can get a clearer picture of what in the rest of the theory is based on 
Rawls's assumptions about human nature. My aim is not to assess Rawls's assumptions 
about human nature here, as noted in the introduction to the thesis. To stress why: the 
actual content of Rawls's moral psychology is both complex and expansive, and forms a 
tightly unified system. Critically examining it, particularly in the light of empirical 
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evidence, would be a task which would take up a whole other thesis, and would be the task 
of some more empirically-orientated study. My aim is rather to set the groundwork for the 
correct philosophical orientation towards this ambition. 
 The ambition of sketching the character and development of the persons in the 
well-ordered society in their most minimal details rests on being careful to distinguish 
between different categories of interests, desires etc. possessed by the members of the 
well-ordered society. The next section introduces the idea of the first-order and second-
order interests, aims, ends and desires of the members of the well-ordered society. Two 
further categorisations of interests – intrinsic vs. instrumental, and non-public vs. public – 
are also introduced, to be elaborated over the coming sections. Eventually, these 
categorisations of interest will be combined to help give us the minimal account of the 
conception of the person. 
 
6.3 First- and second-order interests 
 
 The distinction between first- and second-order interests, aims, ends, preferences, 
desires, concerns etc.275 is a common one.276 I here simply reproduce Rawls's own 
discussion of altruism. It introduces the idea clearly enough. 
 
 There is ... a peculiar feature of perfect altruism that deserves mention. A 
perfect altruist can fulfil his desire only if someone else has independent, or 
first-order, desires. To illustrate this fact, suppose that in deciding what to do 
all vote to do what everyone else wants to do. Obviously nothing gets settled; 
in fact, there is nothing to decide.277 
  
What holds of altruism, we shall find, holds of most of the other various basic capacities 
and powers contained in the conception of the person. The interests which are served by 
our employment of these capacities are chiefly our second-order (or third-order etc.) 
interests — interests about our other interests. Our job will be to discover the first-order 
interests which allow these various higher-order interests to become active. Unless we can 
                                                          
275 Though all these concepts (ends, desires etc.) are subtly different, I take that my reader is familiar 
with the general kind of things they all describe, and that there is no need for me to discuss them. I use this 
breadth of terms in order to convey that I am not talking about mental states with specific phenomenologies, 
as might be suggested (to some) if I just used “desire”, as Rawls usually does. Note there are also issues 
regarding how aims and ends relate to motivation which I am glossing over. 
276 The classic statement of the idea is still Frankfurt (1971) 
277 TJ, p. 189/165 
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ascribe suitable first-order interests to the members of the well-ordered society, we cannot 
say anything about what they will actually do. It is only in the presence of first-order ends 
that second- or higher-order ends can be pursued. 
 Three short notes of clarification here. First, there are two different kinds of 
second- or higher-order interest. There are those such as the one I have just mentioned: 
altruism. Others include reasonableness and rationality. What bands these interests together 
is that they are interests in other interests being ordered in a certain way, rather than being 
interests in other interests having certain determinate contents. An altruistic interest is an 
interest in others’ interests being met, whatever those interests are. A second kind of 
second-order interest does constitute an interest in a person acquiring a further more 
concrete interest. An example might be having an interest in having an interest in 
becoming vegetarian. I want to want to be a vegetarian. However, I also want a bacon 
sandwich. If my second-order interest was realised, the resulting first-order interest would 
be in conflict with my existing first-order interest in quite an obvious way.278 In this 
chapter, I am uninterested in this latter category of interests, desires etc. Rawls conception 
of the person only includes higher-order desires of the former category. Hence, I ask the 
reader to put the latter type of higher-order desire or interest out their mind, and understand 
my use of higher-order interest to only refer to the former.   
Second, simply because a certain power or capacity serves a second-order interest 
does not prevent the employment of that same capacity being the subject of a first-order 
interest. Indeed, Rawls relies on this idea in order to fully explain the value of the well-
ordered society, as we shall see. To illustrate the general idea here: altruism moves me to 
help the interests of other people to be met. The aim of altruism is to help others. However, 
I may also want to be an altruistic person. Of course, if I am some Robinson Crusoe, this 
particular interest of mine will not be met. Alternatively, though I am an altruistic person, 
and (we’ll assume) have an interest in meeting the interests of others, I may not have an 
interest in having my interest in meeting the interests of others. I may wish not to have an 
interest in altruism. What holds for altruism, and other's interests, holds for other capacities 
which are orientated towards our own interests. We need to find the first-order interests of 
the members of the well-ordered society which are not interests in using their second-order 
capacities. 
 This last comment leads on to a more general point. I aim to distinguish between 
the higher- and first-order interests, desires etc. of the members of the well-ordered society. 
                                                          
278
  I am unsure as to whether these is a sharp a distinction between these two categories of higher-order 
interest as I have indicated. But I ignore this complication – the dichotomy I assume here is enough for my 
requirements. 
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But this will not be enough to give the full account of the conception of the person met by 
such individuals. As mentioned in the previous subsection, there are other categories of 
interest which must be ascribed to the members of the society in order for our account to 
be complete. We are hence not simply looking for the first-order desires of the members of 
the well-ordered society, but a specific class of first-order desires which falls into other 
categories as well. What these other categories are will be revealed in due course. The 
class of first-order desires, interests or ends we are seeking we will simply call the key 
desires, interests or ends. They are the key first-order desires or interests as, until we 
ascribe them to the members of the well-ordered society, we cannot say that the members 
of the society will actually be motivated by anything. 
 Third and finally, here we might ask whether the capacities, powers and 
characteristics we ascribe to the members of the well-ordered society will tell us anything 
before we hit upon the key first-order desires. What we shall find is that they serve to 
restrict what the first-order interests of the members of the well-ordered society could be, 
without directly indicating what their actual first-order interests will be. This overall 
account, as I develop it through the chapter, may seem bound to be too indeterminate. I do 
not believe this is the case. Our minimal conception of the persons in the well-ordered 
society will be found to contain the appropriate first-order interests and desires. But they 
will still leave the conception of the person quite minimal. 
 We are hence to look for a subset of the first-order desires of the members of the 
well-ordered society. I say subset, as the desires we are looking for must also fall under 
two further categories. They must be non-public, as opposed to public, and they must be 
intrinsic, as opposed to instrumental. How exactly these further categorisations are to be 
understood will be introduced in the course of the discussion in section 7.  
 
Section 7: The Circumstances of Justice 
 
 This chapter presents an account of Rawls's conception of the person, as this 
conception would be psychologically realised in the well-ordered society. The well-
ordered society, however, exists under the circumstances of justice. The account of these 
circumstances is part of what is needed order to give the minimal account of what the 
members of the well-ordered society will be like. 
 I first recount Rawls's account of the circumstances of justice. I then comment on 
whether his account of the circumstances of justice needs to be modified. I also try to get 
clear on what the relationship between the circumstances, social cooperation, and justice 
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exactly is. I argue all three of these should be sharply distinguished. Clarity on this matter 
will allow us to criticise the oft-repeated idea that the circumstances represent problems 
which justice remedies. This leads on to a brief, introductory discussion of one of Rawls's 
major themes — that of attempting to outline that the need for liberal democracy, in the 
face of diversity, is not solely a regrettable fact. 
 Rawls announces that the circumstances of justice are conditions under which 
social cooperation is both possible and necessary. Social cooperation is possible, as all 
have interests which can be realised through social cooperation. Social cooperation is also 
necessary to meet those interests. It is the role of justice to distribute the goods of social 
cooperation – and hence meet such interests – fairly.279 
 In his characterisation of the circumstances of justice, Rawls departs primarily from 
Hume.280 In the initial presentation of the circumstances of justice, the characteristics of 
these circumstances are as follows. Humans exist within a shared geographical territory. 
There is a rough equality in their physical and mental powers, such that no single 
individual, or coalition, is invulnerable to having their plans thwarted by the rest. Natural 
and other resources are moderately scarce. Humans do not live in a cornucopia, such that 
all needs, desires and interests can be satisfied. Nor do they live in a world so barren that 
cooperative schemes must break down. Together, Rawls calls these characteristics the 
objective circumstances of justice.  
 Furthermore, the human beings within such circumstances have interests which, 
while partially overlapping, are also to some extent in conflict. Each has their own 
conception of the good, and the demands of all the conceptions taken together cannot be 
fully met under the moderate scarcity, and divergence in conceptions of the good, that is 
faced. No single conception of the good is shared by all. In addition each individual 
possesses interests which are not interests in others' interests, i.e. are not interests in 
helping or hindering another's good. Finally, these individual's knowledge is incomplete, 
and their use of their intellect falls short of perfect. There is hence disagreement: scientific, 
philosophical and religious. The latter conditions listed here are the subjective 
circumstances of justice.281 
 Rawls's later work appears to alter, and in certain ways weaken, the 
characterisation of the circumstances. In “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory”, he 
                                                          
279 TJ, pp. 4/4, 126/109 
280 See TJ, p. 126/109 fn 3. For the first introduction of these circumstances into Rawls's work, see CP, 
pp. 52—53. The first use of the name “circumstances of justice” is found at p. 178, in “The Justification of 
Civil Disobedience”. For Hume's original discussion in the Treatise, see bk. 3, part 2, sec. 2, paras 5—7, 16. 
For the discussion in the Enquiry, see sec 3.1 
281 See TJ, pp. 126—127/109—110 for both the objective and subjective circumstances. 
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allows the possibility that the moderate scarcity of natural resources with respect to our 
needs may perhaps one day be overcome. This, however, is not presumed to remove or 
eliminate the conflict between conceptions of the good, nor remedy the limits to our 
knowledge and reasoning.282 The concession is not repeated in Political Liberalism or 
Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, but it is perfectly compatible with their content. In 
these works and elsewhere, Rawls stresses that liberal democracy, by its very nature, is 
marked by a pervasive pluralism of reasonable outlooks, doctrines and conceptions.283 
Other remarks strongly suggest that human nature is marked by pluralism in general – a 
pluralism which can be suppressed only by illegitimate force and coercion, and never 
eliminated.284 It is this plurality of conceptions of the good, and divergence in views, 
arising from what are called the burdens of judgement,285 which is stressed above all. This 
idea will be returned to in subsection 12.1, when we come to discuss the distinctive ideas 
of Rawls's later period. The rough equality of human beings is not specified in any of the 
characterisations of the circumstances of justice after A Theory of Justice.286 Some writers 
have pointed out that this simply does not obtain in our world. Some individuals – whole 
societies at times – have been in a completely vulnerable position compared to their 
aggressors.287 It is likely that no one, not even the most cautious and well-established 
dictator, or hermit, has ever been entirely invulnerable to others’ aggression. In summary, 
moderate scarcity, and human beings' mutual vulnerability, are de-emphasised and perhaps 
even rendered inessential as Rawls's thought progresses, whilst the plurality of outlooks is 
placed to the fore. 
 What relation does justice bear to the circumstances of justice? Rawls gives us two 
answers. In Theory, the circumstances of justice, when they give rise to social cooperation, 
indirectly give rise to the need for justice, and similarly indirectly give the role that justice 
must play within a cooperative scheme.288 Social cooperation makes for mutual benefit to 
all, but conflicts of interest persist. Principles of justice are needed in order to arbitrate the 
various conflicts of interest, and to distribute cooperative benefits. Outside the 
circumstances of justice, then, there would be “no occasion for the virtue of justice, just as 
in the absence of threats of injury to life and limb there would be no occasion for physical 
courage.”289  
                                                          
282 See CP, p. 329 
283 See PL, pp.  xvi—xvii, xxiv—xxv, 36—38, and JF, pp. 3—5, 33—35 
284 PL, p. 37, JF, p. 34 
285 On the burdens of judgement, see PL, pp. 54—58, JF, pp. 35—36 
286 For noting this I'm indebted to Stark (2009) pp. 79—81 
287 See Barry (1995a) pp. 40—41, Stark (2009) pp. 83—84 
288 TJ, pp. 4/4, 126/109 
289 TJ, p. 128/110 
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 In the later specification in Political Liberalism, the circumstances of justice are 
assumed in order to render the idea of the well-ordered society “suitably realistic.”290 In 
Justice as Fairness: A Restatement – another account from the later period – they are said 
to reflect “the historical conditions under which modern democratic societies exist” (and, 
we might add, will be expected to exist in perpetuity).291 I believe that the earlier and later 
accounts can be related to each other in the following way. In the later philosophy, Rawls 
is concerned only with developing a conception of justice suitable for a modern liberal 
democratic society. Without these assumptions about the objective and subjective 
circumstances of justice, we may end up developing a conception of justice ostensibly for 
such a liberal society, but which in actual fact is unrealisable. His later philosophy requires 
that he retreats from the earlier claim that it is only under such circumstances that justice 
will be called for, for reasons which follow from the limitations about what conceptions of 
justice are allowed to claim in the later philosophy (see subsection 12.3). Granted this, 
however, we can still say that the circumstances of justice bear the same relation to justice 
as in the earlier philosophy. 
 The idea of the circumstances of justice, as employed by Hume, Rawls, or anyone 
else, has been widely discussed. I briefly comment on some aspects of the debates here. 
First, discussions by certain writers broadly sympathetic to Rawls's employment of the 
circumstances of justice suggest they should be revised or added to in certain ways. Take, 
for example, Peter Vanderschraaf's argument that the account of the circumstances of 
justice Rawls accepts does not render social cooperation and justice possible, but rather, 
upon examination, is formally equivalent to a Hobbesian state of nature. If so, justice will 
be impossible without further conditions obtaining.292   
 Two points can be made here: first, additions to the circumstances of justice needed 
to make social cooperation possible are unproblematic for Rawls, providing that something 
like original aspects of the circumstances are retained. As Rawls himself adapted Hume's 
account, and then seemingly further tweaked his own account, debates about further 
alterations do not necessarily pose a great danger to him.293 So long as the conditions we 
end up with for social cooperation to be possible and necessary do not radically depart 
from or transcend Rawls's account, then his account of the circumstances can be retained, 
which is the important thing from his perspective.  
 Second, Rawls himself does not think that the circumstances of justice are 
                                                          
290 PL, p. 66 
291 JF, p. 84 
292 Vanderschraaf (2006) pp. 321—329 
293 Alterations of his account may include adaptations as well as additions. For example, Ci (2006), p. 
45—60, argues that the subjective circumstances should be re—conceived 
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sufficient for justice. They only render it possible and necessary given that humans can be 
motivated by a sense of justice. The circumstances of justice are not sufficient for social 
cooperation. To see this, the work “possible” and “necessary” are doing in the specification 
needs to be further clarified. In saying that the circumstances of justice render social 
cooperation necessary, Rawls should not be taken to mean that these circumstances 
necessitate social cooperation. This is to ascribe an explanatory role to the circumstances 
of justice, as with the account in Hume's Treatise. Such an explanation, however, requires 
additional assumptions about the extent to which human beings are rational and reasonable, 
and are able to develop publicly recognised rules and procedures. Rawls considers these 
further matters elsewhere.294 As he states them, the circumstances of justice do not amount 
to an explanation of why social cooperation occurs, but are rather simply conditions which 
make it possible. The circumstances of justice then render social cooperation necessary in a 
prudential sense. The majority, at least, of the interests and needs of human beings require 
social cooperation to be fulfilled. There is no other way. 
 Often, the circumstances of justice are described as giving us the role of justice. 
This is not quite right. More accurately, the role of justice stems from the features of social 
cooperation which social cooperation inherits from the circumstances of justice. Rawls 
writes 
 
principles are needed for choosing among the various social arrangements 
which determine [the] division of advantages and for underwriting an 
agreement on the proper distributive shares. These requirements define the role 
of justice. The background conditions which give rise to these necessities are 
the circumstances of justice.295 
 
It seems clear here that the need to arrange our cooperative scheme is what gives rise to the 
need for justice. Of course, that there can be a cooperative scheme, and the particular 
issues which must be settled regarding it, presupposes the existence of circumstances of 
justice. But the circumstances of justice only give rise to justice indirectly. They do 
constrain its role. But they do not, as has often been argued, determine its content and 
scope.296 
 The reason why this distinction is important is because it allows the correct 
                                                          
294 TJ, pp. 142—145/123—126. On the need for public rules for cooperation, see PL, p. 16 
295 TJ, p. 126/109. My italics. 
296 For example, Hubin (1979) pp. 9—10, 21—24, Nussbaum (2006) pp. 103—104, 119, Barry (1989) 
chapter V, esp. pp. 179—189 
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perspective on the circumstances of justice to be adopted. A characterisation often 
proposed is that the circumstances of justice represent the problems that justice is to 
remedy.297 But this is, at most, only half the story. It is at odds with various aspects of the 
classic historical accounts. Hume refuses to engage with the debate as to the virtue or 
viciousness of the aspects of our persons which give rise to the need for justice on his 
theory.298 Of the characteristics of humankind which give rise both to the State of War and 
the State of Peace, Hobbes, with characteristic melody, writes “the Desires, and other 
Passions of man, are in themselves no Sin.”299 The presuppositions of social cooperation, 
then – the interests and means for meeting those interests – do not represent problems in 
themselves. Rather they give rise to problems in social cooperation. But at least some of 
these problems only arise in the absence of justice. The better rendering is this: the 
circumstances of justice can give rise to problems in social cooperation. But at least some 
(note: not all) aspects of the circumstances which might otherwise lead to problems do not 
lead to problems at all if justice is attained. Circumstances which give rise to problems in 
unjust societies can in fact give rise to great benefits in just societies. For example, 
religious diversity in the past led to civil war. But now, some religions at least appreciate 
the greater diversity which liberal democracy allows to be publicly expressed: for instance, 
believing that dialogue with those of other faiths allows them to understand their own faith 
in a deeper way. 
 What is going on here needs to be more precisely outlined. First, let's distinguish 
between interests which are instrumentally served by justice, and interests in justice, and 
political society more generally, which see justice as intrinsically valuable — valuable for 
its own sake. This is a further distinction between categories of interests, desires etc., in 
addition to the distinction between first- and second-order desires, interests etc. given 
above in subsection 6.2. The “problems” I have just spoken of should be thought of as 
failures, or potential failures,300 to meet both these types of interest – intrinsic and 
                                                          
297 See Ci (2006), p. 45, Hope (2010). By contrast Vanderschraaf (2006), pp. 321, 332—333 observes 
that the circumstances of justice give rise to problems, rather than being problems. But even this isn't quite 
right. The circumstances of justice do contain elements which are unavoidably problems. But, with regards to 
those aspects of the circumstances which are not unavoidably problematic, if we go straight from the 
circumstances of justice to a just and beneficial social arrangement, on my analysis (see this paragraph and 
the next) it is odd to say that justice is remedying a problem for us. We should say: we would have had a 
problem, to which justice would have been the solution, but as we got justice straight away, there never was a 
problem. 
298 See Bk 3, part 2, sec. 2, para 13 of the Treatise 
299 Leviathan, Part 1, chpt. 13, para 10. It is often remarked that Hobbes's account of the natural 
passions and equality of human beings (though not, necessarily, their “naturall condition”, the state of nature 
– see the reference to Vanderschraaf above) is the ancestor of Hume's account of the circumstances of justice. 
300 The word “problems” as used so far has been ambiguous between actual existing problems, or 
problems which have been remedied by justice. 
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instrumental. In all societies – just or unjust – many interests always remain unsatisfied.301 
So there are always problems in life. An unjust society does not, of course, pose a 
“problem” to those who benefit from it, and have no wish to see things change. Rather, 
such social arrangements are a problem for others, particularly for those who see value in 
justice. The just society, then, meets many of the instrumental interests of all, in a fair way, 
and also meets the ends of those who thirst for justice for its own sake. 
 The claim that a just, well-ordered society is intrinsically valuable is one of the key 
claims which Rawls wants to argue for. Rawls is at pains to argue that the just liberal 
society is not equivalent to a “private society”, whose members are not assumed to have 
any shared ends realised by their political institutions.302 Following his later philosophy, I 
think it is acceptable here for us to call the shared, intrinsically valuable political interests 
or goods met by the well-ordered society public ends, and the “private” ends – 
instrumentally met by the well-ordered society – non-public ends.303 It is part of Rawls's 
definition of a well-ordered society that it is valuable in itself.304 This is in addition to 
saying that it is valuable instrumentally in that it allows everyone to realise their good to 
some adequate and fair extent. Note that, in holding this, Rawls does not need to be taken 
to be saying that there would be no worth in a society which did not live under the 
circumstances of justice, and hence which did not have to realise justice. This thought is 
unnecessary. Rawls is not saying that we should bring about justice even if we do not need 
it. All he is saying is: here is justice, and it has intrinsic worth. 
 This idea leads on to an important aspect of Rawls's theory and philosophy in 
general. (We have already briefly touched on an aspect of this in subsection 5.2.) Rawls 
appeals to us to try to see our inescapable historically grounded human condition not as 
simply a source for regret. As he puts it at one point, one of the roles of political 
philosophy is “reconciliation” to our society, our world, and their history. Such a 
perspective must be developed carefully – else we risk becoming simple apologists for 
immoral regimes, and whitewash humankind's seemingly unavoidable streak of 
wickedness.305 But part of adopting such an attitude responsibly is to recognise that, if we 
are to value a just society for its own sake, we cannot see the circumstances of justice as 
giving rise only to problems. They of course do give rise to problems, and unavoidably so. 
But if the circumstances of justice only gave rise to problems, justice would then only be 
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302 TJ, p. 521/457, PL, pp. 201—202 
303 See PL, pp. 220—222 
304 This is clear from many discussions: TJ, pp. 5/4—5, 476—477/416—418, 522—529/458—464, 
570—572/499—501, PL, pp. 147—148, 201—206 
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82 
 
remedial, and we would be unequivocally better off if there was no occasion for it. That we 
live under the circumstances of justice allows us to be just, and this is a matter of 
celebration, as well as regret.306  
 Having said all this, we can now add to our account of the key first-order interests 
we are looking to ascribe to the members of the well-ordered society. First, these interests 
cannot be public first-order interests. Though the members of the well-ordered society 
value their political institutions intrinsically, those political institutions are designed to 
fairly meet the various non-public interests of the members of the society. The public 
institutions of the well-ordered society have similar properties to the capacity for 
rationality or altruism, i.e. they can be intrinsically valued, but without first-order desires 
to work on, they have no application. Second, the key interests must also be intrinsic 
interests. Instrumental interests imply intrinsic interests, after all. In summary then, the key 
interests of the members are their first-order, non-public, intrinsic interests. We need to 
ascribe the members of the well-ordered society such interests, otherwise they will not be 
represented as being motivated to do anything. 
To summarise this section: I have stressed that the circumstances of justice are 
themselves morally neutral, and that they imply a certain degree of divergence of interests, 
as well as a certain degree of identity. I have mentioned that Rawls conceives this identity 
of interests to be of both non-public interests, and public interests. The circumstances of 
justice are not simply taken to be simply a burden on ourselves. They allow valuable ways 
of life which could not exist in their absence. In the course of describing the circumstances 
of justice, I have been able to expand the account of the key interests of the members of the 
well-ordered society, which are now described as first-order, non-public, intrinsic interests. 
 
Section 8: Rawls's Conception of the Person 
 
 As was introduced in section 2, and elaborated somewhat in section 4.2 Rawls's 
conception of the person is of persons as free, equal, rational and reasonable. The account 
of people's freedom and equality is based upon the account of their reasonableness and 
rationality.307 Hence I outline rationality and reasonableness first, in subsection 8.1, and 
then 8.2. Each discussion will try only to touch on the essentials of the notions, in line with 
my minimalist ambitions. At the end of 8.2, I outline why these accounts of reasonableness 
and rationality are not sufficient to ascribe any first-order, non-public, intrinsic interests to 
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307 PL, p. 19 
83 
 
the members of the well-ordered society. After that, I shall first insert a brief nod to 
equality (subsection 8.3), and then present Rawls's account of freedom (subsection 8.4). At 
the close of the latter subsection, I shall again indicate why these two aspects of the 
persons in the well-ordered society do not ascribe any key first-order interests to those 
persons. 
 
8.1 Rationality 
 
 Rawls's account of rationality has already been touched upon in subsection 4.2. But 
there, a lot more was left to be discussed. 
 Rationality is the capacity or power to reflect upon and order our ends, up to the 
limit of our ends as a whole. Rawls allows that rational deliberation can alter our ends and 
motivations in ways which go beyond the standard account of means-end rationality. This 
is explicitly asserted in the later philosophy.308 In Theory, aspects of the discussion suggest 
means-end restrictions,309 whilst others do not.310 But I do not think that there is anything 
in the book which is in obvious opposition to his later understanding. The key continuities 
are that rational deliberation always proceeds from our existing motivations, even if these 
are eventually altered, and that rational deliberation puts no restrictions on what our actual 
first-order ends might be.311 Rawls's conception of rationality, then, though not necessarily 
means-end, is clearly formal.312 
 Rationality consists in the power to form and revise our conception of the good. On 
occasion, Rawls also refers to our ability to form, revise and pursue a rational plan of life. 
Our plan of life is our scheme of ends and goals. When organising our plan rationally, we 
attempt to organise it in accordance with various principles of rational choice.313 These 
include the principle of taking effective means to ends — definitive of means/end 
rationality. They also include (1) the principle to organise our ends so as to ensure that the 
more inclusive selection of them can be met, (2) to weigh our various final ends by 
reference to their perceived importance, and (3) to select the more probable over the less 
probable alternative.314 Rationality also includes what Rawls calls deliberative rationality: 
the inspecting and specifying of our ends in order to better understand them and discern 
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their respective weights.315 
 Rawls is clear that a rational plan of life is not necessarily a life of constant 
deliberation and planning. Rather, the particular individual must simply be contented that 
they made choices which were overall sensible, and which are not to be regretted, even if 
they do not turn out for the best.316 
 Rawls employs his account of a rational plan of life in order to give a definition of 
happiness: “a person is happy when he is in the way of a successful execution (more or less) 
of a rational plan of life drawn up under (more or less) favourable conditions, and he is 
reasonably confident that his intentions can be carried through.”317 Under sufficiently 
unfavourable conditions, even succeeding in a rational plan need not be said to make us 
happy, as our circumstances (though not our response to them) may simply be too 
regrettable.318 Happiness consists in two aspects: the execution of your plan, and the state 
of mind consisting in the “sure confidence” that your plan will be successful.319 A person 
can be happy, moreover, without purposefully pursuing happiness. What we pursue, rather, 
are the various ends of our plan of life.320 It might be allowed that they may not even think 
of this as their happiness.321 This kind of conceptual disagreement is perfectly acceptable, 
providing that people are able to recognise the importance of the state of the person and 
attitude which Rawls calls happiness (see below). 
 Rawls's discussion of happiness segues into a discussion of the possibility of 
rationally choosing between different rational plans of life. Rawls assesses various 
traditional solutions to this question which posit a “dominant end” — a single monistic 
object of value, by reference to which all other values and ends can be subject to 
arbitration.322 For Christian philosophers, this is God.323 For the classical utilitarians, this is 
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(2010).  
322 TJ, pp. 551—553/484—485 
323 TJ, pp. 553—554/485—486 
85 
 
pleasurable feeling.324  
 For Rawls, all such theories are examples of teleological theories. His own theory 
is deontological. He rejects the idea of a dominant end, and instead proposes that rational 
choice between different rational plans of life is ultimately down to the free choice of the 
individual agent, providing that choice is constrained by the requirements of a conception 
of right. Rational choice of a rational plan is, at the last hurdle, down to the standards of 
the individual agent that they themselves recognise. Hence, with respect to the plurality of 
individuals, an extremely wide range of quite different plans of life can be rational.325  
 This is the basic idea behind Justice as Fairness's account of what Rawls calls “The 
Unity of the Self.” Rawls speaks of “the unity of the person being manifest in the 
coherence of his plan” such that “in the ways that justice allows, he is able to formulate 
and to follow a plan of life and thereby fashion his own unity.”326 These passages should 
not be taken to be saying too much. All Rawls is saying is that we can be said to have 
rationally chosen our rational plan of life providing that (1) we have indeed rationally 
chosen it (i.e. developed it through deliberation and reflection), and (2) it is consistent with 
the principles of right. There is no need for a further criterion to evaluate plans as more or 
less rational, such as a dominant end.  
 Why is the word “unity” used here? The best sense I can make of why it is 
appropriate is by considering that we can be torn between two or more equally rational 
plans of life, even after full consideration according to the standards of deliberative 
rationality. If it ever makes sense to talk of a “self” being dis-unified, it is surely when they 
are in this kind of predicament. Rawls's answer is to say simply that each person is at 
liberty in such a situation to decide what will count as a unified character and plan for 
themselves, given the restrictions of right. The secure institutions and infrastructure of the 
well-ordered society are assumed to make the ultimate lack of a single criterion for choice 
less threatening.327 But it is allowed that the person could choose to remain pulled in both 
directions, if that is what they truly see as rational. The “unity” of the self, then, does not 
require the elimination of all tensions and dilemmas in our conception of the good or our 
commitments.328 “Unity” seems to have been an extremely misleading word to use here. I 
cannot recall any of the few discussions I have seen of this section of Theory having 
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realised this is all he is talking about.329 But the central point is that Justice as Fairness has 
no need to posit something beyond deliberative rationality in virtue of which persons can 
rationally choose between equally rational ways of life. The account of rationality can 
hence remain purely formal, and compatible with Rawls's account of freedom. 
 This leads onto a further aspect of Rawls's perspective of rationality. He attributes 
certain features to the rational agent, and proposes certain principles they follow. But he 
does not take himself to be giving a definitive account of the concept of rationality. He is 
hence proposing a conception of the concept of rationality – admittedly one he does his 
best to make fairly accommodating. Within certain parameters, he aims to avoid argument 
with those who have a different conception of rationality. Rawls does not want Justice as 
Fairness to be unacceptable to those who believe that rational deliberation is entirely a 
matter of means-end reasoning, or who believe rationality incorporates certain ends. With 
regards the latter example, this is not to admit that Justice as Fairness is compatible with 
any conception of rationality. Those which incorporate excessively extensive substantive 
ends into the goals of the rational agent cannot be accommodated within Justice as Fairness 
(what counts as “excessive” would obviously be a matter of debate). As the above 
discussion makes clear, conceptions of rationality which incorporate the notion of a 
dominant end are also at odds with Justice as Fairness.  
Rawls believes he can allow a fair amount of latitude, however, as it is important 
only that his theory can make use of some account(s) of rationality sufficient to 
complement the account of reasonableness and justice. The account of reasonableness, and 
more acutely justice, themselves need to be more specific, as they are to arbitrate between 
the various rational agents. Deciding what is the correct account of rationality is not a 
moral issue. Deciding on the correct account of justice, by contrast, is.330 Providing that 
persons in the well-ordered society can recognise that they are all using acceptable 
conceptions of rationality, all will be well.331 
This position of Rawls may be thought to be inconsistent. How can he put forward 
a conception of rationality, but then maintain that that conception is inessential, and that 
Justice as Fairness can be accepted even by those who accept some cousin of that 
conception of rationality? The volume of material Rawls presents on Goodness as 
Rationality is perhaps excessive given this concession, but that is no reason to think that 
this general attitude is not acceptable. Rawls is not saying that every conception of 
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rationality is compatible with Justice as Fairness. Admittedly, he does not precisely 
elaborate which ones are compatible, but there is no reason to think this task could not be 
completed 
 Three final minor points. The accounts of rationality and happiness here, and the 
rejection of a hedonistic dominant end, should make it clear that happiness for Rawls is not 
simply a matter of an agreeable or joyful feeling. Happiness is rather the pursuit of and 
success in our rational plan, and given the connection between rationality and freedom, is 
also an expression of our freedom. 
 Rational agents are not always simply individual human beings. Organisations, 
collectives, companies, etc. can all also be rational agents. Each can have their own 
distinctive ways of organising their ends into overall schemes, and hence each can have 
their own variant of rationality, within certain limitations.332 
 Furthermore, rationality is the perspective of an agent's own good. I have hitherto 
said that the parties in the original position are self-interestedly rational (subsection 4.2). 
But this is misleading. Self-interest is ambiguous between being only concerned for one's 
self, i.e. being an egoist, or being only concerned with one's personal interests — interests 
“of a self” rather than “in a self.”333 Hence our rational interests – our good – can include 
commitments to our friends, family, community, country, religion, or what have you.334  
 
8.2 Reasonableness 
 
 Reasonableness is contrasted with, and complements,335 rationality. When 
reasonable persons pursue their own good in cooperation with others, they wish to pursue 
it in a way that is fair to the others they are cooperating with in that pursuit, and to 
themselves. I think of it this way: reasonable persons come to interaction with others 
unwilling to press for their own good at all costs, and unwilling to use the full powers of 
their physical or intellectual advantages to get as much as they can. Instead, they stand 
ready to put aside some of their aims (though not all), providing that others are also willing 
to put aside theirs, and come to an agreement on fair terms of cooperation. 
 If reasonable, you approach cooperation with others with your interests viewed as 
provisional. You are willing to put aside any of these interests, provided that (1) the 
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willingness of others to do the same can be known and assured, and that (2) the 
cooperation is mutually advantageous to all overall. I believe that any interests is the right 
understanding. A merely reasonable being “would have no ends of their own they wanted 
to advance by fair cooperation.”336 From this statement I conjecture that an ideally 
reasonable person would be willing to put aside any of their particular ends, providing it 
supported a fair and advantageous social world. Only an understanding such as this could 
be compatible with Rawls's comments in Theory that “a perfectly just society should be 
part of an ideal that rational human beings could desire more than anything else once they 
have full knowledge and experience of what it was”337 and “for the sake of justice a man 
may lose his life where another would live to a later day.”338 This latter example quite 
starkly supports my reading, I feel. If any interest may be expected not to be put aside, it 
would be an interest such as this. Of course the sacrifice couldn't be pointless. But then the 
sacrifice wouldn't be pointless if it was in the service of preserving a just and fair social 
world. 
 It may appear that this ideal of reasonableness is excessively demanding. Surely 
there are certain commitments each of us has which we could never consider giving up in 
the name of a just and fair social world? What if doing my part in preserving or working 
towards a just society required I put my family in danger? I was the only one with the 
information regarding the coup which is being plotted. I know that the coup will most 
likely succeed unless I act. I also know that revenge will no doubt be pursued if I do act. It 
is understandable that I may not act — I do not think inaction would make anyone an 
immoral person here. But there are several observations to make. First, a fair social world 
would presumably not require that people give up such commitments unless it were 
completely necessary to maintain the essentials of that society. It will often be the case that 
other demands can be made of us. These other demands could indeed also be serious 
sacrifices. But it all comes down to whether failing to do what is necessary to support the 
fair scheme of cooperation is the greater or lesser sacrifice for the person. In my example, 
my family's safety is a greater sacrifice to me than acting on the ideals of a just society. But 
placing our home in jeopardy, while a great sacrifice as well, may not be as great a 
sacrifice as justice. Hence, all-things-considered, acting justly at the cost of the family 
home may be my only proper response.339 However, if such choices continually arise, 
eventually it may be that there is not enough in common between our interests and those of 
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the rest of society. Cooperation for reciprocal advantage may simply not be possible, and 
the circumstances of justice will not obtain. So in summary, reasonableness may be very 
demanding. But it cannot be so demanding that the individual agent actually gains nothing 
at all from playing their part in a reasonable scheme. This is ruled out by the very 
definition of reasonableness given by Rawls. 
 It is important to stress at this point that being motivated to be reasonable is not 
necessarily to be motivated by some element of one's good. If this were the case, there 
would be no question as to whether the requirements of justice and right could be 
congruent with a person's good (subsection 4.2). Either justice would be part of your good, 
or you would be completely unconcerned with justice. The possibility that you acted justly, 
but acting justly was not good for you, would not exist. This is not to say that being just is 
not an end for people who are reasonable. It is simply that it is an open question whether it 
is a rational end – an open question which congruence arguments attempt to close.  
 Furthermore, being reasonable – it should be stressed – is not to be motived purely 
by the elements of other people's good, as with altruism.340 Rather, reasonable persons 
 
are not moved by the general good as such but desire for its own sake a social 
world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others on terms all 
can accept. They insist that reciprocity should hold within that world so that 
each benefits along with others.341  
 
 Neither reasonableness, nor rationality, nor indeed altruism, are sufficient in 
themselves to ascribe much character to the members of the well-ordered society. As noted 
earlier, interests relating to each of these capacities are second-order interests, i.e. interests 
about one's other interests, or the interests of others. This is obvious with altruism. It 
moves us to meet others' interests, but not our own. But the other powers presuppose first-
order motivations and interests also. Rationality entreats us to organise our various ends 
and motivations. But need not itself, on Rawls's view, provide any. Reasonableness asks us 
to secure arrangements between oneself and others where a fair selection of everyone's 
interests are met. But, again, there must first be initial interests to balance. Having said that 
the members of the well-ordered society are reasonable and rational, we hold that whatever 
interests and ends they possess, they will order them and attempt to act on them within the 
limits set by rationality and reasonableness. But we have not said anything about what 
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those interests etc. will actually be.342 Included amongst these interests are the key interests 
previously spoken of. Until we have said something about these key interests, we cannot 
say that the members of the society will actually do anything at all. 
 
8.3 Equality 
 
 The members of the well-ordered society are equal due to “their having [the moral] 
powers [or the capacity for them] to the requisite minimum degree to be fully cooperating 
members of society.”343 The criterion for equality will be discussed at length in the final 
chapter. Hence I do not further discuss equality here. 
 
8.4 Freedom 
 
 It is 
 
In virtue of their two moral powers (a capacity for a sense of justice and for a 
conception of the good) and the powers of reason (of judgement, thought, and 
inference connected with these powers), [that] persons are free.344 
 
As outlined in Political Liberalism, and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, a person's 
freedom has three aspects.345 
 (i) Persons are free in that they are capable of developing and revising their 
conception of the good. Persons do not see themselves as tied to any of their particular 
ends. They are able to reflectively appraise them and decide whether they affirm them.346 
Being free in this way follows directly from the members of the well-ordered society 
having the moral power of rationality. 
 (ii) Persons are free in that they regard themselves as “self-authenticating sources 
of valid claims”. They take themselves to be able to make claims on their shared 
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institutions. In regarding themselves as able to authenticate those claims themselves, they 
do not regard themselves as only able to make claims in virtue of prior “duties and 
obligations owed to society”.347 
 Though Rawls is not explicit, I believe that this aspect of freedom is best seen as 
arising from the fact that persons are, and view themselves as, reasonable. Reasonableness 
considers not just others apart from the agent, but the agent themselves as well, and the 
relationship between the agent and others. Each must be seen, and must see themselves, as 
a source of valid claims in order for a fair and mutually advantageous arrangement to be 
generated.  
 By contrast, rationality appears to be perfectly compatible with not viewing 
ourselves as the ultimate sources of the claims we make. As an example of those who do 
not see any claims they may make as ultimately originating from themselves, but from 
others in their society, Rawls cites slaves who have completely internalised the way they 
are regarded by a slave-owning polis. It is arguable that such slaves could still be described 
as rational.348 The idea would be that they can sensibly organise, pursue, and perhaps even 
to a certain extent adapt the ends which another has ascribed to them.349 But such slaves 
cannot act reasonably so long as they fail to recognise themselves as a sovereign agent as 
well. 
 (iii) Persons are free in that they understand themselves to be responsible for their 
ends, given the just institutions of their society. They do not take the simple strength of any 
of their desires on its own to constitute a reason for society to fulfil that desire, or for them 
to act as they can in order to meet that desire themselves.350 Rather, reasons are based on 
the authority which a desire possesses, due to its being endorsed as reasonable, and, 
perhaps, rational.351 
 This aspect of freedom may be seen to derive from persons’ reasonableness and 
rationality. Rationality allows us to separate out the strength of our desires from their 
authority, as we can view a powerful desire which we acted on as nevertheless against our 
own rational interest. Reasonableness furthermore leads us not to make demands on our 
society which go beyond what is fair, even if we strongly desire that such demands should 
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be met, or that we should make such demands. 
 
 Once again, neither freedom nor equality are sufficient by themselves to ascribe 
any first-order interests to the members of the well-ordered society. Simply saying that 
people regard each other as having equal possession of the moral powers does not suffice 
to ascribe them any aims, as the interests connected to those powers are all second-order. 
Regarding the aspects of freedom: saying (i) that the members of the well-ordered society 
do not see themselves as unavoidably tied to any of their particular aims does not tell us 
anything about what those aims could be. Seeing one's claims as having some kind of 
authority independent of what society demands of you – (ii) – and seeing yourself as 
responsible for whatever claims you make, providing your society is reasonably well-
ordered, and that you cannot reasonably claim whatever you might desire – (iii) – similarly 
do not determine what the claims and desires in question are.  
 In particular, regarding (ii), note that Rawls's account does not commit him to the 
position that people in the well-ordered society will see themselves as a self-authenticating 
source of valid claims per se. This would allow us to say that their first-order interests 
include interests in themselves, i.e. in their own well-being. But this is not so. Rather, the 
persons in the well-ordered society see themselves as a self-interested source of valid 
claims with respect to the rest of their society as a whole. According to their own 
understanding of their first-order interests, these interests may not be conceived as 
primarily their interests at all. They may be of a largely altruistic cast of mind, and see 
their interests as only instrumental for others interests — such as those of their family, or 
club, or ethnic group. Whole groups of people – even whole societies – may have this kind 
of mindset, if they simply see their interests as ultimately based on the interests of  
fictional, transcendent, or non-human being or beings. I may view my interests as validated 
solely because they serve the interests of God, the Animals, Nature, or the Justified 
Ancients of Mu Mu. Of course, some of these are outlandish possibilities, given human 
nature (we might think). But formally, nothing in Rawls's account of the conception of the 
person rules them out. That these possibilities are compatible with his account of freedom 
is clearer in Rawls's later philosophy.352 But they follow from the earlier account as 
well.353 
 Finally, we might assert that the conception of the person is as yet incomplete. 
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Though we have described the two moral powers, and the nature of the equality and 
freedom that follows from them, it must be remembered that the conception of the person 
is of a person living their life in a well-ordered society. We must be able to ascribe first-
order, non-public, intrinsic interests to such persons – a person can hardly be described to 
be living their life if they have no interests or desires which actually spur them to action. 
The picture will be completed in the next section. 
To summarise this section: all the characteristics so far attributed to the members of 
the well-ordered society merely serve to narrow down the possibilities of the first-order 
interests the members of the society. So far, the members will ideally not pursue their 
interests and attachments in ways which are obviously irrational.354 They may have 
interests which would be unreasonable to claim, but they will not press for those interests 
to be met. They will consider themselves as equal in possessing the powers to be able to 
act this way. And they will consider themselves to be free of being tied to a particular set 
of commitments, to be free to claim the authority of their own claims, and will see their 
claims as outcomes of their free agency, and hence as their responsibility. They will have 
an understanding of what their happiness is. This all narrows the range of possible 
conceptions of the good — of possible systems of ends. But we have still specified nothing 
positive about the first-order, non-public, intrinsic interests of the members of the well-
ordered society. Without such interests, none of these second order interests, or attitudes 
towards our interests, will have any application. 
 
Section 9: The Conception of the Person and Human Psychology 
 
 What I have attempted to show in the preceding discussion is that Rawls's account 
of the person in the well-ordered society does not tell us much at all about the character of 
such persons. In particular, it does not give such a person's key first-order interests. For 
these various character traits and interests are all second-order. When, then, do we acquire 
the information about the key interests of the members of the society? I believe that the 
best answer is to be found from considering the circumstances of justice. I defend the idea 
that the circumstances of justice and the conception of the person combined are sufficient 
to ascribe key first-order, non-public, intrinsic interests to the members of the well-ordered 
society, and that we need not have to recourse to postulating more specific facts about 
persons' psychologies. Once we have this, I believe we will be able to delineate the 
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minimal core of the normative conception of the person found in Rawls's theory. This all 
happens in subsection 9.1 below. From this basis, we are then well placed to clearly 
distinguish the various further features which Rawls attributes to the members of the well-
ordered society. We can see these as primarily arising from psychological claims, now that 
we have the normative essentials of his position. This is not to say that they exclude 
normative claims themselves, as was noted in subsection 6.1 above. But these latter claims 
will have a different standing in the theory, as they will be based on Rawls's assumptions 
about human nature in the way the conception of the person is not. Such will be the subject 
of subsection 9.2. 
 
9.1 Key interests and the circumstances of justice  
 
 This section will first outline how the conception of the person, combined with the 
circumstances of justice, are sufficient to ascribe first-order, non-public interests to the 
members of the well-ordered society. It will then argue that the specification of the 
psychological, biological, and sociological attributes required for human beings to realise 
the moral powers – which are also ascribed to the members of the well-ordered society – 
do not necessarily specify any first-order, non-public ends to the members of the society. 
Similarly, the specification of the psychological, biological and sociological attributes 
which are provided to each member of the society as part of the social primary goods does 
not, necessarily, ascribe any first-order, non-public ends to the members of the society. 
Such first-order ends are only necessarily ascribed if the correct account of human nature 
indicates that they would have to be present in order for the well-ordered society to be 
sufficiently stable. 
 We have been searching for the non-public, intrinsic first-order interests of the 
members of the well-ordered society. But we have yet to find them. None fall out of the 
conception of the person Rawls offers. However, I believe that we can attribute first-order 
ends of the members of the well-ordered society simply by considering how the 
circumstances of justice relate to the conception of the person. I first describe how the 
circumstances of justice and the conception of the person together can be understood to 
give sufficient information about the parties in order to say that they have suitable first-
order ends. I then answer some possible misgivings those familiar with Rawls's texts will 
have about the answer I give here. 
 I ask you to recall that the subjective circumstances of justice specify that human 
beings' interests and ends are such that social cooperation is mutually beneficial, though it 
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still allows and gives rise to many conflicts of interest. Purely on the basis of this, we can 
say that the first-order interests of the members of the well-ordered society are such that 
social cooperation is beneficial to the members, i.e. they have interests which they can 
meet only through cooperation. It also allows us to say that they have first-order interests 
which are in conflict. These two sets of interests are not mutually exclusive. I may have an 
interest which I can only meet through social cooperation, but which is in conflict with 
others' interests. It cannot be said in advance whether any such interest will be met for that 
person, as was indicated in the discussion of reasonableness above. What can be said is 
that a fair number of every person's interests will be met. If this were not the case, then the 
society would simply not be a fair system of cooperation. Furthermore, it will be 
remembered that the interests which are met include ends for which the political order of 
the well-ordered society is instrumental, and ends in virtue of which the political order is 
intrinsically valuable. However, it is the case that the political order rests on their being 
non-public interests which need to be fairly governed by that order. This is the task of 
political institutions, so if there are no non-public, first-order interests to fairly adjudicate, 
then political institutions have no such task to perform. Hence, though public ends can be 
first-order ends, like the first-order interests in being altruistic considered in subsection 6.2 
above, they are not the right sort of first-order interests we need to allow us to ascribe first-
order interests to the members of the well-ordered society. The ascription of non-public, 
first-order interests is essential.355 Finally, non-public, first-order interests also include 
intrinsic interests. 
 All this follows from the circumstances of justice. But, as was noted in subsection 
7, the circumstances of justice themselves do not get us justice. Indeed, they do not even 
get us social cooperation. That is why the account of the circumstances of justice needs to 
be combined with the account of the person with two moral powers. It is by the exercise of 
these powers that the interests given by the circumstances of justice can be met. In order to 
get social cooperation, a rough answer would be that we need the circumstances of justice, 
                                                          
355 It might be thought that these comments about persons having ends which can only be met through 
social cooperation, and persons having ends which are nevertheless in conflict, only applies to non-public 
ends. I do not think this need not be the case. There can be dispute about the precise way that public 
institutions are arranged, and about the precise shape of the public culture. Different groups and persons can 
prefer different arrangements. What is again required is, again, that a fair number of each of these public 
interests will be met. There are complications looming here. These disputes about the arrangement of public 
institutions must presumably stop at some point, as everyone will need to agree to certain institutions whose 
job is to arbitrate between the rest of the arrangements of society. I have in mind here elements of a society's 
constitution (TJ, pp. 195—196/171—172). There must also be sufficient shared content in the public 
conception of justice to allow acts of civil disobedience to appeal to a shared conception of justice (TJ, pp. 
365—366). But I leave this matter and others aside here. 
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and rational agents.356 In order to get just social cooperation, we need in addition agents 
who are reasonable. If agents were not reasonable and rational in these ways, a scheme of 
social cooperation would never even get off the ground. The full, minimal conception of 
the person is constituted by the combination of the circumstances of justice (from which 
we get first-order, public and non-public interests) and the moral powers (from which we 
get the various second-order interests).  
 We have finally found some first-order, non-public interests to ascribe to the 
members of the well-ordered society. They are given by the assumption that the 
circumstances of justice obtain, and that persons are reasonable and rational. We can now 
present the most fundamental elements of Rawls's conception of the person. Persons are 
free, equal, rational and reasonable, which means that their interests will be organised in 
certain ways. Such persons find political cooperation beneficial to their interests, both 
instrumentally and intrinsically, but also find that some of their interests conflict.  
 This specification of the first-order interests of the members of the well-ordered 
society tells us very little about the content of the interests themselves. Indeed, all it says is 
that they have first-order interests which can be met only through cooperation with each 
other, and also interests which are in conflict. We are only to make further specifications of 
the member's first-order interests in view of the general psychological, biological and 
sociological facts about human beings which the parties have access to in the original 
position. 
 These elements represent a significant chunk of the normative fundamentals of 
Justice as Fairness (others may arise from the conception of the well-ordered society, see 
section 11 — but also see section 15, particularly subsection 15.5 L). Any further elements 
of Justice as Fairness are developed in the light of the facts of human nature as they are 
considered by the parties in the original position. Aside from these facts, the conception of 
the person (combined with the conception of the well-ordered society) would be 
appropriate to form the foundation for the derivation of principles for any type of 
reasonable and rational agent, whether human or not. Justice as Fairness, and its distinctive 
principles of Right and ideas of the Good, is developed in the light of human nature. As 
Rawls writes: “justice as fairness is a theory of human justice and among its premises are 
the elementary facts about persons and their place in nature.”357 
 It may be thought that this interpretation runs against what Rawls actually says. It 
                                                          
356 I say rough answer, as remarks about the inherently reasonable (to some minimal extent) nature of 
social cooperation at PL, p. 16 complicate matters. Presumably, ideal reasonableness yields justice, but 
human beings can be reasonable but less than ideally reasonable, and hence merely socially cooperate. I 
ignore these complications here. 
357 TJ, p. 257/226. See also pp. 159—161/137—139 
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might be thought that Rawls builds more robust assumptions about human nature directly 
into the specification of his conception of the person and their first-order ends. In A Theory 
of Justice, having given his account of deliberative rationality, Rawls then remarks that the 
account remains purely formal. In order to develop an account of what he calls the social 
primary goods (see subsection 15.2), so as to derive principles of justice, Rawls makes 
clear that we now have to attend to “certain general facts” about human nature. These 
include “the broad features of human desires and needs, their relative urgency and cycles 
of recurrence, and their phases of development as affected by physiological and other 
circumstances” and “the requirements of human capacities and abilities, their trends of 
maturation and growth, and how they are best trained and educated for this or that 
purpose.”358 It might be thought that reference to these facts may specify the content of 
some of the non-public, first-order, intrinsic interests of the members of the well-ordered 
society. Well they may. But it is completely unnecessary to assert this when outlining the 
conception of the person. There only arises a need to assert this if the parties in the original 
position, considering the facts of human nature, discover that we need to specify that 
possession of such characteristics must be amongst the first-order, non-public, intrinsic 
interests of the members of the well-ordered society in order for the society to be stable.   
I shall first consider whether the psychological and biological needs which underlie 
the development of the two moral powers ascribe any non-public, first-order, intrinsic ends 
to the members of the well-ordered society. I shall conclude no. I shall then consider 
whether the presuppositions about human nature made in specifying the social primary 
goods ascribe any such ends either. Again, my answer will be no. 
 The moral powers are capacities which are embodied by the members of the well-
ordered society. Given human nature and our environment, there are certain basic needs – 
biological, psychological, physical, social etc. – which will need to be met whenever the 
moral powers are to be realised.359  Physical health, and the absence of physical pain, for 
example, are generally needed if we are to be able to adequately exercise our two moral 
powers.360 
 It is likely that the members of the well-ordered society will have first-order, non-
public interests in having these attributes. They are the sorts of things often valued in their 
own right, and not simply as instrumental for the realisation of the moral powers. But we 
cannot assume this for the persons in the well-ordered society simply on the basis of the 
conception of the person. We are only able to say that the members of the well-ordered 
                                                          
358 TJ, p. 424/372—373. See also PL, p. 178 
359 See PL, pp. 177 and 178 
360 As suggested at PL, pp. 181—182 
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society have these biological and psychological characteristics, and inhabit these kinds of 
physical and social surroundings, because human nature is such that they are required in 
order to develop the moral powers. But even if this is true, this does not imply that the 
members of the well-ordered society value these attributes in themselves. And we only 
have reason to explore whether they value these things in themselves to the extent that this 
is relevant to the parties' considerations in the original position regarding the stability of 
different conceptions of justice. We can say the members of the society value these 
biological and psychological considerations instrumentally, because they are assumed to 
value the moral powers. But we cannot say more than that, unless stability considerations 
turn out to require more to be said. 
 Rawls also holds that the members of the well-ordered society will have access to a 
fair allotment of social primary goods. These are to allow each to follow their conception 
of the good. Such social primary goods will allow the realisation of the psychological and 
physical attributes which allow those conceptions of the good to be pursued. It is assumed 
that there is enough overlap in permissible conceptions of the good such that we can 
specify certain basic human needs – again biological, physical, psychological, social etc. – 
which are required for the pursuit of any permissible conception of the good.361 
 Once again, however, this stipulation by itself does not tell us what the first-order, 
non-public, intrinsic interests of the members of the well-ordered society will be. It is 
assumed that there is a set of basic needs which must be met, and means which must be 
provided, for the pursuit of any permissible conception of the good in the well-ordered 
society. But there is no reason to assume that the social primary goods held by the 
members of the well-ordered society are valued intrinsically by the members of the well-
ordered society. Or rather, no need to assume this simply on the basis of the conception of 
the person, aside from considerations of what human nature appears to demand for 
stability.362 Indeed, Rawls holds that these basic needs, and the goods which meet them, 
are to be thought of as instrumental for meeting our conceptions of the good.363 Again, it is 
likely that they are often intrinsically valued. But we need some grounds for saying this, 
other than that they are means which help any conception of the good to be met. 
 It should be noted here that there may exist scepticism about whether any workable 
                                                          
361 See PL, pp. 176—178, 180 fn8, TJ, pp. 424—425/372—373, 433—434/380—381 
362
  It is true that interests in the social primary goods are first-order and not second-order interests. This 
is because they are interests in what everyone wants regardless of what else they want. And the social 
primary goods are also, often, non-public interests. However, they need not be intrinsic interests, which is the 
significant thing. 
363 E.g. TJ, p. 93/ 
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conception of the social primary goods can be developed.364 Are there resources such that 
any conception of the good can make use of them? As an extreme example, what about 
ascetic conceptions of the good, which deny any value to material possessions? This 
problem is avoided – as far as it can be – by the formal features of the circumstances of 
justice. It is simply stipulated that the members of a well-ordered society have interests 
which can only be met through social cooperation. Given the assumption that they want to 
cooperate, and cooperate fairly, they will be able to decide amongst themselves what is 
required for each one to meet the interests they can fairly advance. Of course, the question 
then arises whether it is necessarily the case that every individual who finds themselves in 
the well-ordered society will feel they have anything to gain by cooperating in its 
institutions. I see no reason to presuppose so. What would then need to be investigated is 
what can be asked of such a person, or group of persons, by the members of the well-
ordered society, and more specifically what (if anything) can be reasonably asked. This is a 
big topic, and I leave it aside here. 
  Hence, I hold that we can ascribe first-order, non-public, intrinsic interests to the 
members of the well-ordered society of Justice as Fairness simply by stipulating that they 
all can benefit, in a fair manner, from social and political cooperation, and that they are 
rational and reasonable persons. 
 
9.2 Psychological facts in the original position 
 
 I have delineated the essential features of the members of the well-ordered society 
which can be ascribed to them on the basis of the normative conception of the person 
employed by Rawls. Such persons are reasonable, rational, free and equal, and possess a 
conception of the good, which can be furthered by social cooperation, but which is also in 
partial conflict with the interests of the other free, equal, rational and reasonable persons in 
their society. Any further things we say about the psychology and character of the 
members of the well-ordered society follow not from this conception of the person, but 
from the facts about human nature which are made available to the parties in the original 
position. To argue for Justice as Fairness and its principles, Rawls makes various claims 
about these psychological facts, and these give the particular character of his version of the 
well-ordered society. 
                                                          
364 Such scepticism was expressed early after the publication of A Theory of Justice by Nagel (1975) 
and Schwartz (1973). Rawls's response to Nagel can be found at PL, p. 196 fn31, and the surrounding 
passages. 
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 At this point, let's remind ourselves of the place and roles of moral psychology 
within the original position, once again. From section 4 we have: 
 
-Psychological facts have the role of showing which conceptions of justice avoid futility, 
and hence are realisable and stable over time in favourable conditions. Psychological facts 
also have the role of showing which conception of justice is more likely to be stable than 
its rivals. 
 
-Psychological facts are employed in both parts of the argument from the original position, 
with different readings being available for when and how exactly they are so employed. 
The two extreme readings or renderings, situated at opposite poles to each other, are these. 
Psychology could not play an arbitrating role at all in the first part of the argument. Hence 
any conception which was stable could be chosen there, and would only need to be shown 
to be non-futile in the second part of the argument. Or arbitration between different full 
moral psychologies of different conceptions of justice could occur in the first part of the 
argument. In between these two options, there exists a continuum of others. 
 
From subsection 5.2, and section 11 (which is yet to come) we have 
 
- Once the principles of justice have been provisionally chosen in the first part of the 
argument, they can then be referred to in developing a moral psychology corresponding to 
those principles. Hence moral psychology presupposes moral principles. Developing a 
moral psychology also plays a role in further specifying moral principles. The principles 
which are chosen at the end of the second part of the argument from the original position 
are the fully justified principles of justice, and are the principles which have normative 
authority (this will be emphasised in section 11). 
 
- In saying that psychology helps to specify moral principles, but that our particular moral 
psychology depends upon assumed moral principles, we also seem warranted in saying 
similar things about the relationship between the conception of the person and moral 
psychology. So developing our moral psychology presupposes a certain conception of the 
person. But in the course of developing our moral psychology we can also specify our 
conception of the person. However, unlike with principles of justice, the basic (minimal) 
conception of the person remains unchanged throughout this (as was stated in subsection 
6.1). 
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 From this, we can draw the following distinctions. We can distinguish between 
those aspects of human psychology which are constitutive of the conception of the person 
when it is embodied in human beings, and those aspects of human psychology which are 
supportive of the conception of the person being embodied in human beings. The first of 
these is composed from what we might call the minimal content of the conception of the 
person, which we have outlined above, and also the content which is added to that 
conception of the person when we come to specify that conception of the person with 
regards to the case of human beings. The second of these is composed of the necessary and 
sufficient psychological and biological characteristics which a person must have in order to 
be able to realise the conception of the person, but which are not themselves elements of 
that conception of the person, and hence cannot be said to be constitutive of it. 
 The relationship between the conception of the person, between a set of principles 
of justice which is in accordance with that conception of the person, and between human 
psychology overall, appears to be this. Part of the content of any viable set of principles of 
justice must be the provision of the resources needed for human beings to realise the 
conception of the person — i.e. to realise the two moral powers and meet some minimal 
level of a fair determinate conception of the good. This consists in the provision of 
resources which are sufficient to allow a human being's capacity to realise the conception 
of the person to indeed be realised — both the resources which constitute that capacity, and 
those which support it. The further content of any viable set of principles of justice will 
detail how the further goods of social cooperation are going to be distributed, i.e. how 
social primary goods are going to be distributed fairly between all the different moral 
persons. In other words, the further content of any set of principles of justice distributes the 
social primary goods which are surplus to realising everyone's moral powers, and meeting 
everyone's conceptions of the good to a minimal level (this latter minimum must be met for 
everyone in order for social cooperation to be mutually beneficial, and hence for the 
society to even be a well-ordered society).365 
                                                          
365 Rawls describes what this minimum must be clearest at JF, pp. 97—100 esp. fn21. The minimum is 
basically the equivalent in Rawls's theory to the non-cooperation point in social contract theory generally. 
What this non-cooperation point is varies from theory to theory. For example, in Hobbes (1651) it is the State 
of Nature (see the famous chpt 13). Rawls's theory is distinctive in that his “non-cooperation point” is 
actually quite high. In fact, it is not really accurate to describe it as a non-cooperation, given that he believes 
that cooperation can exist which is not just (see section 7 above). Rawls himself describes it as the 
“guaranteeable level” which allows for at least a “satisfactory political and social world” (JF, pp. 99—100, 
see also pp. 127—130). It might alternatively be characterised as the minimally just, or even better minimally 
reasonable cooperation point. Rawls believes that Justice as Fairness is the most reasonable conception of 
justice as it represents the fairest departure from the minimally reasonable cooperation point. On non-
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 In order to be able to come to a decision in the original position, given the 
fundamental interests of their representees in being moral persons, then, the parties there 
must be able to determine the following, through reflection on human psychology. They 
must determine what is essential for it to be non-futile that (1) human beings realise their 
moral powers and that (2) human beings each receive a fair allotment of the social primary 
goods. Furthermore, given this, the parties must also consider, given the facts of human 
nature, what makes it more likely for (1) and (2) to obtain. Finally, they must also consider 
which principles allow the fairest allotment of social primary goods, given the previous 
two requirements have been considered. 
 Departing from the minimal account of the conception of the person, we can try to 
account for the presence of the other features of the members of the well-ordered society 
and their principles of justice as specified by Rawls, and what they imply about his 
assumptions of human nature. Whereas Rawls worked outwards from a conception of the 
person, through the various stages of the argument from the original position, by reference 
to human nature, to a set of principles of justice, we can take the conception of the person, 
the set of principles, and the set-up of the original position as given, and attempt to 
reconstruct in more careful detail the assumptions about human nature which Rawls 
makes, both explicitly and implicitly. 
 As noted above, and in the introduction, I shall not be attempting this task here. I 
know for a fact that it would be a serious labour. Such an account would first have to 
outline the psychology presupposed by Rawls's accounts of both moral powers — the 
ability to develop a conception of the good, and the sense of justice. As noted in subsection 
3.1 above, we should view all these, plus the presence of a determinate conception of the 
good, as elements of the moral psychology of the members of the well-ordered society. 
The study would then need to take in the accounts of self-respect and self-esteem — a 
topic which has been well covered in itself, but which has still not been linked up to the 
rest of his moral psychology in a systematic way.366 There would also been a need to look 
in depth at various more particular psychological posits, such as the Aristotelian 
Principle.367 Beyond the account of self respect, there would be a need for a thorough 
assessment of Rawls’s argument for the primary goods from a psychological perspective. 
The account of moral development is complex in its detail, and has nowhere, I feel, been 
                                                                                                                                                                                
cooperation points (or as they are sometimes called, non-cooperative baselines, or nonagreement points) in 
general, see Barry (1989) esp. chapter II. 
366 See TJ, pp. 440—446/386—391, PL, pp. 318—319. Recent work includes Zaino (1998), Eyal 
(2005), Doppelt (2009), Zink (2011) 
367 See TJ, pp. 424—433/372—380, 440—441/386—387, 528/463, 571—572/500—501, PL, pp. 203 
fn35, 207 
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adequately covered. Nor has it been explored how compatible it still is with subsequent 
developments in the field, or with Rawls's own modifications of his theory.368 An account 
of moral development will need to be linked to an account of the moral emotions, and their 
relations to the moral and natural sentiments.369 The account of the moral motive in Rawls 
– the motivation to be a just and reasonable person — has not been systematically explored, 
nor the more general notion of acting on principles of right, as opposed to habit or 
custom.370 The notion of a psychological reciprocity principle will need to be examined at 
length.371 The discussion of envy, and the other special psychologies, need to be related to 
related to what has gone before.372 And I feel we still lack an adequate treatment of the 
congruence argument in all its details.373  
 In both earlier and in subsequent chapters, I have made occasional references to the 
content of this moral psychology when appropriate for my arguments or outlining my 
position. But I do not view these scattered comments as at all amounting to a full account 
of Rawls's moral psychology, though I have tried to fit them as best I can to what my 
current understanding of the overall shape of that psychology currently is. But, as I have 
said before, a thorough account of Rawls's moral psychology would take a whole other 
thesis in itself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
368 See in particular TJ, pp. 467—479/409—419. Existing discussions include Pritchard (1977), Kearns 
(1983), Alford (1991) chpt 7, and Baldwin (2008) pp. 258—261 
369 See TJ, pp. 442—446/388—391, 479—490/420—429. Important discussions include Deigh (1982), 
Taylor (1985) chpts III and IV 
370 See TJ, pp. 476—479/416—419, PL, pp. 48—54, 82—86. Discussions include Bates (1974), Barry 
(1995b), Freeman (2003), (2007b) chpt 5. See also Schwarzenbach (2009) pp. 82—88 
371 See TJ, pp. 490—496/429—434. Pritchard (1977) and Ci (2006) chapter 7 discuss this 
372 TJ, pp. 530—541/464—474. This is often covered in the literature on self-esteem and self-respect. 
See, in particular, Zaino (1998) 
373 See TJ, pp. 567—577/496—505, PL, pp. 201—206, JF, pp. 198—202. For discussion, see Barry 
(1995b), Freeman (2003), (2007b) chapters 5 and 6, Mendus, chapter 4 
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Chapter 5: Moral Psychology in Political Liberalism 
 
This chapter explores the connection between Rawls's development of his political 
liberalism and the question of stability. It also considers, as a distinct issue, what relevance 
Rawls's shift to his later philosophy has to the roles and content of his moral psychology, 
though it comes to no definite conclusions as regards the content. Section 10 presents an 
outline of the chapter. Section 11 introduces and examines the notion of stability for the 
right reasons, which led to Rawls's adopting the idea of political liberalism. Section 12, 
after first outlining the major features of political liberalism, then reconstructs why Rawls's 
commitment to stability for the right reasons led to political liberalism. In section 13, I then 
remark on alterations in Rawls's use of his moral psychology during the politically liberal 
period. I highlight how the roles of moral psychology are essentially the same in the later 
philosophy as in the earlier philosophy. I then give some small indication of the extent to 
which the shift to political liberalism could influence the content of Rawls's moral 
psychology. 
 
Section 10: Outline of the Chapter 
 
 The initial focus of this chapter is not on moral psychology. Its initial concern, 
rather, is to try to get clear on the reasons why the question of stability led to Rawls 
revising his theory. I believe that only after getting clear on this we can begin to examine 
to what extent Rawls's later political liberalism forces changes to his moral psychology. I 
do not explore extensively what alterations may be needed. Once again, as in chapter 4, I 
believe that more extensive empirical research is needed. But, in addition, my analysis will 
leave the more precise relationship between psychology and justification in the original 
position in the later philosophy for the most part unexamined. Hence, even more so than 
my other chapters, this chapter only represents a groundwork for assessing the content of 
Justice as Fairness's moral psychology. 
 Other discussions of why the concern with stability led to the revisions of Political 
Liberalism have proceeded differently. They have looked to individual elements of the 
stability argument as it was presented in Theory, with the aim of determining which of 
them required Rawls to revise his views.374 I believe this is a less than ideal approach – 
though I would not claim it is hopeless. It may be that there are elements of the stability 
                                                          
374 At least in part, this is the approach adopted by Barry (1995b), and Freeman (2003), (2007b) 
chapters 5, 6. 
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argument and of the moral psychology which need to be dropped, in order for the stability 
argument to succeed, given the further assumptions Rawls adds to his theory in his later 
period. Against most critical opinion, I actually doubt that this is the case. I suspect that 
Rawls actually retains all of his existing arguments in some altered form. I believe that he 
can do so, providing he can argue, amongst other things, that the account of human nature 
in Theory is still correct in the appropriate ways. But even if Rawls is wrong in his account 
of human nature, this would not make the approach I am pitting myself against here the 
right approach. We should first seek to attain a clear understanding of just what the 
additional premises were which Rawls added to his theory, and from these reconstruct why 
the changes were necessary. From this foundation, we can then accurately assess what 
changes Rawls did make, and even more importantly what changes he should have made. 
 As mentioned, the approach I adopt shares some commonality with the approach in 
the previous chapter. I attempt to find the most basic and minimal presuppositions which 
Rawls must have made in order for him to judge that his theory needed to be revised. Once 
we have these, then we can investigate why these impact on the other elements of the 
theory in the way they do. The overall aim of the chapter, then, is to investigate what 
changes Rawls's political liberalism brings for the content and roles of moral psychology 
within his theory, by first developing an understanding of why considerations of stability 
led Rawls to revise his theory in the first place. The chapter will proceed by first 
examining this latter issue (sections 11 and 12). I then move on to the former issue, though 
I consider it more briefly (section 13). 
 I first clarify the notion of stability which is at work in Rawls (section 11). I then 
introduce the basic ideas of political liberalism (section 12). I then turn to Rawls's account 
of why stability forced changes in Justice as Fairness. On investigation, Rawls's reasons for 
the changes he made are presented by him in a misleading fashion.  
 I will then turn to what ramifications this had for the moral psychology. I first 
outline how Rawls's moral psychology is employed in the later work – highlighting that 
though it is employed slightly more expansively than in the earlier work, it plays basically 
the same roles. I then very briefly comment on what sort of impact restrictions from the 
idea of political liberalism might make on the content of the moral psychology, when it is 
brought forward from the earlier work. I argue this could well be quite slight, but aim to 
leave the matter open, and to urge caution. All of this occurs over section 13. 
 
Section 11: Stability for the Right Reasons 
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 What led Rawls to make the changes he did? I have so far said that Rawls holds 
that any conception of justice, to be fully justified, must be able to be accompanied by a 
moral psychology which shows how the well-ordered society corresponding to that 
conception can be stable over time (subsections 3.2, 3.3, section 4). But the notion of 
stability has not been presented with all its elements as of yet (except in summary fashion 
in subsection 3.2. It was also briefly mentioned again in subsection 5.2). Rawls's full 
commitment is that any theory of a well-ordered society must show how that society can 
be “stable for the right reasons.”375 
 In this section, I first remark on when Rawls introduced the phrase, though not the 
idea, of stability for the right reasons to his theory. I then outline the two elements of 
stability for the right reasons, and I then show how they are interdependent. 
 Rawls does not make it easy to recognise just when and where the idea of stability 
for the right reasons is at work in his theory. The phrase “stability for the right reasons” 
was only introduced in “Reply to Habermas”,376 and then subsequently incorporated into 
the introduction to the paperback edition of Political Liberalism. There Rawls remarks that 
 
The phrase “stability for the right reasons” does not occur in the text of PL, but 
“stability” should usually be given that meaning in both Theory and PL, as the 
context determines.377  
 
The idea of stability for the right reasons is present in the earlier and the later philosophy. 
To illustrate this continuity with an example, when discussing “the criterion of stability” in 
Theory, Rawls notes that “some ethical theories have flouted it entirely.” The example he 
gives is of an interpretation of Benthamite Utilitarianism, in which psychological egoism is 
presumed. The utilitarian legislator arranges society's institutions so that, nevertheless, an 
artificial identification of interests results.378 But surely such a society could be stable and 
persist over time? The point is that it would not be the kind of stability Rawls is interested 
in. Rawls's contrast can only make sense if the meaning behind his use of the word 
“stability” in this section of Theory is stability for the right reasons.379 Stability for the 
right reasons, then, does not enter only with Rawls's political liberalism. 
 Stability for the right reasons is a characteristic of well-ordered societies, and it has 
two elements. Stability obtains for the right reasons when the society is governed by a 
                                                          
375 PL, p. xxxvii 
376 PL, pp. 388 fn21, 390, 392 
377 PL, p. xxxvii 
378 TJ, p. 455/399 
379 TJ, pp. 453—455/397—399. For confirmation, see PL, p. xl 
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public conception of justice (section 2). The institutional arrangements of the society are 
hence publicly justified, and the society meets what Rawls calls the liberal principle of 
legitimacy (see below). Such a society, organised in accordance with the right sorts of 
reasons, is stable when human beings growing up in such a society are liable to develop a 
sense of justice strong enough to lead them to act so as to support the basic institutions of 
that society (subsection 3.2). Both these elements are essential. Not only must the 
“character and interests [people form] by living under a just basic structure [be] strong 
enough to resist the normal tendencies to injustice.” In addition, the people's support of the 
justice of the society cannot be merely a function of them acting on the basis of other 
reasons or motivations.380 It must based on their express and “reasoned” support.381 In the 
manner I put it earlier in subsection 3.2, it must be in virtue of the members of the society 
being moved by the reasons found in the public conception that the well-ordered society 
and its institutions are sustained. 
 I now discuss each half of the idea of stability for the right reasons in turn. The 
second half of the “stability for the right reasons” slogan connects to the widely (though 
not ubiquitously)382 acknowledged liberal ideal of public justification. Jeremy Waldron 
eloquently characterises it: 
 
the social order must be one that can be justified to the people who have to live 
under it ... a transparent order, in the sense that its workings and principles 
should be well-known and available for public apprehension and scrutiny. 
People should know and understand the reasons for the basic distribution of 
wealth, power, authority, and freedom.383 
 
This idea is not unique to Rawls, and is not restricted to his political liberalism, or other 
theories which accept the distinctive key element of that view. Certain writers place the 
idea of public justification at the heart of their work, whilst simultaneously rejecting 
Rawls's political liberalism.384 
 When the ideal of publicity obtains for a society, public justification is achieved. In 
the later philosophy, the ideas of public reason, and the liberal principle of legitimacy are 
                                                          
380 For an illustration of how we could conceive of principles of justice being supported by a society 
without the members of that society being moved by those principles itself, see Cohen (2008) pp. 127—129.  
381 See JF, p. 185—186, PL, pp. 142—144 
382 See fn389 below 
383 Waldron (1993) pp. 57-58 
384 One such writer is Gerald Gaus. See, for example, his (1996) pp. 3-5 for the endorsement of public 
justification, and (1996) pp. 131—136 and (2003) chapter 7, for the rejection of Rawls's political liberalism. 
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also introduced. Public reason, briefly put, is the body of knowledge, methods of inquiry, 
reasons and justifications from which are specified “the basic moral and political values 
that are to determine a constitutional democratic government's relation to its citizens and 
their relation to one another.”385 Public justification is hence to be achieved through the use 
of public reasoning. 
 Given the nature of liberal democracy as a political order, Rawls assumes that 
public justification is needed in order for the institutions and constitution of society to be 
legitimate. A political order, in anything other than an anarchist society, is an expression of 
state power. State power, in an ideal liberal democracy, must ultimately only be wielded by 
citizens as a collective body. The apparatus of the state, which constitutes a huge resource 
of technological know-how and institutional machinery, must be used only in ways which 
can be given public justification. Hence, the ideal liberal state as an entity is not conceived 
as anything over and above the citizens of the state and the state apparatus taken together 
in conjunction. But state power – liberal or not – is always coercive power, backed by 
sanctions.386 Intuitively, this is enough to urge the need for legitimacy. But beyond even 
this, the political structure and basic institutions of a society impact on the character and 
aims of those who develop under them in profound and deep ways. Such a great impact 
also calls for justification. The ways in which the social order influences our upbringing 
must be capable of some appropriate kind of reflective endorsement by each member of 
society when they reach maturity.387  
 The liberal principle of legitimacy, as Rawls formulates it, states that “our exercise 
of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a 
constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be 
expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human 
reason.”388 Public reason is the common human reason spoken of here, or at least a major 
section of it. Any liberal view which endorses the idea of public justification – which aims 
to bring about a liberal regime governed by the right reasons, meaning public reasons389 – 
has need of a similar principle of legitimacy. I'll call these public justification 
                                                          
385 PL, pp. 441—442, CP, p. 574, LP, p. 132 
386 PL, pp. 68, 136, 216—217, CP, p. 482 
387 PL, pp. 68, 269—271, TJ, p. 7/6—7. See also TJ, pp. 514—519/451—456, on autonomy, which at 
least in part is conceived as a kind of reflective endorsement of how our upbringing influenced the 
development of our character. 
388 PL, p. 137 
389 Not all liberalisms endorse the ideal of public justification, or place it at the centre of the idea of 
liberalism. These include certain Hobbesian liberalisms, certain value—pluralist liberalisms, and certain 
perfectionist liberalisms. In this taxonomy I have followed Quong (2011) pp. 12—21. I do not say that all 
varieties of these liberalisms must reject or downplay the importance of public justification, but at least some 
examples of each do so. See in addition fn108 below. 
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liberalisms.390 
 So the well-ordered society of Justice as Fairness must be governed by the right 
reasons: public reasons. But the society must also be stable, and stable for those reasons. 
The well-ordered society must not only possess a public conception of justice. It must also 
persist, given favourable conditions. And it must persist, given favourable conditions, due 
to its public conception. 
 The idea of stability spoken of here is essentially the same as that outlined in 
subsection 3.2 and elsewhere. I summarise it again here. It can be boiled down to two 
elements. The members of the well-ordered society must be able to realise a moral 
sensibility the content of which is given by the public conception of justice. As we have 
seen, this sensibility consists in the two moral powers. Furthermore, this sensibility must 
be compatible with human nature more generally. This means that the psychological 
strength of the motivations incorporated into the moral powers, and the strength of the 
other motivations which are congruent with those powers, must win out, at least in 
favourable conditions, against the strength of whatever further motivations human beings 
may be capable of developing under the institutions of the well-ordered society. Realising 
such a moral sensibility means that the members of the society grasp and are moved by the 
right reasons. The greater strength of these motivations, in comparison to opposing, unjust 
motivations, makes the society stable. 
 The account of the correct public conception, and the correct account of a stable 
well-ordered society, are interdependent. It should be remembered from chapter 2 that a 
well-ordered society must be sufficiently stable in order for a conception of justice to be 
justified, all-things-considered. To recap, a proposed conception of justice can fail in the 
argument from the original position in three ways. First, its principles can directly fail to 
meet the fundamental interests of the representees of the parties in the original position. 
But even if this test is met, a proposed conception of justice can fail if, second, it fails to be 
associated with a suitable moral psychology capable of (1) being realised by human beings, 
and (2) winning out against the special psychologies. If it is unable to meet one or both of 
these requirements, it would hence be futile. Third, and finally, it may be that all these 
requirements may be met, and so the conception of justice will be likely enough to be 
stable, given favourable circumstances. But it may be that the conception is comparatively 
less stable than some other conception which meets all the same criteria. It may come with 
                                                          
390 This moniker follows Quong (2011) p. 17, though on his usage public justification liberalism is a 
variety of political liberalism. I have restricted the term “political liberalism” to Rawls's view, or those 
positions which share the distinctive basic commitments of Rawls's political liberalism. These are outlined in 
subsection 14.1. I have not used Gaus's “justificatory liberalism” as I believe this is better reserved for Gaus's 
own view. See, for example, Gaus (1996), (2003) chapter 8. 
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a higher risk of being unstable, as was considered in chapter 2. The alternative conception 
will then win out in the parties' overall judgement, and the conception will have failed the 
test of arbitration.  
 If a given set of principles of justice fails the futility test,391 then even if a society 
manages to come about which is governed by the corresponding public conception of 
justice, we can assume that many members of that society will eventually be moved to act 
unjustly. The ones who possess sufficient power will succeed. In so far as these powerful 
individuals use their power to alter the basic structure of society, the institutions of the 
society will become unjust. They will no longer be an expression of the collectively 
exercised power of the people, constrained by the requirements of public justification. The 
institutions will be an expression of the will of the most powerful factions in society. This 
amounts to the well-ordered society being unstable, for by definition a well-ordered society 
is governed and its power employed in accordance with its public conception of justice. 
Hence that conception of justice is unable to be sustained, even under ideal conditions.  
 By the requirements of the argument from the original position, this means that that 
conception of justice is unjustified, all-things-considered. But this means that the principles 
of that conception cannot provide the right public reasons by which a well-ordered society 
is to be governed. Even though we can imagine that this conception is capable of being 
realised as public conception, it is incapable of being sustained. This means it is unstable. 
But therefore, such a society was never governed by the right public reasons in the first 
place, as the right reasons must always be stable reasons over time. 
 In summary, stability for the right reasons obtains only for conceptions of justice 
which can be public conceptions shared between the members of the well-ordered society 
and which are stable over time. Reasons cannot be the right reasons without also being 
stable. And a conception of justice cannot be stable for the right reasons without its well-
ordered society being governed by a public conception of justice. Hence, as was just stated, 
the account of the correct public conception of justice and the account of the stable well-
ordered society are interdependent. It is important to get this dual-criterion on any 
conception of justice right in order to be clear on why the issue of stability for the right 
reasons leads to the revision of Justice as Fairness into a politically liberal theory.  
 
Section 12: The Road to Political Liberalism 
 
                                                          
391 I leave aside here complications arising from considering the arbitration test. 
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 In Political Liberalism, Rawls indicates how the commitment to stability for the 
right reasons led to the revisions of Justice as Fairness, and his endorsement of the idea of 
political liberalism. But his exact reasons are not fully or properly elaborated. To begin, I 
first introduce the ideas and modifications Rawls introduced into his theory in order to turn 
it into a politically liberal theory (subsection 12.1). Given this account, I then assess 
Rawls's statements as to why commitment to stability for the right reasons led him to these 
revisions and additions to his theory (subsection 12.2). I argue that these statements are in 
part misleading. But, whatever his exact reasons, Rawls's commitment to public 
justification and to what he calls reasonable pluralism is enough to lead to these revisions 
in any case.  
 
12.1 Basic features of political liberalism 
 
 To begin to outline the idea of political liberalism, I first note that Justice as 
Fairness (and the internal problems which Rawls perceived in it which led to its revision), 
and the idea of political liberalism more generally, are distinct. It was reflecting on 
problems in Justice as Fairness which led Rawls to political liberalism.392 But the general 
idea can be reached by different routes, and formulated in subtly different ways.393 
 There are several ways we might choose to introduce the idea of political liberalism. 
I start from an assumption Rawls makes about the institutions of liberal democracy. The 
institutions definitive of the ideal of liberal democracy – the fundamental liberal rights and 
liberties, and the arrangement of social institutions such as to guarantee every member of 
the society the ability to make effective use of those liberties394 – inevitably give rise to a 
diversity of different comprehensive conceptions of the good, comprehensive religious and 
philosophical doctrines, and comprehensive ways of life.395 Liberal democracy is marked 
by permanent pluralism.   
 A comprehensive conception or doctrine “includes conceptions of what is of value 
in human life, as well as ideals of personal virtue and character, that are to inform much of 
our nonpolitical life (in the limit our life as a whole).” Furthermore “by definition, for a 
conception to be even partially comprehensive, it must extend beyond the political and 
                                                          
392 PL, p. xv—xvi 
393 Rawls cites (PL, p. 374 fn1), Larmore (1990) and Shklar (1989) as other writers who can be counted 
as political liberals, but who reached the idea by different routes. Neither are Rawlsians, particularly Shklar. 
394 PL, pp. xlvi, 6 
395 PL, pp. 3—4, 36, 39, 63—64 
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include non-political values and virtues”396 (what a non-comprehensive, i.e. political, 
conception amounts to is outlined below). Comprehensive conceptions can be both liberal 
and non-liberal in their values and outlooks, and can be either secular or religious.397 There 
have always been many comprehensive doctrines vying against one another.398 In a liberal 
democracy, the diversity of opinion can be expected to be greater than under other regimes, 
due to the guarantee of the basic liberties, including freedom of thought, conscience, 
speech and association.399 
 Given that liberal institutions foster and promote such diversity, the question is 
whether this diversity is compatible with the long term sustainability of liberal democracy. 
Are the institutions of liberal democracy self-defeating? Do they give rise to too much 
diversity, such as to make it likely that too many comprehensive doctrines will arise which 
reject the basic liberties and ideals of liberal democracy, and do what they can to 
undermine them?400 
 In order for this outcome to be avoidable, it must be the case that there are not 
merely comprehensive doctrines, but reasonable and unreasonable comprehensive 
doctrines.401 A wide enough selection of the doctrines which arise under the institutions of 
an ideal liberal democracy must be reasonable, or else be capable of reforming themselves 
to be reasonable if treated reasonably by already reasonable doctrines. Such doctrines are 
held to reform themselves by the lights of their own traditions of reasoning and reflection – 
not by political pressure or coercion.402 Reasonable comprehensive doctrines are defined as 
those which are willing to wholeheartedly support the institutions of liberal democracy,403 
providing that they have good assurance that enough of their fellow citizens are willing to 
support those institutions as well.404  Reasonable doctrines act reasonably in favourable 
circumstances. In unfavourable circumstances, in which they are threatened by many 
unreasonable doctrines, they still wish that they could behave reasonably. To the extent 
that it is possible, they try to act so as to bring about the liberal institutions which accord 
                                                          
396 PL, p. 175. See also p. 13 
397 PL, p. xxxviii—xxxix 
398 See PL, p. 37 
399 PL, pp. 36, 63—64 
400 See Rawls's statement of the “fundamental question” of political liberalism, PL, pp. xvii, xxxvii, 3—
4. See also CP, pp. 620—622 
401 PL, pp. xxxvii—xxxix, lviii—lx,  
402 PL, pp. 65—66. On the idea that conceptions of the good must come to be reasonable by reflection 
using their own traditions of reason, see, for example, pp. 36—37, 169, 386—387. I note that p. 160 fn25 is 
misleading in this respect when says that a politically liberal conception of justice “shapes comprehensive 
views to cohere with it.” This makes it sound like becoming reasonable is simply a psychological or 
sociological process which happens over time. Rather, the comprehensive doctrines must reason their own 
way to being reasonable. 
403 PL, pp. 38—39, 58—61 
404 PL, p. 49, 54 
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with their commitment to liberal democracy in the future.405 As should be stressed, many 
comprehensive conceptions – again both liberal and non-liberal – are assumed to be 
reasonable.406 
 The reasonableness of reasonable persons, groups, and doctrines was partially 
described in subsection 8.2. We can expand on that characterisation here. Earlier I stressed 
that reasonableness consists in the willingness to propose fair terms of political 
organisation and cooperation. A second aspect of reasonableness consists in a willingness 
to recognise the burdens of judgement.407 These burdens, as an aspect of the circumstances 
of justice, were mentioned previously in section 7. But they have yet to be elaborated fully. 
 The burdens of judgement are “the sources, or causes, of disagreement between 
reasonable persons.”408 Though reasonable persons are motivated to be conscientious and 
to come to fair agreement with each other, nevertheless for various reasons disagreement 
can be expected to persist between them. Between reasonable persons, such disagreement 
is reasonable disagreement. What is to be avoided is the idea that all disagreement stems 
from “most people [holding] views that advance their own more narrow interests” or from 
the fact that “people are often irrational and not very bright.”409 These represent sources of 
unreasonable disagreement, not reasonable disagreement. To grasp what is involved in 
reasonable disagreement, we must bear in mind “the different kinds of judgements”410 that 
reasonable and rational persons are required to make. Rational persons must balance their 
various ends and assess their overall plan of life. Reasonable persons recognise they must 
assess “the strength of peoples' claims, not only against [their own] claims, but against one 
another, or on [their] common practices and institutions”411 and also assess their “use of 
[their] theoretical (and not [only their] moral and practical) powers.”412 
 But even when people recognise these complexities, and are conscientiously trying 
to come to reasonable agreement, there are a host of reasons as to why we might expect our 
judgements to nevertheless diverge. Jonathan Quong summarises them clearly.  
 
(a) empirical and scientific evidence may be complex and conflicting, (b) 
people may disagree about the relative weight that different considerations 
                                                          
405 See, for example, PL, p. 54, where Rawls says that the requirements of reasonableness, like 
Hobbes's laws of nature, bind “in foro interno”. See Hobbes (1651) p. 110  
406 E.g. PL, pp. 170 
407 See PL, pp. 54—58, for this first feature, and pp49—50, for the second 
408 PL, pp. 55—56 
409 PL, p. 55 
410 PL, p. 56 
411 PL 
412 PL 
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should carry, (c) all conceptions are to some extent inherently vague and 
subject to hard cases, (d) the way we assess moral and political values is 
inevitably shaped to some degree by our total life experience, (e) there are 
often different kinds of normative considerations on both sides of a question 
which fully rational people may not agree how to place, and (f) social 
institutions are limited in the number of values they can incorporate, which 
will sometimes necessitate difficult or even tragic choices.413 
 
The burdens of judgement are hence the explanation for the permanent reasonable 
pluralism found in even an ideal liberal democracy.414  
 Though they are divided in their comprehensive conceptions and doctrines, 
reasonable persons desire to live together with other reasonable persons on terms that are 
reasonable and fair. As was outlined in subsection 9.2, reasonable persons recognise each 
others' individual sovereignty, and the need for cooperative endeavour to be fair, for its 
own sake. To organise their joint affairs, however, they need to develop liberal conceptions 
of justice. They need articulated principles and reasons of sufficient determinacy to come 
to agreement on their political arrangements, or at least to narrow disagreement.415 Such 
conceptions of justice are political conceptions of justice, in contrast to comprehensive 
doctrines and conceptions. Political conceptions are moral conceptions worked out to apply 
only to a specific subject – the political institutions of a liberal democracy, and to articulate 
their political ideals, including justice and legitimacy.416 One difference between a political 
conception of justice and a comprehensive doctrine is hence down to scope. The former 
applies only to the political relations between citizens, whilst comprehensive doctrines may 
apply beyond this, to the limit of the whole of the universe and reality.417 
 There are many such liberal political conceptions of justice. Justice as Fairness is 
just one of them. They are bound together as a class by three common features. They 
assign certain basic rights and liberties to citizens. They assign a special priority to those 
rights and liberties “especially with respect to the good and perfectionist values.” And they 
                                                          
413 Quong (2011) p. 37, citing PL, p. 55—57.  
414 PL, p. 36—37. Several authors have questioned Rawls's account of the burdens of judgement, and 
the use he puts it to. See, for example, Wenar (2003) pp. 64—69. It is inessential for me to address such 
claims here. Quong (2011) pp. 245—246 thinks that Rawlsian-style political liberalism can be defended 
without the burdens of judgement, provided we maintain that “normal human reasoning ... under liberal 
conditions produces permanent disagreement,” which is the position I assume here.  
415 See PL, pp. 9—10, 156, 161, 223—227 
416 PL, pp. xxxvi, xliii, 11—12. Note that justice and legitimacy are distinguished, as a legitimate 
government may still enact unjust laws (pp. 427—428) 
417 PL, pp. 12—13 
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attempt to ensure that all citizens receive adequate all-purpose means to their liberties.418 I 
shall refer to these three features as the three basic features of liberal conceptions. It is 
subscription to these three features as necessary requirements on their political 
arrangements which picks out comprehensive doctrines as reasonable. If a doctrine does 
not wholeheartedly endorse these three requirements at some level, whatever else it may 
hold, it is not reasonable. 
 Political conceptions are further distinguished from comprehensive conceptions in 
that they are developed purely within public reason, and using public reasoning.419 Being 
developed within the limits of public reason, the political conceptions, as a class, are able 
to be the focus of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. To 
repeat: an overlapping consensus need not be focused on a single liberal political 
conception, but may be focused on several.420 The idea of an overlapping consensus is 
distinguished from the related idea of a modus vivendi in the following way.  
 A modus vivendi arises when “a plurality of conflicting comprehensive doctrines” 
are faced with certain historical circumstances that have “turned out [such] that for the time 
being at least, the balance of forces keeps all sides supporting the current arrangements 
which happen to be just to each of them.”421 There is hence some kind of consensus around 
shared political institutions. But each comprehensive doctrine in the society supports the 
political settlement merely instrumentally. It represents for them the best they can hope for 
given the roughly equal share of power between themselves and the other comprehensive 
doctrines. If the power balance shifts, no side will feel compunction in reshaping the 
society to accord with their comprehensive ideals. A modus vivendi hence occurs only 
                                                          
418 PL, pp. xlvi, 6, 223 
419 See, for example, PL, pp. 8, 223—227. Rawls argues that political conceptions are in addition 
restricted to constitutional essentials and matters of “basic justice”, e.g. PL, pp. 227—230. Not all political 
liberals follow him on this. See Quong (2011) chapter 9. I do not believe my basic arguments are effected 
whichever position is adopted, though there may be more influence when we consider how psychological 
theory interacts with the requirements of public reason (subsection 15.2).  
420 PL, pp. 44 fn46, 149, 482—483, CP, p. 608—609, LP, pp. 172—173. Conceiving of the 
overlapping consensus as focused upon the group of political conceptions, is suggested by these passages. 
But this idea is not spelt out by Rawls himself. Quong (2011) chpt 6 represents a development and defence of 
the idea. I think he is probably on the right track, though I have not had the time to reflect on his position 
sufficiently to tell whether I would want to endorse it myself, or another similar to it. I have not incorporated 
this idea into the account of the stability argument in subsection 15.2 below. The way that Rawls presents 
that argument does not reflect this feature of the focus of an overlapping consensus, but instead restricts itself 
to talking of an overlapping consensus focused on Justice as Fairness. Given that my aim in that section is 
largely to indicate the continuity in Rawls's understanding of the stability argument between the later and 
earlier philosophies, incorporating the complexities of the overlapping consensus having a wider focus would 
be a distraction here. In addition, on Quong's own view, the overlapping consensus is no longer situated 
within the second part of the argument from the original position (Quong (2011) p. 186), but is rather 
presupposed by the fundamental ideas. 
421 PL, pp. xl—xli. See also pp. 146—7. By “happen to be just to each of them” Rawls appears to mean 
that the arrangements satisfy at least some of the requirements of liberal political conceptions, not that the 
arrangements are just from the perspective of each comprehensive doctrine, for some of these may be 
unreasonable. 
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between unreasonable comprehensive doctrines, or between unreasonable and reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines. 
 The overlapping consensus of a well-ordered society, by contrast, “consists of all 
the reasonable opposing religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines likely to persist over 
generations and to gain a sizeable body of adherents.”422 In an overlapping consensus, “the 
acceptance of the political conception is not a compromise between those holding different 
[comprehensive] views.”423 Rather, the reasonable comprehensive doctrines affirm their 
preferred political conception for its own sake.  
 As we stressed in sections 8 and 9, in a well-ordered society members of the society 
value political justice and the political institutions of their society intrinsically.424 Come the 
shift to political liberalism, the account of this becomes more complicated. First, each 
political conception is accepted by the reasonable members of the well-ordered society as 
giving pro tanto reasons for its own endorsement.425 These pro tanto reasons are public 
reasons, as a political conception is, as has been said, purely developed from public 
reasoning. Reasonable comprehensive doctrines are then to determine for themselves how 
the pro tanto political reasons stemming from the political conception they endorse are to 
fit within the structure of their overall comprehensive view. It is imagined that there are 
many ways in which different comprehensive doctrines can do this, and the political 
conception itself gives no guidance as to how to it is to be conceived of as compatible with 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines.426 How these added complications alter the stability 
argument will be reviewed in subsection 13.1 below. 
 I now move on to introduce what is often thought of as the most notorious aspect of 
Rawls's political liberalism: the idea that a liberal political conception is developed and 
presented as reasonable, and is not claimed to be true.427 The first question to ask ourselves 
is: developed and presented by who? Individual political conceptions will be developed by 
particular individuals, such as Rawls, or they may be developed by politically active 
groups, or perhaps certain professions, such as the legal profession, or certain traditions, 
such as various religions, or even by political parties. A fully articulated and systematic 
political conception is the sort of thing we might expect to be developed by a philosopher 
or similar academic, but we might imagine a political conception which obtains only over a 
                                                          
422 PL, p. 15 
423 PL, pp. 170—171 
424 PL, pp. xxxvii—xxxviii makes it clear this this reaffirmed in the later philosophy. 
425 PL, p. 386.  
426 See PL, pp. 168—171, 386—387 
427 See clear statements at PL. pp. xx, 94, 394—395. Comments by Raz (2003b) p. 396 serve to 
underline just how surprising we might find Rawls's position. 
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certain area of political consideration, such as the interpretation of a constitution, or on 
civil disobedience. The actual political conceptions endorsed by many individuals will 
most likely be a ramshackle collection of different political conceptions, ideas, reasons and 
principles – and most likely none the worse for it.428 But really, all such exercises in 
reflection stem from a common source: the public reason of a liberal democracy. So when 
Rawls say that he does not put forward his theory as true, we should not focus on this. 
What we should understand is that Rawls thinks that the body of public reason in a liberal 
democracy should not be understood simply as true, in its own terms, but merely as 
reasonable. 
 What exactly are reasonableness and unreasonableness, in this context, such that 
they can be contrasted with truth and falsity? The True – i.e. the body of truths about the 
world – Rawls assumes, is unitary.429 It is opposed to the False. But the False is not unitary. 
It is plural. There are many false things to think. But both the Reasonable and the 
Unreasonable are plural. There are many reasonable opinions, and only a selection of them 
could be true. The many reasonable beliefs oppose the many unreasonable beliefs. Again, 
only a selection of the unreasonable beliefs could ever be true. Truths and falsehoods, and 
reasonable and unreasonable beliefs, are contraries. Each one of this pair of contraries – 
true, false, reasonable, and unreasonable – is a different category, and obtains over a 
different range of beliefs or claims. 
 However, as Rawls understands these notions in this context, reasonableness is a 
more substantive notion than truth (though exactly what it means to say something is 
“more substantive”, and to deny that it is simply formal, is, I recognise, a deep 
philosophical question). The sense of reasonableness Rawls means is that developed here 
and previously in subsection 8.2. From everything that has been said, we can say that the 
sense of “reasonable” meant is a specifically political sense of reasonable. This is required 
by the limitations of developing a non-comprehensive conception of justice and legitimacy 
suitable given the reasonable pluralism of ideal liberal democratic societies.  
 There can be assumed to be, similarly, a body of truths specifically related to 
politics and political philosophy. Political liberalism in no way aims to stop us from saying 
or thinking this. Assuming the unity of truth, there can only one truth about the way that a 
given society should be organised politically. But there can be many reasonable ways a 
liberal democracy can be organised. The reason why political reasonableness is, 
nevertheless, the more substantive notion than political truth is this: simply by saying that 
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429 PL, p. 129 
118 
 
there is only one true way to organise a polity, we do not say whether this one true way is 
liberal, or democratic, or autocratic, or anarchic (i.e. to properly organise a state, we 
destroy it).430 But all the reasonable ways to organise a society, given Rawls's usage, are 
liberal democratic ways to organise a society. All such ways are committed to the three 
basic features of a liberal regime. Hence political reasonableness and political liberalism 
are linked together for Rawls, and this gives his notion of reasonableness quite substantive 
content, even though he refrains from relating it to the notion of truth.431 
 Rawls believes that it is important that political conceptions are put forward as 
reasonable, and are not put forward as true, for a further reason. When put forward as true, 
a political conception can be in contradiction with a great many comprehensive doctrines, 
both reasonable and unreasonable (and, as it happens, with a great many political 
conceptions).432 But it is unnecessary, for various reasons, for a liberal political conception 
to claim such a status – to claim it is true. For example, Rawls speculates that in proposing 
itself as true, a political conception might prevent itself from being the focus of a 
reasonable overlapping consensus. Hence, a liberal political conception should be content 
to put itself forward as reasonable.433 
 I shall briefly summarise the elements of political liberalism this subsection has 
introduced. Liberal democracies are marked by permanent pluralism in comprehensive 
moral doctrines. But this pluralism is not simply pluralism as such. It is reasonable 
pluralism, as much of the disagreement arises between conscientious reasonable persons. 
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  There is much to be said about what putting forward a political conception as reasonable and not as 
true actually amounts to. I understand this to have both a metaethical aspect and a normative aspect. Any 
political conception will be accompanied by a metaethical story about the status of its principles of justice. 
For example, Rawls’s liberal political conception is presented with a constructivist metaethic. But this 
metaethical story, whatever it is, needs to be publicly presented as reasonable, and not as true. I believe that 
we can best understand what it means to present the metaethical position underwriting a political conception 
as reasonable and not as true by understanding it as being public presented only as prima facie. Individuals 
then decide from the perspective of their own comprehensive doctrines whether they are going to accept this 
account as anything more than prima facie, or else abandon it in their non-public beliefs. The normative 
aspect of presenting a political conception as reasonable and not as true is that the normative authority of a 
political conception is only to be publicly asserted as prima facie. Whether the political conception has 
genuine normative authority, either pro tanto or all-things-considered, is again to be decided by citizens in 
the well-ordered society from the perspective of their comprehensive doctrines. To fully defend this 
interpretation of the idea of comprehensive doctrines being publicly presented as reasonable and not as true, 
and to critically assess it in light of how it relates to our interest in moral psychology in political liberalism, 
would be a lengthy task. For example, I have stated that the normative authority of political conceptions is to 
be presented as prima facie, but I have also (in the main text) stated it is presented to reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines as pro tanto. I have not explained here how these two claims are consistent. But I 
put it aside this and other issues for the course of this discussion. Hence, for the rest of the chapter I will 
simply refer to political conceptions of justice being presented as reasonable and not as true without further 
explaining what this means. 
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The reason for this is that there are burdens of judgement which effect even the debates 
and disputes of those who are wholeheartedly trying to be reasonable. Comprehensive 
moral doctrines can be both reasonable and unreasonable. The former endorse the basic 
institutions and ideals of a liberal democratic regime. The latter do not. Being divided in 
their comprehensive moral doctrines, but at the same time being subscribers to the ideal of 
liberal democracy, reasonable comprehensive doctrines – and politically reasonable 
persons – develop political conceptions of justice. Political conceptions are marked out by 
their scope. They are moral conceptions which apply only to issues regarding the political 
arrangements of liberal democracies. Political conceptions are also marked out in that they 
are drawn entirely from the public culture of liberal democracies, and hence are exercises 
in public reasoning. In a well-ordered society, political conceptions, taken as a group, are 
the focus of an overlapping consensus of the reasonable comprehensive doctrines. The 
political conceptions provide pro tanto reasons for their acceptance to reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines. The full account of how such political values and principles fit 
with a person's other values and principles is given by how their particular comprehensive 
doctrine fits the former values and principles in with the latter. Finally, political 
conceptions should ideally be understood as reasonable rather than true. There can be 
many political conceptions, and many comprehensive moral doctrines, that are reasonable. 
Assuming Truth is One, there can only ever be one body of truth regarding moral and 
political matters. But the fact of reasonable pluralism means that political conceptions 
proposed as true are not suitable as the focus of an overlapping consensus. 
 
12.2 Why was Theory's well-ordered society not stable?  
  
 Having laid out the fundamentals of the idea of political liberalism, and earlier the 
notion of stability for the right reasons, I now investigate what reasons Rawls had, or may 
have had, for revising Justice as Fairness. I first present Rawls's account. I then argue that 
aspects of this account are misleading, in particular the idea that the alterations to Justice as 
Fairness were necessary in order to make its well-ordered society realistic. This is true, but 
the revisions were needed anyway, simply in virtue of the combination of the need for 
public justification, combined with the fact of reasonable pluralism. 
 Rawls believed Justice as Fairness failed to be stable for the right reasons, in its 
original comprehensive formulation. Hence why he held it needed to be reformed. Justice 
as Fairness failed because of the facts that political liberalisms more generally accept. It 
did not recognise the fact of reasonable pluralism which characterises modern liberal 
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democracies, even when they are conceived in their ideal form. But let's see how Rawls 
puts the matter himself. 
 Rawls writes that the problem arises due to the “unrealistic idea of a well-ordered 
society as it appears in Theory.”434 In this original formulation of the well-ordered society, 
all members of the society endorse Justice as Fairness and its two principles “on the basis 
of ... a comprehensive philosophical doctrine.”435 But as we have seen, “a modern 
democratic society is characterised by ... a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines” which, being reasonable, do not “reject the essentials of a 
democratic regime.”436 Justice as Fairness is, in its original formulation, a comprehensive 
liberal conception of justice. It also accepts those essentials. But this leads to the difficulty: 
 
However, since the principles of justice as fairness in Theory require a 
constitutional democratic regime, and since the fact of reasonable pluralism is 
the long-term outcome of a society's culture in the context of these free 
institutions, ... the argument in Theory relies on a premise the realisation of 
which its principles of justice rule out. This is the premise that in the well-
ordered society of justice as fairness, citizens hold the same comprehensive 
doctrine, and this includes aspects of Kant's comprehensive liberalism, to 
which the principles of justice as fairness belong. But given the fact of 
reasonable pluralism, this comprehensive view is not held by citizens generally, 
any more than a religious doctrine, or some form of utilitarianism.437  
 
The idea is that the society of Justice as Fairness, when conceived as based on a 
comprehensive conception as in Theory, cannot be realised. Its institutional structure gives 
rise to reasonable pluralism, and not the monism of Kantian comprehensive liberalism 
which Justice as Fairness in Theory is described here as helping itself to when arguing for 
the stability of its well-ordered society. To expect all members of the society to be, in some 
sense, comprehensive Kantians is “unrealistic,”438 even in favourable conditions. But if this 
is unrealistic, then the argument in Theory is not completed. The stability argument as 
presented in that book does not by itself secure the stability of the institutional structure of 
                                                          
434 TJ, p. xvi. See also CP, p. 488—490 which speaks of the society of Theory as being “utopian”, in an 
unrealistic, and not realistic way (on this latter distinction, see JF, pp. 4—5). See further subsection 13.1 
below. 
435 TJ, p. xvi 
436 PL, p. xvi 
437 PL, p. xl 
438 PL, p. xvii 
121 
 
the society described. As was made clear in section 11 above, and in earlier chapters, such 
stability is required for full justification. Of course, such a society might be stable, in a 
certain sense, if those who accept the comprehensive version of Justice as Fairness impose 
conformity to its requirements on all other members of the society. But this would require 
the violation of basic liberal rights. The society would be stable for the wrong reasons. 
This is what Rawls asserts when he writes that “a society united on ... the reasonable 
liberalisms of Kant or Mill, would ... require the sanctions of state power [to be used in an 
oppressive, illegitimate manner] to remain so [united].”439  
 This introduces some of the reasons for Rawls's alteration of his views. But my first 
point is that simply saying that the well-ordered society of Justice as Fairness was 
unrealistic, or that it would require a repression which would amount to the contradiction 
of its very own principles, is potentially misleading. What may be suggested is that Rawls 
simply views the well-ordered society of Justice as Fairness as psychologically unrealistic, 
i.e. unrealisable or unstable in the light of human nature. The changes in Rawls theory 
would hence be forced by Rawls reassessing his earlier account of human nature.  
However, what becomes clearer from examining Rawls's position as a whole is that 
the essential problem isn't just that we could not bring about the well-ordered society of 
Theory. It's that we should not even want to. What is important is not that the society of 
Theory is psychologically impossible, but that it would not be stable for the right reasons 
even if it were possible. As described in Theory, the well-ordered society is unjustified. It 
is either unjustified because its argument from stability is incomplete, or it is unjustified 
because elements of its argument from stability are in contradiction with one of the other 
elements of the theory – the priority of liberty. Assuming a close connection between the 
priority of liberty and the fundamental conception of the person (not a rash assumption, I 
feel), the argument from stability is also in contradiction with the assumptions of the 
conception of the person. 
 To see this, let's imagine, against the assumptions from the burdens of judgement, 
that the well-ordered society of Justice as Fairness in Theory did come about. The 
members of the society have a public conception of justice, which they follow and which 
sustains the society in perpetuity. Is it the case that this society will be stable for the right 
reasons? 
 Now imagine that the members of the well-ordered society consider the following 
(for them) hypothetical scenario: what if other reasonable comprehensive moral doctrines – 
whether liberal or non-liberal – were to arise in their society? Being reasonable 
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comprehensive doctrines, these other comprehensive doctrines will endorse some liberal 
political conception of justice, even if it is not Justice as Fairness. Given the uniform 
endorsement of the comprehensive version of Justice as Fairness, the members of this 
society had not previously considered this possibility. Hence, consideration of it was not 
included within the justification of the public conception of the well-ordered society 
known to each member of the society. This situation is perfectly possible by Rawls's 
stipulations. Justification via the original position need not be thought to be definitive, but 
is simply the most justified conclusion we can offer given the progress of our reflections so 
far.440  
 We might imagine two possible reactions to such hypothetical moral musings, and 
two corresponding extensions of the public conception of justice of the society: 
 
a: If more reasonable comprehensive doctrines arose, it would be 
justifiable to suppress them using the coercive power of the state. 
 
b: If more reasonable doctrines were to arise, it would not be permissible to 
suppress any of them, except if, in the case of certain ones, failing to suppress 
those ones would be certain, or highly likely, to lead to the liberal institutions 
of the society being undermined.441 
 
These two reactions can be thought of as extensions of the existing public conception. The 
members of the society are formulating new beliefs, linked to their existing attitudes, on a 
scenario they have not previously considered. For the later Rawls, only societies which 
adopted b above would be classifiable as stable for the right reasons.  
 Societies which conform to a, though perhaps stable, are not stable for the right 
reasons. This is because their public conception of justice, which would contain a, could 
not be publicly justified to new reasonable comprehensive doctrines if any were to arise. 
Given a, new reasonable comprehensive doctrines would be suppressed. But how could 
this be justified to the advocates of those doctrines? After all, the new doctrines would 
endorse liberal democratic institutions. Being reasonable, they would be willing to offer 
justifications for this endorsement which would be public. This would require that those 
justifications be understandable by anyone else who endorses the ideal of liberal 
                                                          
440 See TJ, p. 52/45—46, 508—509/580—582, JF, p. 31 
441 The question of whether and to what extent it is permissible to oppress unreasonable comprehensive 
doctrines is a complicated one. I do not take it up here. Rawls says something about it (see, for example, TJ, 
pp. 216—221/190—194 and 575—577/503—505), and the issue has recently received extended treatment by 
Quong (2011) chapter 10 
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democracy. The public culture and body of public reasoning of the existing liberal society, 
which in our scenario contains only advocates of Justice as Fairness in its comprehensive 
guise, would be expanded by the presence of these new doctrines. The existing inhabitants 
of the society could hardly claim that the new arrivals were appealing to reasons they 
simply could not recognise, given the shared commitment to liberal democratic institutions 
and basic liberal rights. Furthermore, it is important to note that these considerations apply 
even if the development of new comprehensive doctrines was truly counter-factual, and 
none actually did ever arise. For the members of the society who endorse a would be 
willing to suppress other doctrines if they did arise. But in holding this, they show that they 
are not genuinely committed to basic liberal rights, even though they never get a chance to 
demonstrate their illiberality. Though their society is stable, it is not governed by the right 
reasons – at least in one key respect. 
 Hence, whether or not we accept that the well-ordered society of Theory is 
unrealistic, its public conception is importantly undetermined, as it does not address the 
above possibility.442 In so far as it fails to address this possibility, it is (to that extent, we 
might say) unjustified as a liberal conception of justice, providing we assume that a liberal 
conception of justice has to have something to say about reasonable pluralism. 
 Given all this, what can we say about Rawls's claim that the well-ordered society of 
Theory is unrealistic? The claim, I assume, is plausible. But it was a misstep for Rawls to 
put things primarily in this way. The problem with the well-ordered society of the 
comprehensive version of Justice as Fairness is not primarily that it is unrealistic given 
real-world circumstances (though this would be a problem). The more fundamental 
problem is that such a well-ordered society would be stable for the wrong reasons, even in 
favourable circumstances which allowed such a society to occur and thrive. Liberal 
democratic societies are marked, Rawls assumes, by reasonable pluralism. In order for 
there to be public justification of the institutions of such societies, and hence for them to be 
legitimate liberal states, there need to be specifically political conceptions of justice. This 
is the only way for there to be shared public reasons between all members of the society, as 
they are divided in their comprehensive moral doctrines, and the reasons associated with 
these. Hence, we need a revised stability argument: one which takes reasonable pluralism 
into account. A society united under one liberal comprehensive doctrine, if it could even 
exist, is simply not a liberal society, in political terms at least. It is perhaps better described 
as a liberal culture. Whether this liberal culture existed under a liberal or an illiberal state 
                                                          
442 PL, p. xv—xvi for a statement that Theory simply fails to take a view on this matter, i.e. does not 
explicitly come down on either a or b. 
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would depend upon whether its members would publicly endorse, on consideration, a or b 
above. 
 Given these considerations, I draw two conclusions. The first is that the fact of 
reasonable pluralism is important simply as a possibility, independently of whether it is 
realised or not. The fact of reasonable pluralism is of course assumed to obtain in our 
world. But if there were another world in which it did not obtain, reflection on the 
possibility of reasonable pluralism would still force the changes on Justice as Fairness 
which Rawls identifies. This follows simply from the requirement of public justification.443 
 The second conclusion is that problems with the psychological realisability of the 
original account of Justice as Fairness are not at the heart of the modifications in Rawls’s 
later work. In both the earlier and the later philosophy, psychological realisability has a 
prominent place. What I want to suggest it is the same prominent place. It is not that a 
renewed concern with psychological stability, and Rawls’s existing moral psychology, led 
to revisions to the idea of stability for the right reasons, and the introduction of the 
distinctive ideas of the later works. Rather, consideration of the idea of stability for the 
right reasons lead to these introductions directly. It is left an open question how much the 
moral psychology has to be altered in the light of this (which is not to say it will not be 
altered). 
Contrary certain interpretations of his work,444 Rawls’s later philosophy does not 
show an increased concern with stability over justice. Rather, it notices certain overlooked 
ramifications of the endorsement of public justification and basic liberal rights, and 
attempts to develop what conclusions these may lead to. This does lead Rawls away from 
being concerned to develop the true theory of justice, but only due to self-imposed 
restrictions arising from what he understands to be the requirements of public justification. 
This is different from altering one’s theory simply due to the practical limitations of the 
world per se. As I remarked in subsection 6.1, Rawls’s conception of the person (and of 
the well-ordered society) represent non-negotiable normative foundations to his theory. If 
he were simply adjusting his theory to practical restrictions, this could not be true. 
Hence, it was not problems with psychological realisability which primarily led to 
the revisions found in the later theory. Some of Rawls’s own remarks are hence misleading 
in this regard. Approaches to explaining why Rawls revised his theory which focus on 
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  Whether reasonable pluralism is to be understood exactly as Rawls understands it, or whether public 
justification requires the distinctively Rawlsian idea that political conceptions must be presented as 
reasonable and not as true, is left open by this conclusion. 
444
  For example, Klosko (1994). Interpretations which go against such positions include Krasnoff (1999) 
and Quong (2011) chapter 5. These latter interpretations are more in line with my own. 
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looking for weaknesses in the stability argument, such as Barry’s,445 are in a subtle way 
misguided. The stability argument is, in truth, the wrong aspect of Rawls’s theory to start 
from in tracing the changes in his thought. The more basic idea of stability for the right 
reasons should be our point of departure, and it is this road which I have attempted to take 
in this section. In the next section, I shall begin to examine what changes may need to be 
made to the stability argument and Rawls’s account of moral psychology given the 
alterations to his theory in his later period. 
 Before continuing however, I remark to the reader that I do not aim to defend 
political liberalism, or even public justification liberalism in this chapter. My aim is simply 
to clarify what stability for the right reasons commits Rawls to, in order have a firm 
footing from which to understand the place of moral psychology within Rawls’s later 
theory. I hence leave aside here debates about whether political liberalism is or is not the 
only correct formulation of liberalism as a political philosophical theory.446 
 
Section 13: Moral Psychology in Political Liberalism 
 
 In the previous section, I assessed why stability for the right reasons led to the 
revisions of the late period Rawls. In the previous subsection in particular, I argued that it 
is not particularly issues of psychological realism which led to Rawls’s revisions of his 
philosophy, or at least which should have led Rawls to his revisions. Rather, it is the 
requirement of stability for the right reasons itself, when combined with the fact of 
reasonable pluralism. It is the need for public justification which leads to the need to 
distinguish between comprehensive and political conceptions. In this section, I try to make 
some in-roads into how much this may cause alterations in Rawls's moral psychology, as it 
appeared in Theory and other early works. My first claim is that the roles of moral 
psychology, and the shape of the stability argument, do not and need not change much at 
all. I then observe that the changes made in Rawls's later period do not in themselves 
require that the content of the psychology be changed at all. It may be that Rawls's moral 
psychology does need to be altered. But it is difficult to say whether this is so, without a 
much more substantial account of how the requirements of public reasoning limit the use 
of psychological data. This is not given by the basic ideas in Rawls's later work, and no 
more sufficiently substantial discussion of this issue is provided by him, as the discussion 
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  Barry (1995b) 
446 For representative exchanges regarding this issue, one for political liberalism, and one against, see, 
respectively, Quong (2011) and Wall (1998). 
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below shall illustrate. 
 I first briefly outline the stability argument as it now appears in the later works 
(subsection 13.1). This allows me to introduce the uses that Rawls put his moral 
psychology to in his politically liberal period, which have very minor differences with his 
comprehensively liberal times. It also allows me to observe that the essential roles of the 
moral psychology are unchanged. In the following subsection, 13.2, I then very briefly 
comment on how the limitations imposed by political liberalism may impact on the 
assessment of the moral psychology. 
 
13.1 Rawls's use of moral psychology in his politically liberal theory 
 
 As I noted in the introduction to the thesis, the general shape of Rawls's moral 
psychology, and the use to which he puts it, does not significantly alter between A Theory 
of Justice, and Political Liberalism and beyond. In this section, I outline how the roles of 
moral psychology are essentially the same in Rawls's later theory as in his earlier.  
 In Political Liberalism, Rawls refers to his continued reliance on the moral 
psychology.447 The moral psychology is again referenced, summarised this time in slightly 
more expanded detail, in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement.448 In this second discussion, 
Rawls states that he “would not change ... substantially” the earlier account.449 It should be 
noted, however, that he only makes reference to §§70-72 and §§75-76 of Theory. The 
sections missing are those that discuss the moral emotions, the moral sentiments, and the 
natural sentiments. I am unsure whether this omission has any deeper significance. Given 
the brief account of the moral psychology Rawls presents here, it may be that he thought 
these sections unnecessary to cite. Alternatively, he may have believed there were more 
fundamental problems with his views on these matters. I do not here investigate this matter, 
though it is of obvious significance regarding debates surrounding what sort of role both 
the early and late Rawls saw (and should have seen) the emotions having in politics.450 
 I have earlier noted in subsection 3.1 that the content of the moral psychology is 
broader than just the account of the sense of justice. It is clear that these further elements 
are also included within the moral psychology in Rawls's later views. The concept of the 
person is the same there, and the account of the ability to revise and develop a conception 
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448 JF, pp. 195—197, esp fn17 
449 JF, pp. 195—197 
450 On this debate, see, for example, Solomon (1995), Nussbaum (2003) pp. 489—499, Held (2006) pp. 
83—84, Krause (2008), pp. 28—37 
127 
 
of the good is largely the same.451 Indeed, I made use of this material in chapter 4. 
 In his later works, Rawls calls his moral psychology “a reasonable moral 
psychology.” Regarding this, he writes that “this name is appropriate since the idea of 
reciprocity appears both as a principle giving its content and as a disposition to answer in 
kind.”452 I think the “principle” referred to here is most likely a normative principle. The 
“disposition” by contrast corresponds to the psychological principles of reciprocity: see 
Appendix II.  
 We can reconstruct from Political Liberalism and Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement a subtly new account of the stability argument. It will be seen to employ 
moral psychology once again in its roles of demonstrating the realisability and stability of 
the well-ordered society, and also playing the justifying roles of avoiding futility and 
arbitration.  
 The “question of stability”453 is answered in the following stages. First, the moral 
psychology of the sense of justice is again presented in order to demonstrate that, living 
under the institutions of Justice as Fairness, citizens acquire a sense of justice and the 
corresponding motivation.454 
 It can then be argued, as discussed in chapter 2, that the sense of justice generated 
by Justice as Fairness wins out against competing moral psychologies, developed this time 
from rival political conceptions. As has been made clear, political liberalism rejects the 
idea that a straight comparison between the strengths of the sense of justice associated with 
different comprehensive moral conceptions can serve in an argument for the stability (for 
the right reasons) of a liberal democracy, given the fact of reasonable pluralism.  As 
previously noted in subsection 4.5, however, Rawls does not appear to stress such 
comparisons in the various restatements of the argument from stability in his later works. 
In addition, he cites the “relative stability” section of Theory as one of those which 
indicates that it assumes an unrealistic, monistic conception of well-ordered societies and 
their comprehensive doctrines.455 It may be that he meant to indicate that assessing the 
comparative stability of different conceptions should be dropped from the argument in the 
original position, and hence also the role of arbitration. Yet the passage just referenced 
does not say this, but simply observes that this is one place in Theory in which Justice as 
Fairness is assumed to be a partially comprehensive doctrine, in contradiction to Rawls's 
later formulation of his theory. This does not rule out the comparison of different political 
                                                          
451 See, for example, PL, pp. 81—86, 176—178 
452 PL, pp. 195—196. The name is introduced at CP, p. 445 
453 PL, p. 140 
454 See PL, pp. 140—143, JF, pp. 195—197 
455 JF, pp. 186—187. See also CP, p. 489 
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conceptions along these lines.456 And when we consider it, why should the parties in the 
original position deprive themselves of such potentially relevant considerations? I do not 
think it is obvious that Rawls needs to drop relative stability comparisons from the 
argument from the original position entirely, provided they are understood to be 
comparisons between the psychologies associated with rival political conceptions.457 But I 
leave it open that he may have decided not to stress this element of the stability argument 
in later work. 
 Next, the special psychologies are again considered, and it is argued that, in the 
well-ordered society of Justice as Fairness, these psychologies will not be so powerful as 
to overwhelm our motivation to act justly and civilly as citizens.458 Note that the reason 
that Rawls is able to include the discussion of the special psychologies here, rather than in 
the discussion of the overlapping consensus, say, is that he ties them closely to a variety of 
conflict which it is not political liberalism's job to specifically address. These are conflicts 
from “citizen's status, class position, and occupation, or from their ethnicity, gender and 
race.”459 It is a deeply complicated issue as to how far disputes between comprehensive 
doctrines can be disentangled from these further disputes, at least in our non-ideal 
circumstances. It may be that they cannot, and hence perhaps that political liberalism takes 
the wrong approach to these problems.460 It is an important issue as to how successfully 
Justice as Fairness is able to deal with these issues, and if it is not successful, what this 
means for Justice as Fairness, and liberal theory generally. But I do not address this here. 
 To return to our current topic, arguments regarding the congruence of the Right and 
the Good are now reprised.461 These sections are the ones most frequently cited as 
responsible for Rawls's revisions of his work in Political Liberalism.462 I have reservations 
about the way such claims are usually put. But there is undoubtedly something correct 
about them – Rawls himself frequently calls attention to the difference between political 
and comprehensive conceptions of the  good of liberal society.463 But I will not air my 
reservations here, as noted in section 12 above. But it is clear that Rawls puts forward 
several arguments for the good of political justice, at least when viewed from the 
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perspective of Justice as Fairness as a political conception.464 
 It is only after all these elements of the stability argument from A Theory of Justice 
have been reprised, now as elements of a political conception of justice, that the argument 
for the possibility for an overlapping consensus is taken up. This argument uses the same 
moral psychology of the sense of justice (and reasonableness) which has been used 
throughout the stability argument.465 If it can be shown that an overlapping consensus is a 
reasonable possibility, given the wider social situation of the well-ordered society, then 
Justice as Fairness will be a stable political conception, and hence be justified all-things-
considered. 
 It is important to note here is that the argument does not proceed by arguing that, 
given its moral psychology, Justice as Fairness will develop an overlapping consensus 
around itself. Rawls clarifies this in the introduction to the paperback edition of Political 
Liberalism. That book 
 
makes no attempt to prove, or to show, that [an overlapping] consensus would 
eventually form around a reasonable political conception of justice. The most 
it does is to present a ... liberal political conception that does not oppose 
comprehensive doctrines on their own ground and does not preclude the 
possibility of an overlapping consensus for the right reasons. PL does note 
certain historical events and processes that seem to have led to [a more limited] 
consensus, and others that may take place, but observing these commonsense 
facts of political sociology does not constitute proof.466 
 
The idea of an overlapping consensus does not complete the stability argument by arguing 
that the institutions of the well-ordered society will lead to such a consensus, given the  
moral psychology of Justice as Fairness. Rather, it completes the stability argument by 
showing that it is not a foregone conclusion that the public acceptance of a liberal 
conception of justice is incompatible with the reasonable pluralism which basic liberal 
institutions inevitably give rise to. 
 This limitation on the stability argument is not imposed simply because it would be 
impossible to determine whether, psychologically, the institutions of Justice as Fairness 
give rise to an overlapping consensus. Rather, making such an argument would require us 
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to go outside the limitations of public reason.467 There may be several reasons for this. I 
give one here. To make such an argument would require a quite extensive social and 
political psychology, which would give a general theory regarding how liberal political 
institutions and a range of comprehensive doctrines with certain features generally interact. 
Such a psycho-social theory would no doubt be beyond the limits of public reason. Such a 
theory would not describe how comprehensive doctrines come to endorse the political 
conception in their own terms, but by reference to the psychological theory. But obviously, 
the advocates of such comprehensive doctrines couldn't accept the theory's explanation for 
their behaviour without abandoning their own views.468 
 In Theory, the moral psychology is restricted to demonstrating how, in a well-
ordered society, individuals would acquire a sense of justice over the normal course of 
development. In Political Liberalism, Justice as Fairness:A Restatement, and the 
preceding article “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus”, the psychology is also used as 
part of an argument for how a society initially characterised by a modus vivendi between 
its different comprehensive doctrines may, given favourable conditions, develop into a 
well-ordered society.469 This might surprise us. Why doesn't Rawls simply illustrate the 
possibility of various comprehensive doctrines within an well-ordered society endorsing 
the political institutions of that society for their own sake?  
 I speculate that this historical just-so story may be presented in order to help better 
justify political liberalism to ourselves. In our historical situation, Rawls believes the 
United States, and certain other democracies, to have achieved what he calls a 
constitutional consensus. But he perhaps believes that by telling a certain psychological 
story of how we might have come to such a consensus, and how we might, by the same 
kinds of social changes, come to an overlapping consensus, is enough to show that an 
overlapping consensus is not an incoherent or obviously outlandish idea, and hence is “not 
[unrealistically] utopian.”470 This allows Justice as Fairness, and the idea of political 
liberalism more generally, to be of practical relevance. 
                                                          
467 PL, p. 387 suggested this interpretation to me, though it is talking about justification, and not 
directly about stability. 
468 It may be worried that Rawls's own moral psychology may face similar problems. Against this, there 
are two considerations. The first is that the moral psychology is required to be framed only using publicly 
accessible psychological claims (see subsection 13.2 below). The second is that it is to be presented as 
reasonable and not as true. Individuals are hence free to come up with their own explanations as to why they 
have been psychologically moved to endorse one of the liberal political conceptions, or even why everyone 
else has as well. I believe there may remain problems with Rawls's own presentation in this regard. In 
particular, Rawls sometimes talks as if the account of the overlapping consensus shows how the society of 
Justice as Fairness 'adapts' comprehensive doctrines it itself, as noted above in 12.1 (see also PL p. 219). I am 
unsure whether this kind of phrasing is compatible with the limitations of public reasoning. 
469 Rawls's initial account occurs in CP, pp. 440—446 and . This is expanded in PL, pp. 158—168. See 
also JF, pp. 192—195 
470 See JF, p. 192. See also PL, p. 158 
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 With the presentation of the possibility of an overlapping consensus, the stability 
argument in the original position is now, once again, complete. The first, second, third and 
fourth roles of moral psychology are all found within this argument. I will close this 
subsection by noting that the fifth and sixth roles of moral psychology are still present in 
the later philosophy as well. Our capacity for the moral powers is still taken to be the 
criterion for being owed justice, as the next chapter will examine at length. Moral 
psychology may possibly still be partially constitutive of Justice as Fairness as before – 
though of course it can now only be asserted to be a constitutive element of a political 
conception. 
  
13.2 Psychology and Public Justification 
 
 As noted in subsection 4.5, the parties in the original position in Theory were 
conceived to have access to all social scientific theory. But they were also conceived to 
have a preference for conceptions of justice which were supported by scientific and social-
scientific theories the basic content of which was capable of being publicly accessible. 
Come political liberalism, however, this preference was converted into a requirement. The 
parties now have access only to those aspects of scientific theory which are publicly 
available and uncontroversial. How much might we expect this restriction to alter Rawls's 
moral psychology? 
 Judging by his own assessment, not much. As we have seen, Rawls indicates that 
the essentials, if not most, of his psychology are to be carried over from Justice as 
Fairness's comprehensive formulation. I am myself unsure to what extent his position can 
be defended. But I have these reservations not because I am sceptical about Rawls's claim, 
but because thinking about what restrictions public justification puts on the use of 
empirical psychological data is yet another substantial topic.471 I have not, I feel, reflected 
sufficiently on this matter to come to any definite conclusions. As I said at the outset, my 
focus is on the roles of moral psychology within Rawls's theory, and not on the content of 
the psychology he makes use of, or how it might be assessed. But I here note why it seems 
that those who would defend Rawls cannot avoid this issue. 
 The parties only recognise psychological data which can be framed in terms of 
public reason. This will undoubtedly fall short of the claims of empirical psychological 
                                                          
471 As Rawls recognises at PL, p. 252 
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science,472 or even the moral psychological claims which are developed to accompany 
comprehensive moral theories (remembering the distinctions made in subsection 5.2).  
Rawls glosses framing psychological results within public reason by saying that 
psychological results cannot be controversial. But this does not seem to specify things 
sufficiently precisely. Presumably it is possible to unreasonably discount some 
psychological data. It may be that certain psychological facts are controversial, to us, but 
only because they are being unreasonably discounted.473 In which case, the parties in the 
original position would recognise them. How might we come to recognise which facts the 
parties would recognise and which they would not? Rawls tells us that the parties also 
agree to principles of public inquiry as well as justice, and that we can reflect on the 
original position to see what these may be.474 But he does not elaborate much. 
 Furthermore, it does not seem to be the case that, if psychological debates turn out 
to be rampantly and pervasively controversial, then the parties in the original position 
could simply discount psychological facts. The finality condition, and the demands of 
stability, tell against this. Rawlsian-style contractualism must be able to recourse to the 
facts of human nature to some significant extent, if it is to succeed at all. 
 I will not consider this matter further. To conclude this chapter: I hold that the 
changes introduced by Rawls to Justice as Fairness in his later period do not, in themselves, 
obviously and directly mandate the alteration of substantial elements of his moral 
psychology. Whether this psychology would need to be altered would depend on the 
restrictions imposed by the requirements of public justification, which, it should be 
remembered, were already present in the earlier philosophy in a limited way. It would be 
hasty to assume that these alterations would be wide ranging. It would also be hasty to 
assume that they would not be. But the same can be said of the psychology presented in the 
earlier philosophy, if we decide to reject Rawls's later modifications of his theory. The 
ideas introduced to Justice as Fairness in the politically liberal period, considered in 
themselves, obviously place more restrictions on his psychology than were already present. 
But how extensive are these new restrictions, and how much do they add to the restrictions 
which were already in place in the earlier philosophy? The question simply cannot be 
answered, without a clear view of the admissibility of psychological data into the public 
forum.  
 
                                                          
472 Public reason, and scientific reason, are specified to be different at PL, p. 221 
473 A similar theme is prominent in Gerald Gaus's work. See Gaus (1996), (2011). To what extent the 
recognition of this issue could be combined with a more Rawlsian approach is as yet under-explored. 
474 See PL, pp. 223—227, JF, pp. 91—92 
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Chapter 6: Moral Psychology and The Scope of Justice 
 
In this final chapter, I look at the scope of justice within a well-ordered society — to whom 
claims of justice are attributed, and from whom the requirements of justice are expected. 
Unlike previous chapters, this chapter is much more substantively critical, rather than 
exegetical. As noted in subsection 3.4, Rawls's account of the scope of justice alters 
throughout his career. I believe that his earliest account is the most defensible, though to 
defend it Rawls's later theory needs to be modified. On the earliest account, a sense of 
justice, and a capacity to develop a conception of the good, is necessary and sufficient for 
an individual to be included within the scope of the rights and responsibilities of justice. I 
defend this position, in part, by reference to aspects of Rawls's moral psychology. Section 
14 introduces the discussion and sets out the various possible positions: the content of 
sections 15 through 17 are listed at its end. Section 18 then remarks on whether we should 
accept Rawls's account of the scope of justice, even in the modified form I have presented 
it. Though I believe that the modified position allows for a contractarian account of justice 
which is more plausible than has sometimes been thought, I have unavoidable reservations 
about it given the overall structure of Rawls’s theory, which I shall outline. 
 
Section 14: Turning back the clock on the scope of justice 
 
  I aim to give the best defence I can to the view that the capacity for the moral 
powers is necessary and sufficient to be owed justice. These powers, it will be remembered, 
are the sense of justice, and the capacity to develop a conception of the good (subsection 
3.4). I believe that this is the most plausible view available to Rawls, given both what I 
view as the most essential aspects of his theory, and also my own moral and philosophical 
judgements. But though I give the best defence I can, my affirmation of this position will 
be found to be, at best, half-hearted. This is because I believe that serious problems yet 
remain, and are most likely to remain, as section 18 will discuss. This should be 
remembered throughout the coming discussion. Though I suggest alterations to Rawls’s 
position, I work for the most part within a Rawlsian framework. It is only within section 18 
that I then present my general misgivings about a Rawlsian position on these matters. 
 The Rawlsian position I defend is the one Rawls appears to have held in his earliest 
article to include a discussion of the scope of justice – “The Sense of Justice”. Things 
changed after that, however. Defending this earliest position means that elements of the 
later formulations of the theory will need to be altered, or dropped altogether. These 
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revisions are not entirely external. Even subsequent to “The Sense of Justice”, certain 
elements of Rawls's view make the most sense when combined with the position that the 
moral powers are necessary and sufficient to be owed justice. Most importantly for us, 
these elements include core elements of his moral psychology. My eventual position, then, 
is revisionary. At times it does follow my own moral assessment more than Rawls's. But I 
believe that some of Rawls's commitments are simply morally indefensible, so there is no 
choice in this matter. However, I attempt whenever possible to argue that Rawls's himself, 
given some of his other commitments, should have supported the revisions I propose. I 
shall be careful to indicate what are internal and what are external critiques. 
 I now reiterate, in greater depth than previously in subsection 3.4, and sections 2 
and 8, how Rawls's position on the scope of justice altered throughout his career. In the 
beginning, possession of the capacity for a sense of justice is necessary and sufficient for 
one to be owed justice.475 However, come A Theory of Justice, the capacity for the powers 
is no longer taken to be necessary, but is merely sufficient. What are the other sufficient 
criteria? Rawls does not say directly, but the options can be reconstructed, particularly in 
the light of what comes next in Political Liberalism. There, the criteria for one to be owed 
justice are the capacity for the two moral powers and the capacity to cooperate directly in 
the maintenance of the basic structure of society. In addition, by Political Liberalism and 
the later works, it is no longer clear that the capacity for the two moral powers is sufficient 
in itself. It may be, however, given what is said in A Theory of Justice, that the capacity to 
cooperate is sufficient. Hence Rawls's final position most likely appears to be that the 
capacity to cooperate is sufficient to be owed justice, but the capacity for the two moral 
powers is not sufficient by itself. I view this position as untenable — even by Rawls's own 
lights. Hence, I aim to defend the original formulation as given in “The Sense of Justice” 
as the best account of the scope of justice available for the Rawlsian contractarian. 
 A note on the status of the chapter within the context of the rest of the thesis. 
Previous chapters have largely concentrated on exegesis, making only small gestures 
towards substantive criticism. This chapter is different. It first presents arguments for the 
revision of Rawls’s account of the scope of justice in line within his earliest position. 
These arguments are heavily critical of certain later elements of Rawls’s theory, and 
possibly go beyond what he would himself have been happy to accept. The arguments are 
hence not simply arguments from within Rawls’s overall theory, in its various forms, but 
also contain considerations of my own. This discussion, which takes up most of the chapter, 
                                                          
475 As is, we can assume, the ability to develop a conception of the good. This second power is not 
explicitly mentioned in the original article. 
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elaborates a certain contractarian account of the scope of justice. However, in section 18, 
my criticisms are then extended to contractarian accounts of the scope of justice 
themselves.  
 My argument for turning the clock back to the original specification of the scope of 
justice, and then criticising even that specification, will proceed as follows. I take issue 
with the position put forward in Political Liberalism and the later philosophy more 
generally. First, in sections 15 and 16, I argue that the ability to contribute to a society is 
irrelevant to being owed justice. In section 15, I argue that possession of the capacity for 
the two moral powers is always sufficient, and that the ability to contribute is not necessary. 
In section 16, I argue that the ability to contribute to the basic structure of society is never 
sufficient by itself. In section 17, I address whether there are any other sufficient criteria 
apart from the moral powers. I claim there are not. Sections 15, 16 and 17 together entail 
that the capacity for moral powers is necessary and sufficient. My final position, then, is 
that Rawls should say that when beings owe each other justice, they simply must be 
capable of developing the moral powers. In section 18, however, there is a concluding 
reflection relating to whether we should hence endorse Rawls's account of the scope of 
justice. I believe that we might, but that there appear to be to me problems with Rawls's 
position overall, which stem from combining this account of justice's scope with the ideas 
of political liberalism, public justification and legitimacy.  
 
Section 15: The Moral Powers and the Ability to Contribute 
 
15.1 Society as fair cooperation, and justice as reciprocity 
 
 This section proceeds as follows. This subsection, after pinpointing the specific 
focus of the section over all in contrast to sections 16 and 17, sets up Rawls's account of 
the moral powers as the basis of equality, and then introduces the ideas of society as fair 
cooperation, and justice as reciprocity. Subsection 15.2 then investigates just what Rawls 
conceives to be the product of fair social cooperation in the well-ordered society of justice 
as fairness. Subsection 15.3 introduces the problems which have been raised with the idea 
that the moral powers and the ability to contribute to the productive scheme of society are 
necessary and sufficient to be owed justice. Subsection 15.4 argues for the idea that the 
capacity for the moral powers should be sufficient in itself to be owed justice, and that the 
ability to contribute should not be necessary. Subsection 15.5 then lays out an extensive 
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host of objections and queries regarding whether this revision is legitimate, and how much 
it may alter the structure of Rawls's theory. 
 To begin: at various points, Rawls appears to commit himself to the idea that the 
capacity for the moral powers, and the ability to cooperate in society in certain ways, are 
jointly necessary and sufficient to be owed justice. The most overt statements are found in 
Political Liberalism and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement.476 I say “appears”, but for the 
most part I shall assume that Rawls does make this commitment. Only in subsection 15.5 
A do I address whether this is strictly correct. In any case, I thoroughly reject, over the 
course of this section and the next, what I shall often call “the contribution requirement”.477 
This is the requirement that it is necessary, or alternatively sufficient, that an individual 
contribute to the cooperative surplus of a cooperative scheme in order to be owed justice. 
Contribution is sometimes given to be a necessary condition – along with possessing a 
capacity for the moral powers – to be owed justice. This is the formulation which this 
section (section 15) will consider. Alternatively, other passages taken together suggest that 
contribution is a sufficient condition, by itself, to be owed justice. This idea will be tackled 
in section 16. The eventual conclusion of this section (section 15) is that the capacity for 
the moral powers is sufficient by itself to be owed justice. This section (section 15) hence 
serves to reject the claim that a capacity for the moral powers, and contribution to the 
cooperative scheme of society, are jointly necessary and sufficient. Contribution is not 
necessary, and the capacity for the moral powers is sufficient in itself. It is only in the next 
section (section 16), however, that I argue that contribution in itself is not sufficient. And it 
is only in section 17 that I argue that there are no other sufficient criteria to be owed justice 
other than possessing the capacity for the moral powers. Taken together then, sections 15, 
16 and 17 entail that the capacity for the moral powers is both necessary and sufficient to 
be owed justice. 
 I now introduce Rawls's account of the basis of equality, and the variability he 
allows in people's capacity for the moral powers. I will subsequently introduce the idea of 
society as a fair scheme of cooperation over time, and the idea of justice as reciprocity.  
 The two moral powers, previously discussed in sections 2 and 8, and subsection 3.4, 
are the sense of justice, and the capacity to develop a conception of the good. It is obvious 
that people vary in the degree to which they develop these capacities. Some people may 
                                                          
476 See, for example, PL, pp. 15—22, JF, p5—8. The idea is at play in Theory as well (for example pp. 
4/4, 84/73—74, 88—89/76—77) though it is not explicitly mentioned in the discussion on the basis of equal 
justice in §77. For ease of exposition, I have assumed that Theory alters the account in “The Sense of Justice” 
only in making the moral powers sufficient instead of necessary and sufficient, and does not add the 
requirement to be able to cooperate. If this is strictly incorrect, my arguments are in any case unaffected. 
477 This terminology follows Vanderschraaf (2011) 
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excel in organising the achievement of their life's ambitions, whilst others may be better or 
more easily able to comport themselves in a just manner.478 As noted in subsections 3.4 
and 8.3, the capacity for the moral powers forms the basis of moral equality in Rawls's 
theory. The criticism might arise that, with such individual variety, the moral powers 
cannot serve as the basis of the most basic kind of equality.479  
 Rawls rejects this criticism. The most basic kind of equality is equality of 
fundamental respect or recognition, which “is owed to persons irrespective of their social 
position.”480 Basic equality is based simply on the possession of the capacity for the moral 
powers to some minimum degree. Interpersonal variation in the realisation or capacity to 
realise the two moral powers is irrelevant to basic equality. Once the minimum conditions 
for the moral powers are met (either contemporaneously or prospectively),481 then an 
individual is not only owed justice, but equal justice. The moral powers are hence said to 
constitute a “range property” which marks out those who deserve just treatment. People 
can fall within a certain range of varying moral psychological characteristics. Nevertheless, 
they can still be said to equally possess the property of having the moral powers – of 
falling within that range.482  
 Picking out a range property is essential. The simpler precept of treating equal 
cases equally will not do alone. With that precept “there is no guarantee of substantive 
equal treatment, since slave and caste systems may satisfy this conception.”483 Justice 
could require more and/or deliver more to those whose moral powers were more developed. 
Justice for Rawls does make different demands on different people, but this is a function of 
their social position in a just institutional order, not their basic status in the eyes of 
justice.484  
 Precisely what constitutes the minimum is held by Rawls to be, to some extent, 
irreducibly vague. He writes 
 
The conception of moral personality and the required minimum may often be 
troublesome. While many concepts are vague to some degree, that of moral 
personality is likely to be especially so. But these matters are, I think, best 
discussed in the context of definite moral problems. The nature of the specific 
                                                          
478 See TJ, p. 506—507/443 
479 TJ, p. 507/444 
480 TJ, p. 511/447 
481 TJ, p. 509/445—446 
482 TJ, p. 508/444—445 
483 TJ, p. 507/444 
484 TJ, p. 511—512/447—448. For a recent defence of this approach to equality, see Carter (2011) 
139 
 
issue and the structure of the available general facts may suggest a fruitful way 
to settle them.485 
 
The rest of section 15 assumes that persons are above the minimum threshold, whatever 
that might be, and considers whether a further condition should be relevant to someone 
being within the bounds of justice. This further condition is that, as well as possessing the 
moral powers, a person should be able to contribute to the maintenance of the basic 
structure of society. 
 This further condition stems from two related fundamental ideas found in Rawls's 
work. For Rawls, the basic concern of a theory of justice is society conceived “as a fair 
system of cooperation over time, from one generation to the next.”486 A scheme of social 
cooperation is one in which everyone is benefited by everyone playing their part in shared 
rules of cooperation.487 Cooperation creates an infrastructure for the distribution of a 
supply of goods, to which each contributes and from which each benefits (see earlier 
section 8.2). 
 This idea is the most fundamental in Justice as Fairness. The ideas of the moral 
person or citizen488 (characterised by the possession of the capacity for the two moral 
powers), and the well-ordered society, are both characterised by reference to it.489 Hence, 
sacrificing this understanding of society would not be a small matter for Rawls (see 
subsection 15.5 L below). Speaking of society as a fair scheme of cooperation over time is 
a bit of a mouthful. Hence, I shall from now on use the locution “society as fair 
cooperation”. 
 The idea that justice concerns society as fair cooperation is closely linked by Rawls 
to the idea of justice as reciprocity. This conception of justice is said to occupy the centre 
ground between two others: justice as mutual advantage, and justice as impartiality. The 
terms were coined by Brian Barry to describe the following two positions. In justice as 
mutual advantage, “the just terms of cooperation are those that would have been agreed 
upon by people [merely] trying to do the best for themselves” if they were situated at “a 
non-agreement point from which the hypothetical bargaining is to start.”490 In justice as 
impartiality, by contrast, just arrangements must correspond to “what can be approved of 
                                                          
485 TJ, p. 509/445 
486 PL, p. 15. See also TJ, pp. 4—5/4—5 and JF, p. 5 
487 PL, p. 16, JF, p. 6 
488 “Moral person” is the relevant concept in the earlier, comprehensive statement of Justice as Fairness 
(TJ, p. 505/442), “citizen” in the later, political version (PL, pp. 18—20, 29) 
489 PL, p. 14. See also JF, pp. 24—26 
490 Barry (1989) pp. 367—368. See also pp. 5—7, 359—361 
140 
 
from an impartial standpoint.”491 Justice as mutual advantage conspicuously excludes those 
unable to contribute to cooperative schemes from moral concern all together. People's 
places in the agreed cooperative schemes are determined on the basis of their bargaining 
power, so if you have no bargaining power you will also be excluded from any 
protection.492 Given that your power determines your basic position, justice as mutual 
advantage does not conform to our intuitive concepts of fairness and reasonableness, but 
only to rationality.493 Justice as impartiality, by contrast, simply includes all those with 
interests — which includes all humans, at the very least.494 
 Barry held that Rawls's own theory awkwardly incorporated both elements of 
justice as impartiality and justice as mutual advantage.495 Adopting a suggestion made by 
Allan Gibbard in a review of Barry's work,496 Rawls replied that Justice as Fairness was 
actually a member of a third intermediary view - justice as reciprocity.497 Justice as 
reciprocity holds that justice requires fair mutual advantage between persons, arising from 
mutual reciprocation within fair institutions. This mutual advantage is fair in that what 
persons receive is not conditioned by the quantity or quality of goods they are able to 
contribute to society, and certainly not by the threats they are able to bring to bear on 
others. 
 Rather, what you get is what could be reasonably agreed by all as increasing the 
prospects of everyone who is cooperating, starting from a baseline of equal shares in the 
cooperative surplus.498 To get this baseline, we assume that the proceeds of social 
cooperation – in Rawls's case the social primary goods (see below) – are going to be 
shared out equally between all social positions.499 Shares may then legitimately become 
unequal only if inequalities would serve to raise the absolute shares of everyone, including 
the worse off.500 You yourself may be able to contribute very little to this surplus. But even 
if this leads to you occupying the least favoured social position, you will receive a great 
                                                          
491 Ibid. p. 362. See also pp. 7—9, 284, 361—363 
492 See, for example, ibid. p. 249  
493 See PL, p. 48. See also Scanlon (1998) pp. 191—197 
494 I take “having interests” to be the easiest way to summarise Barry's many distinct discussions of 
who is included within the scope of justice, and morality more generally. Barry holds that at least some of the 
provisions of justice  extend to all humans, even if severely disabled, (see Barry (1989), pp. 244—254, and 
(1995a), pp. 42—43, 60). The rider “at least” follows from the fact that non-human animals are also 
seemingly included (See Barry (1995a), pp. 86, 208) 
495 See Barry (1989) chapters 5 and 6 
496 Gibbard (1991) esp. pp. 266—273 
497 PL, p. 17 fn 17. Note that Rawls does not expressly use the phrase “justice as reciprocity,” as 
Gibbard and Barry do. Nevertheless, he conceives of the ideal of justice as a fair reciprocal relationship 
between agents. Hence, the phrase isn't misleading. 
498 PL, pp. 16—17, JF, p. 6. For the more precise reasoning for starting from an equal division of the 
cooperative surplus, see TJ, pp. 101—104/87—90, JF, pp. 74—77  
499 See TJ, p. 62/54—55, 150—151/130, and also LP, p. 41 
500 For example, see TJ, pp. 60—65/52—56, 151—152/130—131, and JF, pp. 61—64 
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deal more than what you put in. Those who can contribute greatly, and who have 
significant bargaining power and threat-advantage, may be net losers in benefits, in 
contrast to a society in which their shares are linked to their bargaining advantage. But 
justice requires rejecting societal schemes which allow bargaining advantages to play a 
part in determining the benefits of social roles. One's ability to contribute should be seen as 
a morally irrelevant factor for deciding cooperative shares; one's ability to threaten is a 
morally unacceptable one.501  
 However, in justice as reciprocity, contribution to the cooperative scheme of 
society is still required to be included within the remit of justice. Justice requires a 
productive relationship of reciprocity – of both sides fairly benefiting from each other502 – 
and hence justice as reciprocity falls short of the scope of justice as impartiality. Justice is 
based on reasonableness for Rawls (section 8.2), not on altruism, or some mixture of the 
two.503 Barry disputes whether such a middling position can at all be coherently 
maintained;504 I will return to this in subsection 16.5 P. 
 The ideas of society as fair cooperation, and justice as reciprocity, exclude a certain 
class of beings – those we shall call the non-contributors – from justice. Just who the non-
contributors are can be extensively investigated and debated. Candidates often proposed 
include the congenitally impaired and chronically ill, the people of the future, and 
animals.505 That members of such groups should be excluded from justice on the basis of 
their inability to cooperate in society as a fair scheme of cooperation has been frequently 
criticised.506 In my discussion, I shall mainly be considering the physically and mentally 
impaired507 — all the time specifying, throughout this section, that they possess the 
capacity to develop a sense of justice and the ability to develop a conception of the good. 
                                                          
501 See TJ, pp. 102—105/88—90, 133—134/115—116, and also JF, pp. 72—77 
502 JF, p. 61 expresses this particularly strongly. 
503 As we might reconstruct positions offered by Barry (1995a), Stark (2009) 
504 See Barry (1995a), pp. 46—61 
505 Related issues arise relating to the periods in everyone's lives when they are unable to contribute: 
when children, ill or elderly. But Rawls has answers regarding these groups – though  I shall not here address 
how plausible they are. On children see TJ, pp. 462—467/405—409, 509/445—446. On health care see PL, 
pp. 183—186 and JF, pp. 171—176.  
506 For example, Barry (1989), pp. 234—249, (1995), pp. 59—60, Nussbaum (2006), pp. 22—25, 56—
67, 107—154, 330—338,  Kittay (1999), chapter 4 
507 Martha Nussbaum relates that impairment and disability are defined in the disability literature in the 
following way. An impairment is “a loss of normal bodily function”, a disability “is something you cannot do 
in your environment as a result.” See Nussbaum (2006) p98 fn 5. Impairments need not always lead to 
disabilities. The arrangement of one's environment may or may not lead to a disability, depending on whether 
your impairment is taken account of by those who arrange your environment. I note that a wider and more 
formal notion of impairment can be specified, which simply states that impairments are lacks of possible 
bodily functions. Hence, an impairment of mine is that I do not possess a system of echo-location: an 
impairment not shared by a bat. This need not be taken to imply that I am “impaired”, in a looser, colloquial 
sense. This usage seems to fit better with Nussbaum's repeated insistence that those we routinely identify as 
“disabled” persons should not be seen as aberrations of “normal” persons, i.e. pp.  99, 101. No doubt many 
complications would arise from this revised usage – complications I do not consider here. 
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These persons represent the clearest test case. In section 16.5 M below, I shall comment 
briefly on how the position I come to relates to animals and future people. It is important to 
note that Rawls only excludes these groups from justice due to their lack of ability to 
cooperate, and not simply due to the fact that they are impaired per se. It is also important 
to recognise that the classes of those recognised as impaired and/or disabled, and the non-
contributing, are distinct. I am in the process of defining the latter philosophically, whereas 
the former will here be left as a broad and fuzzy folk-category.508 Many of those we 
recognise as having an impairment – the blind, for example – have for many years 
contributed to societies in the ways Rawls requires. However, we have yet to specify just 
what this relevant type of cooperation is. The next subsection will do so. 
 
15.2 What sort of cooperation? To produce what? 
 
 In this subsection, I first characterise the idea of contributing to a cooperative 
scheme in an abstract manner. To then describe what Rawls understands contributing to a 
cooperative scheme to be, I then first describe Rawls concept of the social primary goods, 
and then second describe what Rawls counts as contributing to the cooperative surplus of 
those goods, and hence what counts as meeting the contribution requirement. Subsection 
15.3 then briefly observes how others have attempted to defend Rawls's contribution 
requirement, and also emphasises the distinction between possessing the two moral powers, 
being able to contribute to a productive cooperative scheme, and being physically or 
mentally disabled and/or impaired. 
 To begin speaking abstractly, to contribute to a cooperative scheme is to produce a 
good through following the rules of that scheme. The good may then go on to benefit 
others, or oneself and others. But, importantly, the good goes through the institutions first, 
given that we are talking about schemes of cooperation, rather than just cooperation per se. 
Cooperative schemes cannot exist between individuals none of whom are able to benefit 
each other in any way. Whatever else must be assumed for there to be cooperation, there 
must be at least two individuals benefiting each other. Cooperation must also consist in 
more than this. I benefit from the natural world around me, and at some point it will benefit 
from me, even if only when I'm dead in my grave. This does not intuitively amount to me 
cooperating with the natural world. Cooperation requires jointly recognised intentions 
connecting the cooperating agents – if not everyone to everyone else, then through chains 
                                                          
508 This is not to say that it should be so left. Philosophical work on disability gives us much reason to 
be suspicious of our folk conceptions on this topic. But I cannot engage directly with this literature here. 
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of connection covering all those involved. In summary, “cooperation is guided by publicly 
recognised rules and procedures that those cooperating accept and regard as properly 
regulating their conduct.”509 
 What if a group of individuals benefit each other in a shared practice, but in 
addition benefit a non-contributing third party? It seems right to say that this outlier isn't 
cooperating. Certainly they do not contribute. But are they included within the cooperative 
scheme? This seems less cut and dried. They benefit from it. There is nothing to suggest 
that there can't be cases where the non-contributor understands it, and can convey that they 
understand it. To take an extreme case, imagine a paralytic who is nevertheless able to 
blink his eyes to indicate “yes” or “no” to questions. It seems acceptable to say that they 
can be part of the practice, and even have a position within it. What needs to be stressed is 
that they can play no role in sustaining it in the productive form that it has. More needs to 
be said, but this seems sufficient to head off a suggestion that an inability to contribute to a 
set of cooperative institutions means that, logically, one cannot be a part of such 
institutions. Cooperative institutions need not hold exclusively between cooperative 
agents.510 
  We have so far left open what exactly the contributors in society as fair 
cooperation contribute to. The basic subject of justice for Rawls – what persons in a 
modern society cooperate to produce, and reproduce – as introduced in section 2 is that 
society's basic structure of institutions.511 The basic structure serves to distribute the 
primary social goods.512 These goods were previously mentioned in 9.1. The primary 
goods are those goods any person is rationally presumed to want whatever else they 
want.513 Primary goods are social when they are directly under control of the basic 
structure, whereas primary goods considered more generically can potentially be only 
indirectly influenced by that structure.514  
 In later work, the social primary goods are linked more closely to the conception of 
the person in Justice as Fairness (sections 8 and 9). Rather than simply being the social 
primary goods any person is rationally assumed to want, they are the social primary goods 
                                                          
509 See PL, p. 16 
510 Silvers and Francis (2005) make a similar point, and develop its implications into an argument for 
including the non-contributing within a broadly contractarian theory of justice. See, in particular, pp. 45, 
68—73. I believe that their position is compatible with Rawls, but cannot be substituted into the foundations 
of his theory without leading to wider revisions of his basic ideas than I here propose, particularly to the 
original position. 
511 See TJ, pp. 7—11/6—10. 
512 TJ, p. 62/54—55. Rawls refers interchangeably to “social primary goods” and “primary social 
goods”, though these might be thought to have different connotations. I follow him here. 
513 TJ, p. 62/54—55, 92/79 
514 TJ, p. 62/54—55 
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“normally needed for developing and exercising the two moral powers and for effectively 
pursuing conceptions of the good with widely different contents.”515 I have assumed this 
revision throughout the thesis. 
 The social primary goods are listed as rights and duties, income and wealth, and the 
social bases of self-respect.516 As they are to be distributed through the basic structure, 
which is governed by a public conception of justice, the social primary goods and their 
distributions are assumed to be capable of being publicly observed and accounted for.517 
 The social positions in society that are recognised by the institutions of the basic 
structure are presumed to be those of a person cooperating in the overall maintenance of 
that structure throughout a full life. We can gloss this and say: they are the social positions 
of the people who, for most of their lives at least, have some kind of job within either the 
private or the public sector.518 The least well-off position in society is that of the employed 
person with the lowest expectations of the social primary goods.519 Note also that some of 
the social primary goods, such as the basic liberties and the means to use them, and the 
social bases of self-respect, must be distributed equally.520 The least favoured position does 
include, along with all other social positions, provision for illness and temporary disability. 
But this is justified by reference to the need to enable each person to return to their place in 
society, and their work, in the event of illness or some other misfortune.521 The provision is 
not conceived to have itself some special or lexical weight, or primacy — healthcare is to 
be balanced against other competing distributive demands as required by the two principles 
of justice overall.522 Nor is healthcare conceived to be distributed on any other basis other 
than the need to maintain a person's use of their moral powers, at least in the eyes of 
justice.523 
 Given all these features of the account of the basic structure and social primary 
goods, what contributing to society amounts to in Justice as Fairness is seemingly taking 
up employment in the system of institutions governed by the basic structure. Through this, 
persons contribute to the upkeep of the basic structure and the distribution of primary 
social goods which flow through it. This implies that if one is completely, and not just 
                                                          
515 PL, p. 76. See also CP, pp. 312—313, 365—366, JF, pp. 57—59.  
516 See TJ, pp. 62/54, 92—94/79—80, PL, p. 181, JF, pp. 58—59. 
517 See TJ, p. 95/81, PL, pp. 181—182, JF, pp. 59—60, CP, pp. 363—364 
518 This is supported by Rawls's comments that the least-well off are not to be defined as those reliant 
on state welfare. See JF, p. 138—140, 179  
519 See TJ, pp. 93—94/80. See also JF, pp. 59—64 
520 For example, see TJ, p. 93/80. I say that the social bases of self-respect must be distributed equally, 
assuming that arguments given by Eyal (2005) p. 197 that this is the right reading of TJ, p. 546/478—479 
521 JF, pp. 173—175, PL, p. 184 
522 See JF, pp. 173—174 
523 On this last point, see comments at the start of the next subsection, and also below in subsection 
16.5 A and section 19. 
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temporarily, unable to take up employment, one does not adequately give to society's fair 
scheme of cooperation. One is then outside the scope of justice. 
 
15.3 Moral Powers, and ability to contribute 
 
 As I have mentioned, this restriction on justice has been widely criticised. Several 
defences of Rawls's theory on this point have also been proposed. They aim to show either 
that according to Rawls, those unable to contribute to society in this way are not excluded 
from justice entirely,524 or else are nevertheless shown adequate moral concern under other 
duties and obligations in Rawls's scheme.525 Others have proposed alterations to Rawls's 
theory in order to deal with the issue.526 What does not seem to have been adequately 
recognised by most of this literature, however, is that possession of the two moral powers, 
and the ability to cooperate, are not coextensive. A person can possess a sense of justice 
and an ability to develop their own conception of the good, without being able to take up a 
position within the basic structure of society. Conversely, a person lacking a sense of 
justice can still take part in cooperative schemes. Many writers either fail to observe the 
first fact at all, or else fail to observe it in a sufficiently systematic way.527 What is required 
is for the ability to contribute, capacity for the moral powers, and being impaired or 
disabled all to be clearly distinguished.528  
 That the moral powers can obtain without cooperative ability must be the right 
interpretation.529 Rawls's phrasing indicates that he recognises a distinction between the 
possession of the moral powers and the ability to employ them in cooperative ventures.530 
Falling below the minimum needed to cooperate can be in terms of either “moral, 
intellectual or physical capacities.”531 A person who is in traction for several months is 
unable to go to work. But we would not say that that person, for that period, lacks a sense 
of justice, or a capacity to develop a conception of the good. Hence, we would not say the 
                                                          
524 For example, Freeman (2006) pp. 411—418 
525 See Kelly (2010) pp. 63—66. Quong (2007), pp. 91—97 aims to include the non-contributing within 
justice under the aegis of the natural duty to mutual aid. I do not believe this duty is a duty of justice for 
Rawls. He appears to clearly distinguish the duty from that of justice (TJ, pp. 333—339/293—298, 511/447). 
But this would still allow the non-contributing some level of moral consideration – in certain respects a quite 
significant level if Quong's argument is sound. I argue in subsection 15.5 A that being the subject of these 
natural duties is still inadequate recognition, however. 
526 For example, Richardson (2006), and Stark (2007) 
527 For example, Nussbaum (2006) chapter 2, Freeman (2006), Richardson (2006), Quong (2007) 
528 Stark (2007) pp. 129—132 explicitly discusses these distinctions. Discussions by Stark (2009) pp. 
80—81, Kelly (2010) pp. 63—66 and Terzi (2010) pp. 155—161 also make explicit use of them. My 
eventual position differs from each of these writers. 
529 Contra Nussbaum (2006) pp. 127—135 
530 See, for example, PL, p. 19 
531 PL, p. 184 my emphasis. Stark (2007) p. 130 makes precisely the same point. 
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same for someone who is permanently physically disabled to the same degree. And we can 
say the same for certain mental disorders or cognitive impairments, whether temporary or 
permanent. 
 Furthermore, people who lack a sense of justice – the purely self-interested – can 
still be willing and able to cooperate in fair cooperative schemes, at least when it is to their 
advantage to do so. As Brian Barry writes “so long as even very rough equality of strength 
obtains among the parties to rules of justice, the rules recommended by justice as mutual 
advantage will tend to correspond to those that we would ordinarily think just.”532 It might 
be wondered whether the actions of such people count as genuine cooperation, given our 
specification above in subsection 15.2. Similarly to what was said earlier about whether 
those unable to cooperate can be part of cooperative schemes, we might say that beings 
need not fully share the intentions behind a scheme to be said to take part in it. For the self-
centred surely share some of the potential and acceptable motives of the rest, given that the 
scheme is mutually advantageous. I am unsure whether this reply is fully adequate. But for 
the purposes of this discussion I shall assume that it is, or else that those lacking a sense of 
justice can in some way be correctly said to cooperate. Whether the ability to cooperate in 
those who cannot develop the moral powers is sufficient to be included within the scope of 
justice will be taken up again in section 16. 
 
15.4 Contribution is not required for justice 
 
 Given that the moral powers and the ability to cooperate come apart, are both of 
these necessary (and also jointly sufficient) to be owed justice? I maintain that those 
possessing the moral powers, or their capacity, but lacking the ability to cooperate in the 
maintenance of the basic structure, should be unambiguously included within the scope of 
justice. This means that contributive potential is not necessary to be included within the 
scope of justice, and the contribution requirement, construed as a necessary requirement, is 
misplaced. I also maintain that Rawls should have said that the possession of the capacity 
for the moral powers is sufficient, and that he does not do so leads to internal tensions 
within Justice as Fairness. I also present independent moral reasons for holding that moral 
power capacity is sufficient.  
I first defend the basic idea that possession of the moral powers, or the capacity to 
develop them, is sufficient for justice. These are independent moral reasons – external to 
                                                          
532 Barry (1995a) p. 45 
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Justice as Fairness. Next, I shall highlight those elements of Rawls's work which support 
the position I am defending. This subsection, then, concentrates on laying out my basic 
case. The exposition will raise a number of questions for any astute reader. I attempt to 
answer a host of them in subsection 15.5. 
 We can most vividly see the problem with not including non-contributing beings 
who have or can have the moral powers within the bounds of justice by considering the 
implied attitudes and perspectives of the members of the well-ordered society.533 What we 
postulate as moral ideals, these persons will fully psychologically realise in their thoughts, 
feelings and deeds (subsections 3.2, 9.2). Hence, they will embody the contribution 
restriction in their thoughts and feelings. If we accept the stipulation that the ability to 
cooperate in the maintenance of the basic structure, by accepting some kind of employment, 
is necessary to be owed justice, then in a well-ordered society people will not see justice as 
owed to those who cannot so cooperate. This attitude will be shared by all persons with the 
moral powers: both those who can and those who cannot cooperate. A striking feature of 
this society is that this will be the case even though individuals in the latter group may 
potentially have a better understanding of the rights and duties of the just person or citizen, 
and/or have greater motivation to defend and serve as an advocate for those rights and 
duties, than those who are able to contribute to the upkeep of the basic institutions. 
 If they genuinely do possess the two moral powers, those unable to contribute to 
the basic structure through that structure's recognised positions will nevertheless be 
motivated to uphold the justice of society. And surely this, if anything, expresses good-will 
towards their fellows. The inability to take up some role in the economically productive 
arrangements of society is merely due to some kind of disability or impairment, either 
physical or mental. But it is on the basis of such impairments that the non-contributing 
themselves, as well as everyone else, will accept that the non-contributing cannot be 
granted basic justice. 
 The non-contributing members of society can hence be thought to see things like 
this: “Because we are unable to help in maintaining the basic institutions of our society, we 
cannot be granted what is owed to someone who does play a part in maintaining them. It 
doesn't matter that we are willing to, and that it is only through some misfortune that we 
are unable to. It would be grossly unfair to grant us any of the provisions or recognition 
which come from being included within the scope of justice, when we are unable to 
                                                          
533 The kind of approach I adopt here is inspired by the kind of “interpersonal test” proposed by Cohen 
to test mooted principles of social organisation. See Cohen (2008) pp. 35—48. It works slightly differently, 
by assuming an ideal society which thoroughly adopts the proposed principles, and then considering what our 
moral intuitions are regarding such a society. 
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contribute to the cooperative surplus.” 
 Spelt out like this, the requirement begins to seem deeply problematic. The last 
sentence brings out what is wrong. People who have the moral powers necessarily are able 
to give basic recognition to others who have or are capable of having the moral powers. 
And as we saw above in subsection 15.1, Rawls holds this to be the most basic sense of 
equality from the perspective of justice. This equality is meant to serve as the basis for the 
rest of the rights and duties of justice. If we assume that all the requirements of justice 
must be founded on the basic equality of recognition, then it does not seem that we can 
ever exclude a being with a sense of justice from the scope of justice, whatever their 
cooperative potential. Basic recognition brings with it a stake in the cooperative surplus, 
however this is ultimately to be divided up.534 
 In summary, intuitively it does not seem that we can approve of the attitudes of a 
society of persons who did place this restriction on the scope of justice. If a person has a 
sense of justice, then they are able to give basic recognition to those who are similarly 
endowed. They should hence be owed the protections (and have the responsibilities) of 
justice. Other facts about their person, such as possessing certain disabilities or 
impairments, should not be relevant. But the contribution requirement makes them relevant. 
Hence the contribution requirement is morally suspect. 
 These are external moral reasons for rejecting the contribution requirement, and 
accepting that the capacity for the moral powers is sufficient to be owed justice. Various 
aspects of Rawls's work indicate that this is what he should have maintained. Some of 
these have been remarked upon by various philosophers. Brian Barry notes that restricting 
the scope of justice on the basis of physical or intellectual, but not moral, privations 
offends against one of Rawls's basic moral assumptions. 
 
Natural and social advantages that make people more of less productive are a 
matter or good fortune and hence do not constitute ground-floor claims to 
receive more or less of the social product. This notion, however, clearly 
implies that the congenitally disabled cannot be held responsible for lack of 
productivity and should therefore have a valid claim on a share of their 
                                                          
534 Several writers have made the point that the disabled are able to give basic recognition to other 
beings with a sense of justice. See, for example, Nussbaum (2006) pp. 121—122, 128—130, 133—135 and 
Silvers and Francis (2005), p. 68—73. As mentioned above, these authors do not precisely specify that we 
are talking about persons possessing, or able to possess, the two moral powers, who are unable to take 
employment in the basic structure of society. In addition, we are not talking about any old kind of recognition, 
but specifically the recognition that a person has or is capable of having the two moral powers, which is not 
necessarily the same as the recognition talked about by Nussbaum and Silvers and Francis. 
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society's resources.535 
 
No philosopher to have engaged in such internal critiques,536 however, has explored the 
aspects of Rawls's moral psychology which tell against the contribution requirement. This 
is despite of the fact that Rawls's initial discussions of the basis of equality – in “The Sense 
of Justice” and A Theory of Justice – are both found situated within broader discussions of 
that psychology. 
 There are several aspects of the moral psychology which seem incompatible with 
the contribution requirement. Rawls holds that one of the factors involved in our 
development of the sense of justice is the recognition of “an unconditional caring for our 
good.”537 This unconditional care is presumed to start from birth, if not before. It is directly 
evidenced by our parents, and indirectly, through them, from the society around them.538 
This care is not unconditional in every sense. Moral conduct is eventually expected of a 
person as they develop, as opposed to what we might call perfectly altruistic care.539 But it 
is unconditional in that the person receives care for their own sake, and not simply as a 
means to something else.540 Now persons with a capacity to develop the moral powers can 
ideally be expected to receive this care. What loving parent or guardian wouldn't express 
both altruistic and non-altruistic (what we might call reciprocal) care towards their 
children?541 As the child grows, however, and is seen as capable of the two moral powers, 
then altruistic care becomes less and less appropriate. More and more is expected of them, 
and reciprocal care is repeated stressed. Such attitudes would not be withheld simply on 
the likelihood, or even the certainty, that their child would never be able to join the 
workforce of civil society.  
 Again, ideally, the attitude of such child-rearers would be mirrored in similar 
attitudes and institutions of society at large. Though the sentiments of love (and friendship), 
and justice for Rawls are distinct, they are continuous with one another.542 The love 
between a family, or friendship between similarly close associates, lays the foundation for 
                                                          
535 Barry (1995a) p. 60 
536 In certain ways, Richardson (2006) and Stark (2007) can also be taken to be at least partially internal 
critiques  
537 TJ, p. 498/436. See futher Appendix II. 
538 TP, pp. 464/406—407, 473—474/414—415, 490—491/429—430 
539 TP, pp. 466/408, 498/436 
540 See TP, pp464—465/406—407, 499/436 
541 This statement appears to be unproblematic given the moral psychology as it is presented in the 
early philosophy. However, certain features of the later philosophy, when combined with the quite minimal 
content of the conception of the person outlined in sections 7 to 9, may cause problems for this intuitively 
commonsensical assertion. I do not explore this issue here, and point out the disparity between Rawls's 
original psychology and the contribution requirement. 
542 TP, pp. 476/417, 478/419 
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attitudes of justice towards wider society. Rawls's principles of moral psychology posit that 
the attitudes expressed towards us by successive and expanding circles of relationships – 
family, private and public associations, society in general – bring about the development of 
the sense of justice.543 If these attitudes cease to extend once we are faced with someone 
who cannot cooperate in the maintenance of the basic structure, there needs to be an 
explanation for this. Prima facie, the continuity of the sentiments of love and justice 
implies that such persons will also be included within the scope of justice. To posit 
otherwise would require a disjoint in Rawls's principles of moral psychology. It would 
have to be that the parents or guardians of those with the capacity for the moral powers, but 
without cooperative ability, show the appropriate attitudes of reciprocating care towards 
them, as to their friends. But then wider society does not express those same attitudes, 
because wider society, in addition, requires that persons be able to contribute to the 
maintenance of the basic structure of society. 
 We would have to say that further conditions for being afforded the responsibilities 
and protections of justice are recognised, consisting in meeting certain physical and mental 
requirements which are distinct from simply possessing the sense of justice. What 
opposing sentiment would these correspond to? The person unable to meet such 
requirements is no longer recognised for their own sake solely on the basis of their ability 
to recognise (and comply to the extent that they can with) fair moral requirements. The 
unconditionality of their parent's or guardian's care for them is not reflected in society's 
attitudes towards them. In the well-ordered society, where the ideal of justice as reciprocity 
is embodied perfectly in its member's psychology, everyone will accept that society need 
not have an attitude towards such persons that is continuous with the sentiments those 
persons' parents have towards those persons. People in general need not value them 
intrinsically, on the basis of their just sensibility at least. But, by implication, the able-
bodied people in such a society do not value each other solely on this basis either, but 
conditionally on their ability to contribute. The progression of unconditional sentimental 
attachment posited by Rawls in the well-ordered society is hence broken by the 
contribution requirement. This is sufficient to render that requirement incompatible with 
his moral psychology. 
 Problems can be found at an even deeper level. The principles of moral psychology 
are said to be based upon the idea of reciprocity: “a tendency to answer in kind”544 (see 
further Appendix II). Children answer in kind to their parent's or guardian's love when they 
                                                          
543 See TP, pp470/411—412, 473—474/414—415 490—491/429—430. See also Appendix II 
544 TP, p. 494/433 
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love them in return and live up to the justified standards they impart. Such attitudes are 
continuous and eventually develop into a sense of justice. When grown, such persons will 
recognise others who possess or are capable of possessing a sense of justice, and will both 
respect and have expectations of them. This moral development embodies the idea of 
reciprocity. But the question then becomes – why does a seemingly more demanding 
standard of reciprocity appear by the time we get to the basic structure of society? The idea 
of reciprocity, as a psychological tendency, does not appear to make such a distinction 
itself (see Appendix II). If the moral sentiments and natural attitudes are, ideally, 
continuous with each other, and this is an appropriate specification of the moral principles 
and ideals of Justice as Fairness (see subsections 5.2 and 9.2), there seems no reason to 
construe the well-ordered society of Justice as Fairness's conception of reciprocity in a 
compartmentalised way: as requiring at bottom something different at the level of society's 
basic institutions than in the associations of civil society. I say “at bottom” here in order to 
leave open the question as justice does require different things from different social roles. 
But this variation is not meant to alter basic equality. 
 These central aspects of Rawls's moral psychology fit ill with society as fair 
cooperation, and justice as reciprocity — at least, as they are specified. This is in addition 
to the independent moral arguments which I presented earlier. The fundamental point is 
that it is only the possession of or capacity for the moral powers which is meant to be 
relevant from the point of view of justice. As we have seen, possession or capacity can 
come apart from cooperative ability. Absent some further argument, cooperative ability 
remains morally arbitrary.  
 However, it might still be thought that the proposal to drop the contribution 
requirement is nevertheless unnecessary, or else would require such wide reaching 
revisions of Rawls's theory as to substantially change its character. In the next subsection I 
address a variety of such claims. 
 
15.5 Possible objections 
 
 I reject society as fair cooperation and justice as reciprocity as Rawls formulated 
them. It may be argued I have done so erroneously. I will argue that I have not. Further it 
may be thought that this implies the rejection or alternation of many other aspects of 
Rawls's theory. I will argue either that it does not, or in the cases that it does, these 
alterations are acceptable. 
 I lay out each potential question or criticism in turn in the following flurry of 
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subsections. I shall not summarise them here. Instead, each is prefaced by an italicised 
question or statement which the following subsection should be taken to address. Where 
these subsections are linked to each other, this will be indicated. 
 
15.5 A: Rawls understands Society as Fair Reciprocity as an ideal of justice, not 
as a limit on the scope of justice. Hence, he does not place the non-contributing 
outside the scope of justice. 
 
This idea is suggested by passages such as this one 
 
Since we begin from the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation, we 
assume that persons as citizens have all the capacities that enable them to be 
cooperating members of society. This is done to achieve a clear and 
uncluttered view of what, for us, is the fundamental question of political justice: 
namely, what is the most appropriate conception of justice for specifying the 
terms of social cooperation between citizens regarded as free and equal, and as 
normal and fully cooperating members of society over a complete life? 
 
By taking this as the fundamental question we do not mean to say, of course, 
that no one ever suffers from illness and accident ... But given our aim, I put 
aside for the time being these temporary disabilities and also permanent 
disabilities or mental disorders so severe that they prevent people from being 
cooperating members of society in the usual sense. 
 
Other questions we can discuss later, and how we answer them may require us 
to revise answers already reached. This back-and-forth procedure is to be 
expected. We may think of these other questions as problems of [the] 
extension [of Justice as Fairness].545 
 
The idea here seems to be that the groups Rawls mentions, plus others unable to contribute, 
are to be included within the remit of moral concern, at the very least. It may then be 
further argued that they are to be included within the remit of justice. I have some things to 
say about the former claim in subsection 18 below. I argue against the latter claim on two 
                                                          
545 See PL, p20, my emphasis. See also Stark (2009) pp. 87—88 
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grounds. First, Rawls's solutions to the “problems of extension” at best leave it ambiguous 
whether he can claim that justice extends to the non-contributing. Second, even if this 
route were to be taken, including the non-contributing on the basis that they partially 
match up to the ideal of citizens expressed here remains morally problematic. This is not a 
standard which they should have to meet. 
 What Rawls explicitly says does not obviously include those unable to contribute 
on the grounds of disability within the bounds of justice. He states that he cannot see how 
Justice as Fairness can be extended to the permanently disabled, and that it is likely that it 
cannot.546 “It is obvious” he writes “that we have a duty towards all human beings, 
however severely handicapped.”547 From what I can tell, however, there is no suggestion 
that this is a duty of justice.548 These duties could as easily be natural duties given Rawls's 
system (as proposed by Quong and Kelly).549 I do not think the natural duties, aside from 
the duty of justice, are part of justice for Rawls.550  
 Against writers who insist that Rawls includes all human beings within the scope of 
justice by his endorsement of human rights, I hold that the position of the human rights in 
Rawls's system is ambiguous. In The Law of Peoples, human rights are respected by both 
liberal democratic societies and decent hierarchical societies.551 They are a subset of the 
rights recognised in both kinds of societies.552 For decent hierarchical regimes, these rights 
are derived from their “common good idea of justice.”553 A common good conception of 
justice is obviously different from Justice as Fairness. Even if the human rights might be 
thought of as a requirement of justice under a common good conception, this does not 
imply that they are under Justice as Fairness. After all, not all rights in Justice as Fairness 
are rights of justice. It is perfectly possible that the human rights might be thought to be 
grounded on justice between the cooperating, and on humanity or mutual aid for the non-
cooperating. It is true that Rawls's discussions of human rights in The Law of Peoples may 
suggest that they are minimal rights of justice for all, including the non-cooperating. But 
he does not make this explicit.554 Hence we should not simply appeal to human rights as a 
                                                          
546 PL, p. 21 
547 JF, p. 176 fn59 
548 Stark (2007) p. 130 fn10 agrees Rawls is unclear on this matter.  
549 See Quong (2007) pp. 93—97, and Kelly p64 
550 See fn 48 above 
551 LP, pp. 65, 68 
552 LP, p81 
553 LP, p65 
554 Buchanan (1991) p. 230 fn6 reports a conversation with Rawls. In it, Rawls stated that he believed 
that those unable to cooperate were owed justice. However, simply him saying this does not mean that such 
persons can be included in Justice as Fairness given justice as reciprocity. From his subsequent published 
work, what Rawls reported to Buchanan need not have been his final stance. See, in particular, PL, pp. 244—
245  
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quick and easy way to include the non-cooperating within the scope of justice in Justice as 
Fairness.555  
 It is unclear in any case whether Rawls can include the non-contributing within 
some minimal provision of justice. None of the authors who suggest this claim also 
guarantee the non-contributing full liberal rights. But this goes against Rawls's account of 
the basis of equality. As observed in subsection 5.1, justice is to be granted on the basis of 
possessing minimal moral psychological characteristics sufficient to fall within the range 
property of having, or being able to have, the two moral powers. On this basis, how can a 
person be granted some kind of minimal justice, of the kind that might be thought to be 
embodied in human rights, but not be granted full liberal justice, if we are operating purely 
within Justice as Fairness? Once again, it seems that a person's inability to contribute in the 
right way is being taken as a reason for arbitrary exclusion. 
 Despite these difficulties, what if we accepted the claim that Rawls only viewed the 
idea of moral persons cooperating in the maintenance of the basic structure of society as an 
ideal, and not as a restriction on justice? What this amounts to, however, is to hold that 
those with the moral powers who are unable to contribute can be included within the 
bounds of justice solely as non-ideal cases. This is unsatisfactory. Though the members of 
the well-ordered society can all now recognise that unproductive persons possessing the 
moral powers can be owed justice, they must still be said to fall short of the basic ideal of 
the person or citizen. We then have two options. We might hold this basic ideal is a moral 
ideal. If we make the ability to contribute to such arrangements part of a moral ideal, then 
if people fall short of this in any respect this must be said to be a moral failing. But it is 
ludicrous to hold that the inability to cooperate is a moral failing. If instead we hold that 
the ideal is partially a non-moral ideal, then we can reprise Barry's criticisms, quoted in 
subsection 16.4, of the scope of justice being determined on morally arbitrary grounds. 
 These considerations allow us to elaborate another way in which the contribution 
requirement is out-of-kilter with Rawls's moral psychology. The alternative ideal of a 
member of the well-ordered society I am proposing in opposition to the later Rawls is not 
of a moral person or citizen cooperating throughout a complete life to maintain the basic 
structure of society. Rather, it is simply of a moral person or citizen. The ideal of such a 
person is someone with the right attitudes as regards their unavoidable relations that hold 
between them and the rest of society. It is a person of good will. In order to be a person of 
                                                          
555 In this, I am disagreeing with Freeman (2006) p. 415—416. Similar things to what I have said here 
could be said about Rawls's distinction between “domestic” or “political” justice, as it applies to the basic 
structure, and “local” justice, as it applies to the associations of civil society, which are other distinctions 
Freeman refers to in an attempt to resolve this issue. See JF p. 10—12 and PL p. 21. 
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good will, I do not think it needs to be the case that we are able to act as our good will 
would have us act. What is important is that we are willing to so act if we are able. If such 
a person is unable to cooperate, they will accept this, and will meet the requirements which 
can be reasonably asked of them. This acceptance need not be total. They could of course 
sincerely wish that they were able to cooperate. It is only understandable that this could be 
a source of regret and sadness in their lives.556 But ideally we would expect this regret to 
always be accompanied by self-respect, and pride in their achievements.557 What this regret 
shouldn't be associated with are the self-chastising moral emotions of guilt or shame – at 
least not in the ideal case. For Rawls, these emotions link up to the concepts of the Right 
and the Good respectively.558 The ideal of the person engaged in a scheme of cooperation, 
if a moral ideal, would either be an ideal of the Right or the Good, most likely both. But 
this would lead to persons feeling guilt, or even more likely shame (as shame is directed 
towards defects in one's self),559 if they are unable to cooperate, providing we assume, as 
we should for the well-ordered society, that they fully psychologically embody the 
society's ideals. Of course, we can understand that people can feel these emotions over 
impairments which are in no way their own fault. But Rawls would be unlikely to agree 
that they should feel this way.560 The contribution requirement, however, appears to 
commit him to this. Once we eject this requirement, such emotions are, on the face of it, 
representative of a different set of ideals than Justice as Fairness, or else stem from 
considering a non-ideal rather than ideal case. Feelings such as these, in an ideal situation, 
would be irrational.561 
 
15.5 B: Isn't dropping the contribution requirement incompatible with the 
Publicity Condition? 
 
 Dropping the contribution requirement does not violate the publicity condition. 
That condition, it will be recalled (section 2, section 11), states that any adequate 
                                                          
556 TJ, pp. 442—443/388, 481—482/421—422 
557 See TJ, pp. 440—442/386—388 for the self-respect expected in a well-ordered society. 
558 TJ, p. 482/422 
559 The moral emotions literature widely agrees that guilt adheres to one's wrongful, or believed to be 
wrongful, actions. Shame, by contrast, adheres to the way one is, independently of one's actions. See, for 
example, Taylor (1985), Wollheim (1999) pp. 155—157. This seems correct to me. If so, it may require a 
modification of Rawls's account of shame. See Deigh (1983), though note that I do not think that Deigh's 
account views the matter from a perspective sufficiently internal to Justice as Fairness.   
560 More precisely, they may feel natural shame, but they will not feel moral shame. It can be expected 
that, in an ideal well-ordered society, no one feels natural shame. See TJ, pp. 444—445/389—391 
561 Roughly, Rawls holds that moral emotions always reflect our genuine moral beliefs (see TJ, pp. 
481—482/421—422), so the persistence of these emotions in the well-ordered society would entail a conflict 
in the beliefs of the non-cooperating. 
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conception of justice must be capable of being publicly shared between the members of a 
well-ordered society. That one does not hold an employed position in the basic structure of 
the well-ordered society does not entail that you cannot know the content of the public 
conception of justice. It also does not mean that others cannot know that you know that 
conception. Advocacy in some public forum is not required for shared knowledge – we do 
not need to see our fellow citizens swear allegiance to the state every day, as in the society 
of Yevgeny Zamyatin's We.562 Rather, common knowledge is had by much more diffuse 
and indirect means. If I do not need to be personally acquainted with each and every other 
worker in my country for common knowledge to exist, why think I need to be acquainted 
with every non-worker? 
 
15.5 C: Isn't it often problematic to find out who is capable of developing the 
two moral powers? Won't this be even more difficult for those who cannot 
contribute? 
 
 There are problematic cases amongst both those who can and those who cannot 
contribute. That the proportion of problematic cases in the latter category may be larger 
than the former does not make for a special kind of problem, such that we might think that 
the non-contributing can be legitimately excluded from justice. Often it will be obvious 
that a person unable to hold down a normal job or position is nevertheless capable of 
developing the two moral powers. We can mistakenly think that an individual can develop 
a sense of justice both when they can work and when they cannot, when in actual fact they 
are incapable of developing one. I address such cases in sections 16 and 17 below, but they 
represent no reason to say that some persons who are capable of developing a sense of 
justice, but for whom it might be difficult to tell whether they can because of various 
impairments, aren't owed justice. 
 This again might be thought to pose problems for the publicity requirement. But the 
equivalent case of the person who is able-bodied, but for whom we are uncertain whether 
they are capable of the moral powers, is also problematic for publicity. In general, 
publicity is an ideal to be aimed for. It characterises the well-ordered society, and the well-
ordered society itself is an ideal. Such ideals should not be used in order to exclude certain 
persons from basic recognition simply because their capacity for the two moral powers is 
difficult to discern (see further subsections 15.5 D and 15.5 E below) 
                                                          
562 We by Yevgeny Zamyatin is a Russian dystopia, published in 1921. It was one of the leading 
inspirations for George Orwell's 1984. 
157 
 
 
15.5 D: Isn't it often impossible for society to realise the capacity for the two 
moral powers in all persons? 
 
 Sometimes it is, and this means we are dealing with a non-ideal situation. Non-
ideal theory for Rawls deals with two possible deviations from the ideals of justice: 
injustice arising from people's free choice (either from the active pursuit of injustice, or the 
passive acceptance of the unjust actions of others), and unavoidable injustice arising from 
limitations and burdens from one's environment.563 It is the second kind of non-ideal 
situation we face when there are persons who have the capacities to develop the moral 
powers, but whose capacities can in no way be realised. Being in a non-ideal position, 
these persons are still owed justice: justice which unfortunately cannot be given to them. 
 In order to get to grips with this topic, we should first distinguish between (1) a 
person with a capacity for the moral powers, and (2) a human being with the capacity to 
become a person with a capacity for the moral powers. The may also be a third case: (3) 
those who possessed the capacity for the moral powers, but have irretrievably lost this 
capacity. I postpone discussion of this third group of individuals till subsection 18.2.  
 What actual human beings fit these cases? Intuitively, an immoral person whose 
immorality stems from a brutal upbringing, but who might be rehabilitated, fits (1). A 
congenitally psychopathic individual by contrast, fits (2). Such individuals represent just 
one way in which human beings can fail to possess a sense of justice — roughly through 
having a lack of empathy.564 Certain autistic individuals may be unable to develop a sense 
of justice. But this is a different condition — autistics are not psychopathic. Other 
individuals with various kinds of brain disorders or brain damage will represent yet more 
cases. I present this selection of cases in order to emphasise that someone who lacks a 
sense of justice does not necessarily fit the profile of a criminal psychopath. The diversity 
of human nature makes things much more complicated than this. I shall return to this issue 
in sections 17.2. 
                                                          
563 See TJ, pp. 8—9/7—8, 245—248/216—218, LP, p5. I am indebted to Simmons (2010) for 
clarification on this topic. See esp. pp. 12—18. 
564 Note that saying that psychopaths, and those with an upbringing which damages their empathetic 
capacities, lack empathy (or as it is sometimes called, sympathy) I do not think necessarily tells in favour of 
morality developing on the basis of psychological reciprocity principles, or psychological principles of 
altruism, etc. (on these see Appendix II). Hence I do not contradict one of Rawls's basic psychological 
assumptions. Empathy is usually understood to represent simply the ability to share another's feelings, in 
certain complicated ways. This is presumably involved in reasonableness as much as in altruism. For the 
discussion of empathy or sympathy I have primarily drawn on here, which specifically focuses on Hume, see 
Krause (2008) pp. 79—82. For an introduction to recent discussions on psychopathy, see, for example, Prinz 
(2007) pp. 42—47    
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 Regarding the two cases we are considering, it must be assumed there is some point 
– or at least vague expanse, if we take Rawls's point about the vagueness of moral 
personality seriously (subsection 15.1) – at which the alterations to an individual's nature 
needed for them to become a moral person are so profound that there no longer exists the 
relevant relation of personal identity between the prior individual, and the posterior moral 
person.565 A prima facie case would be the kittens imagined by Michael Tooley in his 
“Abortion and Infanticide”, who could be injected with a serum which will lead them to 
acquire moral personality when they are fully grown cats.566 The kittens, we assume, were 
not beings with a capacity to acquire a sense of justice, in the sense Rawls means this. 
Rather they were beings with the capacity to become beings with the capacity to acquire a 
sense of justice.  
  Where the point should be placed in order to divide those with a capacity for a 
sense of justice, and those with a capacity to acquire that capacity is a problem for all 
theorists. But providing a solution can be found – one furthermore sufficiently compatible 
with Rawls's overall position – then we can say that persons with a capacity for the moral 
powers definitely are owed justice, but human beings with the capacity to become such 
persons may not be (I need to say “may” for now: sections 16 and 17 further argue that 
Rawls should hold they are not owed justice). The latter individuals are not potential moral 
persons. They are not persons with a capacity for a sense of justice. Rather, they are 
numerically distinct567 from any such moral persons. They are non-moral persons. For such 
human beings to be transformed into moral persons, such non-moral persons must cease to 
exist. 
 Regarding the beings with the capacity for the moral powers, it has undoubtedly 
been impossible up until now to realise the innate moral nature of each and every one. 
Perhaps it ever more shall be so. Such impossibilities are either the product of unavoidable 
burdens on the resources available to society, or else are maintained not through such 
scarcity but through unjust actions. But in neither case does this mean that such persons 
should be considered outside the scope of justice. 
 The following aspects of Rawls's theory might be thought to militate against this 
conclusion, and that of the previous subsection as well. First, Rawls explicitly tries to 
frame his theory to fit with the practically possible.568 The parties in the original position 
                                                          
565 For the notion of the criterion of person identity as applied to persons, see the introduction to Perry 
(1975) 
566 See Tooley (1972), pp. 60—61. The though experiment is meant to cause problems for arguing that 
potential persons possess rights. 
567 For this term, see again Perry (1975) 
568 See, for example, JF, pp. 2, 185 
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choose a conception of justice on the basis of human nature. If there are individuals whose 
sense of justice is always going to be very unlikely to be realised, won't the parties in the 
original position simply accept that principles of justice should not be framed to include 
these individuals, on grounds of practicality? 
 This attitude by the parties is inadmissible, as we are talking about the features of 
human beings which qualify them to be represented in the original position in the first 
place.569 Being representeed in the original position, these individuals will get a veto on 
which conception of justice is chosen, given the finality condition and the need for all 
parties to agree. Hence, when a person with a capacity for the moral powers fails to be 
given what they deserve according to justice, leading to their capacity for the moral powers 
to fail to be realised (providing this failure is due to not through brute misfortune in 
favourable circumstances),570 this is always a non-ideal situation. Ideally, it should be 
sufficiently likely that in favourable conditions, everyone who has a capacity for the moral 
powers should have that capacity realised. Conceptions of justice cannot be chosen which 
would lead to some moral persons having no possibility of realising their moral powers, 
even in ideal circumstances. 
 A second element of Rawls's theory relates to the above objection. This is that the 
parties are to choose principles in view of the limitations on information which affect 
legislation and constitutional design in a liberal democracy, including the burdens of 
judgement (subsections 4.5, 12.1, and 13.2).571 Limited information is obviously available 
about which human beings are capable of possessing a sense of justice, and which are not. 
However, once again I cannot see how the parties in the original position can take this as a 
consideration for choosing a conception of justice which systematically excludes such 
individuals whose capacity for the sense of justice is hard to discern from the scope of 
justice. For some of the parties in the original position must have representees who are 
these very individuals, and they will not put aside the fundamental interests of their 
representees for anything — they will refuse to enter into such a contract. 
 In summary, the content of the first principles of justice is not susceptible to being 
altered in order to exclude individuals whose potential for the moral powers is difficult to 
                                                          
569 CP, p. 112 is very clear in this regard. 
570 Favourable circumstances do not guarantee that all moral persons will realise their moral powers. 
Rather, they allow that public institutions can be set up which give the best chance of avoiding this 
possibility. This is implied by the two roles of psychology in justification – moral psychology does not 
guarantee that, in favourable circumstances, each member of the well-ordered society will have their 
fundamental interests met, but rather shows that a given conception of justice is not certain or near certain to 
fail to meet those needs for everyone (futility-avoidance), and is comparatively the most stable conception of 
justice (arbitration). 
571 See, for example, CP, pp. 346—351, TJ, pp. 156/135, 160—161/138—139, 320—325/281—285 
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discern, or perhaps even impossible to bring about.  
 
15.5 E: Isn't it sometimes difficult to guarantee the basic liberties, and their 
fair value, to those who possess the moral powers, but are unable to cooperate 
(usually through certain impairments)? 
 
 Again, this is often a problem, and when it is a problem, it means we are dealing 
with a non-ideal situation. Deep practical difficulties obviously arise in guaranteeing the 
severely physically or mentally impaired their full basic liberties as they are specified by 
Rawls. But it has not been sufficiently recognised that these practical difficulties should be 
considered a product of unavoidable burdens on contemporary liberal society, i.e. non-
ideal conditions.  
 It may be countered here that it is simply unnecessary to give the severely impaired 
their full basic liberties.572 I would agree – providing such human beings are so impaired as 
to lack the capacity for the moral powers. Hence they are amongst the beings described 
above – those who are so different from moral agents that transforming them into moral 
agents would require some severe alteration, if not complete change, of personal identity. 
But, for all who have the capacity, ideally society should be arranged so that they can 
exercise their full liberal rights.  
 It has been widely emphasised that the development of a capacity can be 
encouraged or restricted by the arrangements persons are situated within. Writers on justice 
and disability widely “reject any assumption of disability as an individual disadvantage, 
and [present] instead a distinction between impairment, seen as relating to a loss of some 
aspects of [human] functioning, and disability, defined in terms of the limitations imposed 
on impaired people by the design of social structures.”573  If these are limitations on access 
to basic justice, they can be imposed or allowed to remain only if environmental burdens or 
the inertia of existing social arrangements render this the all-things-considered morally 
preferable option. We would then be in non-ideal circumstances – indeed, in a case in 
which the general conception of justice, rather than the special conception, is applicable.574 
Outside such burdened environments, institutions providing the basic liberties cannot be 
arranged simply to be optimally efficient for the wider populace when this requires the 
exclusion of people with intellectual or physical impairments. The complexity of the state 
                                                          
572 Freeman (2006) p. 415—416 
573 Terzi (2010), p. 151. My emphasis. See also Pogge (2010) pp. 30—31 
574  On the distinction between the general and special conceptions of Justice as Fairness, and their 
relevance to the restriction of the basic liberties, see TJ, p. 60—63/52—55, 244—248/214—218 
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apparatus is a means to serving the lives of moral agents. It is not a tool for preventing the 
development or employment of the moral sensibility of those agents through its complexity. 
 Throughout this discussion, I have attempted to abstract away from the empirical 
details as to how many people fit into the different categories I have outlined. But it seems 
worthwhile here to note that I believe that a fixation on the current arrangements of our 
basic constitutions and legal systems often leads us to ascribe less competency to the 
mentally impaired in matters of justice and moral judgement than we should. These 
systems are as complicated as they are in order to deal with ourselves — the complexity of 
our pursuits and projects, our diversity, and our vices. We – those without mental or 
physical impairment, or at least those commonly so regarded – rightly judge that many 
with mental illnesses or impairments cannot be expected to deal with these institutions by 
themselves. We then, wrongfully, assign the fault to those persons, and assume that we 
must adopt a wholly paternalistic attitude towards their relationship to the basic institutions 
of society. I am not saying that, if the structures are to stay as they are, these people do not 
need help. Everyone needs help in these matters — that is what lawyers, civil servants, 
nurses and doctors, teachers, university lecturers etc. are for. But the possession of the 
moral powers only requires that a person understand the basic normative ideals of the 
society that they live within. I think that the ability to comprehend these ideals is possessed 
by a great many more mentally impaired individuals than is commonly recognised. 
Reciprocity, fraternity, freedom, responsibility etc. are not esoteric concepts, however 
much a full philosophical grasp of them may be. It is having a basic type of stance and set 
of sentiments towards the others in your society which qualifies you for justice, and it is 
solely the lack of this endowment which disqualifies. There is no reason to assume that the 
basic mental and physical preconditions of such a moral sensibility aren't quite minimal. 
 I have elaborated these points by reference to the provision of the basic liberties, as 
they must be met most urgently according to Rawls's theory. How Rawls's conception of 
distributive justice, as governed by the second principle of justice, may have to be 
reformed, I do not engage with here. It may be that Rawls's formulation of the difference 
principle needs to be changed.575 For persons unable to cooperate, the equal opportunities 
principle appears, on the face of it, inapplicable.576 No matter what revisions are necessary, 
I believe the contribution requirement must be rejected. It is fundamentally inconsistent 
with Rawls's basic moral and psychological assumptions, and his account of the basis of 
equality. 
                                                          
575  For proposals on how to avoid this, which may or may not be compatible with my position, see 
Stark (2007) pp. 136—140 and Richardson (2006) pp. 430—439 
576  See Stark (2007) p. 134 fn22 
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15.5 F: Isn't this revision incompatible with Rawls's resourcism? 
 
 Rawls's resourcism comes from his use of the social primary goods as a metric of 
justice, and the fact that the distribution of these primary goods must be seen to be publicly 
ascertainable. It might be wondered whether distributing to everyone possessing or capable 
of the moral powers – including those severely impaired – could be accounted for. I have 
already argued that the non-contributing do not pose a special case as regards the various 
aspects of publicity (15.5 B and C above). The position of being a non-contributing-but-
moral agent, and the resources distributed to you in light of this, is as capable of being 
publicly verified as anything else. 
 It is important to note that the issue I am concerned with can be considered 
separately from the debate surrounding whether primary goods are the correct metric of 
justice. Rawls pioneered the primary goods or resource metric. In this, he is joined by 
many others: both broadly Rawlsian in their approach and not.577 What is to be distributed 
are simply valuable resources, including public institutional arrangements as well as 
exchangeable commodities.578 A leading rival is the capabilities metric, as proposed by 
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum.579 For them, it is capabilities that are to be distributed 
justly. Capabilities are relations between external resources and the internal dispositions of 
persons to realise valuable “functionings”: things persons value doing or being.580 
Resourcist positions are blind to variations in capabilities — at least, beyond the capacities 
to develop some basic moral sensibility, such as Rawls's two moral powers.581 
 The chief claim of the capabilities theorists is that primary goods do not represent a 
fair metric, as different people possess different abilities to convert the same resources into 
valuable functionings. One chief group who are said to come off unfairly under primary 
goods are those with severe impairments – as we have noted, a group which overlaps 
significantly with those unable to contribute to the basic structure of society. In response, 
resourcists have claimed that the disabled need not be said to be unfairly treated under a 
primary goods metric, if the implications of such a metric are properly understood.582 But 
                                                          
577  For examples of the former, see Pogge (2010) and Kelly (2010). For examples of the latter, see 
Dworkin (1981) and Carter (2011)  
578  See CP, pp. 271—273 
579  See, for example, Sen (1980) and Nussbaum (2006) 
580  Many of the other prominent metrics are varieties of welfarism, and take the realisation of well—
being to be what we should attempt to distribute justly. See, for example, Cohen (1989). 
581  See PL, pp. 182—183 and JF, pp. 169—170  
582  See, for example, arguments by Pogge (2010) pp. 32—53 and Kelly (2010) pp. 66—69 
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all I have claimed is that anyone with the capacity for the moral powers is owed full justice, 
regardless of their ability to contribute. All theorists should agree that people with this 
basic moral sensibility, or the equivalent found in their own theory, are owed equal 
recognition.583 Some have argued that only a resourcist position is compatible with this 
basis of equality.584 Others have argued that the capabilities approach is best compatible.585 
Whichever is the correct conclusion I can leave aside here. 
 
15.5 G: Isn't this position incompatible with the basic structure being the first 
subject of justice? 
 
 It might be thought that by jettisoning the contribution requirement, I am hence 
committed to siding with the recent critique of Rawls's distinction between principles of 
justice for the basic structure, and for individuals. This criticism has been proposed by G.A. 
Cohen and Liam B. Murphy, and has been accepted by Rawlsian philosophers such as 
Michael Titelbaum.586 These philosophers argue that there do not exist principles of 
distinct content governing the arrangements of the basic structure of society, and the 
actions of individual agents within the rules of that structure, in opposition to Rawls.587 
Others have produced various counterarguments for the correctness of the distinction.588 
 My revision holds independently of the basic structure debate. Whether or not one 
thinks distinct principles exist for the basic structure, everyone agrees that the members of 
the well-ordered society share a public conception of justice, which embodies certain 
fundamental normative ideas. My observation is that society as fair cooperation, and 
justice as reciprocity, impart normative ideals into Justice as Fairness which are at odds 
with aspects of its moral psychology, and in addition are independently morally dubious. 
Cohen and Titelbaum also agree that aspects of Rawls's psychology undermine the basic 
structure restriction.589 But, though these two criticisms might stem from the same source, 
they may be sustained separately. 
 It may be possible that someone could argue for the following interpretation of the 
well-ordered society. Those unable to contribute to society are fully included within the 
scope of justice. But everyone, including the non-contributing, understands the principles 
                                                          
583  Sen (2010) pp. 242—243 is clear that he does not disagree with Rawls over this issue. 
584  See Carter (2011) pp. 560—571 
585  See Anderson (2010) 
586  See Cohen (2008) chapter 3, Murphy (1999), Titelbaum (2008) 
587  Relevant passages include TJ, pp. 47/54, 108—110/93—95, 116—117/99  
588  See, for example, Williams (1998) 
589  See Cohen (2008) pp. 129—132, Titelbaum (2008) pp. 296—302 
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of justice as being quite distinct for institutions and individuals. Institutions need to 
guarantee justice for all, but, outside the rules of the basic structure, everyone, again 
including the non-contributing, commit no injustice when they fail to observe 
individualistic correlates590 of the principles for institutions in their own choices. I have 
sympathies with those who reject the distinction between institutional and individual 
principles, and it is obvious that the considerations I have stressed are similar to the ones 
that these other authors stress. Both criticisms proceed, in part, from considering the 
fundamental attitudes and perspectives that the members of the well-ordered society can be 
expected to have towards one another on alternative conceptions of justice. But I leave 
open the possibility that one criticism might fail while the other might succeed. 
 
15.5 H: Couldn't simply expressing the moral powers in any sense be said to be a 
“contribution” to society for Rawls? 
 
 If this were true, my criticism of Rawls would lose some of its bite. For then it 
would be the case that to possess the moral powers would be to possess the ability to 
cooperate after all. I earlier rejected the suggestion that to have the ability to cooperate in 
the maintenance of the basic structure through normal employment is what amounts to 
having the moral powers. This suggestion is that even the most generic activities of being a 
moral agent could count as contributing to the cooperative scheme of society with one's 
fellows, in which goods are produced which benefit all fairly.591 
 It should be clear from how Rawls defines cooperation in the basic structure that 
this is not the case for him. Productive activity is assumed to be on a wider scale than the 
most basic moral agency. Persons can be moral agents, and yet be unable to contribute to 
the minimal maintenance of their society from one generation from the next. A society in 
which each member was afflicted by a sufficiently incapacitating physical disability would 
be rendered unable to feed itself, and hence, despite the moral sensibility of its inhabitants, 
would perish. Consider, for example, the scenario described in John Wyndam's Day of the 
Triffids, in which nearly the whole of the population lose their sight, and are hence left 
defenceless against the carnivorous Triffid plants.592 The nature of the disaster in the book 
could have easily left everyone blind, and hence could have led to complete destruction. 
 There is something weak about this point. It is the case that many of the 
                                                          
590  That the principles of justice would be correlates to Rawls's principles for institutions, not the same 
principles themselves, see Titelbaum (2008) pp. 293, 302—307 
591  This kind of defence of contract theory is suggested by Silvers and Francis (2005) and Hartley (2009)  
592  John Wyndam was a British science fiction author. The Day of the Triffids was published in 1951. 
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contributors in a well-ordered society perform roles which are not strictly speaking 
essential for the maintenance of the basic institutional structure in the society year after 
year. And wouldn't being a morally engaged individual in society help to support the 
public culture of the society, even if one could not hold down essential paid employment? I 
am unsure what to say here. Rawls's ideal of a member of the well-ordered society is an 
individual who works, and acts so as to at least not undermine the public political culture 
of the society (see the description of the duty of justice in section 2).593 I do not believe 
that my revision can be incorporated into Rawls's theory without some degree of 
substantial revision. But the precise extent I shall not investigate here.  
 However, we can accept that Rawls would recognise that, though society could not 
be sustained on the activities of the non-contributing alone, there could be many ways in 
which these people could contribute to the maintenance of aspects of the basic structure, 
either directly (i.e. speaking or communicating on public forums) or indirectly (i.e. through 
helping to support sentiments of friendship, trust, and fraternity).594 Even with this, 
however, my point would not be otiose. For it is not in virtue of being a contributor in any 
kind of way that people should be valued, but as moral agents with good will towards their 
fellows. That the activity of being such an agent produces some kind of benefit is beside 
the point. On occasion, good intentions may lead to bad outcomes. No matter how many 
times someone's good will went awry, however, we would not be warranted in excluding 
them from justice (though this is not to say they should avoid all sanction). Reciprocity, I 
argue, at bottom implies the mutual concern for our own and each other's good, and hence 
from that concern, the production of mutual benefit, ideally. 
 
15.5 I: Isn't this revision ruled out by Rawls's conception of reasonableness? 
 
 It will be recalled that reasonable persons desire for its own sake a social world in 
which they fairly cooperate with others for mutual benefit (subsection 8.2). To be a 
reasonable person, it is not required that you are able to fairly cooperate with others. It is 
enough that you desire to. This is clear from Rawls's claim that being a reasonable person 
binds in foro interno. 
 
                                                          
593  I put this quite weakly as, as was noted in chapter 4, Rawls cannot demand that the members of a 
well-ordered society be necessarily strongly politically engaged. 
594  On the possibility of the latter, see Silvers and Francis (2005) 
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15.5 J: How does this revision impact on Justice as Fairness as a political 
conception? Is the revision compatible with political liberalism? 
 
 What is distinctive of political liberalism (section 13), as (perhaps) opposed to 
public justification liberalisms generally, is that it demands that political conceptions be 
presented as only reasonable and not as true. This does not significantly alter the normative 
content of Justice as Fairness, but only regarding the way public political arguments are to 
be presented. The account of the scope of justice appears to be untouched. Hence I believe 
this revision is perfectly compatible with political liberalism – simply that it might be more 
demanding or controversial does not, in itself, debar it from being part of public reason. 
Who is to say it may not actually be better founded given certain public political cultures? 
 
15.5 K: Does this revision lead to any alterations in Rawls's fundamental ideas? 
 
 Yes. The alteration stretches to a rearrangement and a slight change in content. It 
was remarked above in subsection 15.1 that society as fair cooperation is the most 
fundamental idea in Rawls's theory, and that the idea of the person and the idea of the well-
ordered society are defined by reference to it. This cannot be sustained if we are to drop the 
ideal of the person as a contributor to the maintenance of society from one generation to 
the next. Instead, the idea of the person as possessing the two moral powers must be 
thought of as the most fundamental. It can then be joined with the idea of the well-ordered 
society to yield the modified idea of society as fair cooperation. That society can then 
persist from generation to generation is then added as an empirical postulate, not a 
normative ideal (or at least, not a moral one, by reference to which individuals or societies 
can be morally judged). It is, of course, non-ideal (to say the least) if a well-ordered society 
were to collapse due to mass blindness and triffid attack, as in my example above. But the 
collapse here is due to environmental burdens. The situation is not non-ideal in a moral 
sense if the members of such a society act in a morally peerless fashion, despite the 
hopelessness of their situation. 
 There is a further aspect of Rawls's philosophy which may need to be revised in the 
light of this alteration. But the matter is difficult to discern, and would take some work to 
fully analyse, due to the difficulty in working out just what Rawls is committing himself to. 
The aspect I am thinking of stems from the principal sense in which Rawls takes his theory 
to be distinct from Kant's. Kant, Rawls claims, takes as the basic unit of morality the 
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individual moral person. Rawls by contrast, conceives of morality, or at least justice, in a 
more fundamentally social way. He takes the basic ideas to be the moral agent within a 
moral society – the person within a well-ordered society, in other words.595 I am unsure 
whether this assumption can be maintained in the face of the revision I am proposing. It 
may be that it can. For consider, the members of society who are impaired in such a way to 
prevent them from contributing to the maintenance of their society can still conceive of the 
ideal as their being able to contribute. Of course, this must be a non-moral ideal, for 
reasons outlined in 15.5 A above. I can see potential problems with such a response, but I 
do not pursue them here.  
 
15.5 L: What about non-contributing groups other than the mentally or 
physically impaired? 
 
 The two other major groups of non-contributors are certain animals, and future 
people. Some animals have contributed to society for centuries — they are excluded on the 
assumption that they cannot possess the moral powers. I leave aside these animals, and the 
animals undoubtedly unable to contribute, until sections 16.2 and 18. 
 Future persons are unable to cooperate for mutual benefit with the people of the 
present in terms of material goods. It is less clear whether they can be said to cooperate 
when they keep alive valuable practices and institutions. In any case, persons are owed 
justice on the basis of their moral powers. Either future persons will have such powers or 
they will not. So long as they do, we owe them justice – their temporal displacement from 
us being morally irrelevant.596  
 
15.5 M: Does dropping the contribution requirement lead to any alterations in 
the original position? 
 
 Yes. Those who are unable to contribute to the maintenance of the basic structure 
must now be included within the original position. Under the veil of ignorance, no one will 
know whether they will be able to cooperate in the maintenance of society or not. As I 
indicated in subsection 15.5 E, this may lead to alterations in the principles agreed to in 
                                                          
595  See, for example, TJ, pp. 256—257/226, CP, p. 340 
596  This position differs from Rawls's own account of how we owe the people of the future justice (TJ, 
pp. 128—129/111, 139—140/120—121, PL, p. 274) I do not explore whether this demands alterations to 
Rawls's account of a just savings rate between generations (TJ, pp. 284—293/251—258) 
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that position. Other writers have suggested similar modifications.597 I believe the 
alterations entailed for Rawls's theory go further than these writers indicate. I do not pursue 
this matter here. 
 
15.5 N: Doesn't this alteration to Rawls's theory disrupt his account of 
international justice? 
 
 My arguments against the contribution requirement may have left some wondering 
about the status of persons who wish to become citizens and contribute to different 
societies. For, if persons born into a certain society are to be granted full justice and equal 
liberal rights simply because they wish and are motivated to contribute to a society, even if 
they can't, what is to stop a foreign national claiming citizenship of that society simply 
because they conscientiously wish to contribute to it? 
 I believe that Rawls's theory allows us to say the following, and hence that this 
proposal does not constitute a serious internal problem for a Rawlsian theory.598 For Rawls, 
being a just person requires you to attempt to promote and sustain just institutions, so long 
as the (moral) costs are not too great.599 There is no restriction to the institutions of your 
own society, though of course the task of promoting justice abroad is complicated by 
various additional moral-philosophical and practical matters.600 However, the question of 
migration from one society to another is another matter. The duty to promote just 
institutions does not require an open-borders policy with regards to anyone who wishes to 
come and work in your society.601 The duties to (and expectations from) those born within 
one's society who possess the capacity for the moral powers, but are unable to contribute to 
the maintenance of society's institutions, are different to those outside one's society. 
 
15.5 O: Justice as Reciprocity or Impartiality? 
 
 Finally, over this subsection and the next, we can now return to Barry's question 
regarding the coherence of justice as reciprocity as a position. Given what has been argued, 
it does not seem that justice as reciprocity as Rawls understood it is really a stable position. 
                                                          
597  Stark (2007), Richardson (2006) 
598  Whether an external problem remains, due to problems with Rawls's position on global justice in 
general, I leave aside. 
599  TJ, pp. 115/99, 334/293—294 
600  See LP, pp. 37, 105—113 
601  LP, pp. 8—9, 39 fn48 
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Deep-seated elements in his theory undermine it, and there does not seem to be any way to 
ground it in a morally principled manner.  
 However, this does not necessarily undermine the acceptability of the slogan. For 
there is a sense in which, even with the modification I have proposed, a basic idea of 
justice still remains one of reciprocity. This can be seen by considering Rawls's moral 
psychology. In acting justly towards persons as they develop a sense of justice, and an 
ability to develop their own conception of the good, what we expect is that the person 
develop those capacities to the best of their ability. If they possess the capacity for the 
moral powers, then, ideally, our expectations will be met. The relationship between 
persons in the well-ordered society is founded on reciprocity of basic recognition and good 
will.602 Reciprocal production of a certain set of goods (i.e. the institutions of the well-
ordered society) can be an aspect of this reciprocity, but is not an essential aspect. Non-
ideal, regrettable conditions can undermine it.  
 Does this serve to render justice as reciprocity equivalent to justice as impartiality? 
I do not think so. It appears that Barry's basic criterion for being included within the scope 
of justice is to have interests. Hence, animals are included within the scope of justice, 
though they are only afforded minimal and not full justice.603 I have assumed the position 
that we cannot grant a being partial justice (subsection 15.5 A) – beings deserve full justice, 
or they do not. I hence stick with justice as reciprocity – for now (see section 18 below). 
 
15.5 P: The circumstances of justice, and justice as reciprocity 
 
 Rawls's commitment to the circumstances of justice has been argued to be the basis 
for his commitment to the ideas of society as fair cooperation and justice as reciprocity, 
with their implication that non-contributors are excluded from the scope of justice. Brian 
Barry argues the following: Rawls's acceptance of the circumstances of justice, and in 
particular the assumption that social cooperation, and hence justice, supposes rough 
equality, leads to Rawls distinguishing – sometimes implicitly, sometimes not – between 
contributors and non-contributors.604 This distinction plays itself out in different ways for 
different characteristic groups.605  The distinction is traced back to a tension between the 
idea of impartiality embodied in the original position, which requires us to abstract from 
                                                          
602  A similar reinterpretation of Rawls is suggested by Ci (2006) pp. 74—92, 136—141, 146—152 
603  See the page references in fn19 above. 
604  See Barry (1989), pp. 179—183, 241 
605  See in particular, ibid. pp. 183—189 (on future generations), pp. 203—212 (on animals), pp. 183—
189 (on international justice). 
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contributive capacity, and Barry's interpretation of the circumstances of justice, which 
leads to justice exclusively being a virtue of schemes between cooperators. 
 My earlier discussion of the circumstances of justice in section 7 should indicate 
the problem here. The circumstances of justice merely serve to make social cooperation 
possible and necessary. They indirectly give rise to the need for justice, but it is never 
explicitly stated that they restrict the scope of justice. 
 
Section 16: The ability to cooperate as sufficient 
 
16.1 Further sufficient grounds? 
 
 The previous section focused on defending one idea – that the capacity for the 
moral powers is sufficient to be owed justice. By implication, the capacity to contribute to 
production through the basic structure of society is not part of a joint necessity with the 
moral powers. I also believe, from a Rawls-esque contractarian standpoint, that the 
capacity for the moral powers is necessary to be owed justice. This is contradictory to what 
Rawls allows in A Theory of Justice. There, Rawls holds that being able to develop the two 
moral powers is only sufficient, and not necessary, to be included within the scope of the 
rights and duties of justice.606  
 Just which further groups, in addition to those beings with the capacity for the 
moral powers, can be owed justice is unspecified there. I shall consider three relevant 
groups of individuals who could be thought to be owed justice despite not having the two 
moral powers. There are those who have a capacity to develop and revise a conception of 
the good, and are able to cooperate in the fair scheme of society, but lack a sense of justice. 
There are those who lack the ability to cooperate, and lack a sense of justice, but can form 
a conception of the good. And then there are those who lack both moral powers altogether 
and, we can assume, any cooperative ability. I shall consider the first group in this section. 
I shall reject the thought that they are owed justice on the basis of their ability to cooperate 
– the ability to cooperate is not sufficient to be included within the scope of justice. My 
analysis in this section (section 16) will indicate why I feel I can consider this group, and 
the second and third groups all together in section 17. In section 17, I shall reject the idea 
that any of these three groups are owed justice. 
 As before, first I will lay out independent intuitive grounds that count against 
                                                          
606  TJ, p. 506/442—443 
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including beings without a sense of justice but possessing an ability to cooperate, 
presenting an external critique. Then, I indicate how elements of Rawls's own theory 
support this conclusion, thus presenting an internal critique. As before, many of the 
elements of the internal critique stem from Rawls’s moral psychology. This all occurs 
within subsection 16.2. I then reply, in subsection 16.3, to a recent argument that 
contributing to a cooperative scheme has its own moral standing. Relying on earlier 
material, I answer that this proposal cannot be maintained, at least by Rawls. 
 
16.2 Excluding the irredeemably unjust but cooperative 
 
 I first present independent moral considerations against the capacity to cooperate 
being sufficient to be owed justice. I begin by reiterating how it is possible that men and 
women might cooperate in the maintenance of a just society, despite lacking even the 
capacity for a sense of justice. Under certain circumstances, individuals without a sense of 
justice can be moved to act justly so long as it is in their own interest (subsection 15.3). It 
cannot be assumed that these circumstances will obtain very often within our societies. As 
I noted earlier in the discussion of the circumstances of justice, in our world, rough 
equality does not obtain between all agents (subsection 7). So long as they can avoid the 
reprisals or restraint of the just, nothing will stop those without a sense of justice 
mistreating those who are weaker than themselves. The irredeemably unjust will always be 
willing to act contrary to justice when they think they can get away with it. However, it is 
perfectly possible that overall society may be a net beneficiary from the periods when these 
individuals do rationally curb their short-term self-interest for the sake of long-term gains, 
and hence contribute to the overall stock of goods. Expanding on these facts will allow us 
to develop the best picture of the nature of our relations to those who lack a sense of justice. 
 Lacking a sense of justice, our relations towards these individuals can be best 
viewed as equivalent to our relations to animals (or at least most animals, depending on 
one's views), or perhaps even forces of nature. We can benefit overall from our interactions 
with nature. But we do not see ourselves as bound to give the same sort of respect to nature 
as we do to other moral agents (see further section 18 below). Imagine a village where 
people are occasionally attacked by an escaped panther. The village might overall benefit 
from the cat's presence in some way. Cryptozoologists may come and spend lots of money 
staying at the village pub. Merchandising opportunities might exist: mugs and baseball 
caps might be sold to both visiting tourists, and over the Web. If the choice was offered 
between keeping things as they are, or else changing matters so as to prevent the beast's 
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attacks, but only at the cost of also losing the beast-benefits, it would constitute an injustice, 
all-things-considered, for the leaders of the village to keep things as they are. For this 
would essentially be to trade off individuals’ basic rights against wider benefits for the 
community, no matter how great those benefits were. There could be, of course, a range of 
possibilities with regards to how things could be changed. It might be there was only one 
option: to kill the beast. But this is unlikely, at least in a modern setting. Some kind of 
protection against the beast, such as a fence, or a beast-tracking system, could instead be 
used. Some solutions may allow the eradication of the danger from the beast, but the 
preservation of the benefits it brings. But the important point is that the basic rights of the 
individual members of the village must take priority. 
 The villagers’ position as regards the beast is analogous to our position regarding 
humans who lack a sense of justice but who are overall net benefactors to society. We 
know that they cannot be relied on to avoid injustice. We must take the necessary measures 
to avoid this injustice. It will be acceptable for us, it might be thought, to enter into 
productive relations with these individuals if this is compatible with preventing them from 
committing injustice. But if it is not, then such relations are out of bounds. Failing to 
recognise our proper relations to such individuals, then, can easily lead to us acting 
unjustly towards each other. In failing to acknowledge the distinct status of those who are 
unable to be just, we place each other in harm's way of these individuals. 
 None of this is to say that we are allowed to do whatever we like to those without a 
sense of justice, any more than that we can do whatever we like to the animals. Rawls 
holds that “the capacity for feelings of pleasure and pain and for the forms of life of which 
animals are capable” impose on us “duties of compassion and humanity.” However, they 
do not impose duties, or expectations, of justice.607 Our duties towards the animals may 
very well be much more expansive than are usually recognised. Nor need we assume that 
humans who lack any capacity for the sense of justice could only be afforded the rights of 
animals. My discussion so far has been misleading in the following way: it may have put 
the reader purely in mind of the dangerous psychopath. But not all human beings who lack 
the capacity for a sense of justice can be assumed to be dangerous psychopaths. My basic 
point here should be taken to be: whatever we owe to those without the capacity for a sense 
of justice, it is different to what is owed between persons with the capacity for a sense of 
justice. 
 Finally we might point out the implication of including within the scope of justice 
those incapable of developing a sense of justice but with the capacity to contribute, but not 
                                                          
607  See TJ, p. 512/448 
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those capable of a sense of justice but who cannot contribute. If we do this, then it seems 
obvious that we are actually valuing contributive potential more than possession of a sense 
of justice. For we are willing to include someone on the basis of contribution alone, but not 
on the basis of having the capacity for a sense of justice alone. Even if we instead adopt the 
idea that it is merely a moral ideal that persons be able to take employment in the basic 
structure, rather than a strict restriction of the scope of justice (as canvassed in subsection 
15.5 A above), it then appears that we value contribution equally to possessing a sense of 
justice. For we are willing to grant basic justice on the basis of either contributive potential, 
or possession of the capacity for the moral powers. This is intuitively the wrong attitude 
for the Just to have. 
 Having presented external considerations for revising Rawls’s theory, I now 
present internal ones. Several aspects of Rawls's theory militate against including those 
lacking a sense of justice within the scope of justice, even if they are able to contribute to 
society. First, Rawls holds that those without a sense of justice lack the moral emotions. 
Rawls holds that one can only experience the moral emotions if one is able to grasp moral 
concepts. Hence, justice is beyond the ken of those without a sense of justice. Without such 
background beliefs, one can experience only anger and regret, not true resentment, 
indignation, or guilt.608 In “The Sense of Justice”, Rawls claims that a propensity for the 
moral sentiments and emotions is needed if one is to be able to complain of injustice, as 
“the duty of justice is owed only to those who can complain of not being justly treated.”609 
This rests on the more basic idea that “if a person has a right to something, it must be that 
he can claim it and protest its not being given him.”610 Rawls dropped this later claim, 
presumably along with the claim that a sense of justice is necessary for justice. But it does 
follow from assumptions about the moral emotions which are retained in Theory. Unless 
his arguments for the moral powers being merely sufficient are sound (see section 17.2), 
this commitment should be maintained. 
 Furthermore, those without a sense of justice seem incapable of realising the ideal 
of reciprocity that is embedded in Rawls's principles of moral psychology, as we have 
described that ideal (subsection 15.4). The essence of their condition is that they are unable 
to recognise others as possessing the moral powers. They are different, then, from those 
who recognise these powers but who are unwilling to act accordingly. They are also 
                                                          
608  TJ, pp. 487—490/427—429. See also CP, pp. 111—112. 
609  CP, p. 114 
610  CP, p. 114. This statement appears to assume a choice theory of rights. Some believe there are 
problems with including children in a choice theory in the way that Rawls proposes to in CP, p. 114 and TJ, 
p. 509/445—446. See, for example, Steiner (1994) pp. 245—246. I cannot enter this debate here. I simply 
assume that those with a capacity for the moral powers can somehow be shown to be owed rights. 
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different from those who recognise those powers, and the reasons they give, but find 
themselves unable to act appropriately, i.e. who suffer from weakness of will over this 
matter. For both these latter groups possess a sense of justice. They will be able to 
comprehend that their actions or lack of actions are unjust, and hence mandate some kind 
of response from the just. Both groups recognise that justice requires something of them. 
This is psychologically impossible for the first group. If you are unable to recognise the 
sense of justice in others, other things equal, it follows that you lack a sense of justice 
yourself. 
 It is true that those without a sense of justice can enter into certain reciprocal 
relations with the just, under certain conditions. But not any old reciprocation, or ability to 
reciprocate, can give rise to claims of justice. This is obvious when we consider that 
reciprocal relations can exist between persons which constitute an injustice to others. As 
the discussion of the circumstances of justice should have made clear (section 7) not all 
social cooperation is fair social cooperation (see also Appendix II). Indefensible 
exclusionary social practices can be perfectly reciprocal between those who are included – 
honour amongst brigands is still honour, even if restricted. What is required is the right 
kind of basic relationship of reciprocity: one which serves as a proper basis of equality 
between all moral agents. 
 Now it may seem that I am unfairly pressing my case here, by allowing the easy 
association between those without a sense of justice, and egoists, to pass without comment. 
For Rawls, these groups coincide. He argues that, all-things-considered, the development 
of natural attachments and ties to particular others is accompanied by or leads to the 
development of the moral sentiments, including the sense of justice.611 This leads him to 
conclude that those who possess any attachments to others at all are at least capable of 
developing a sense of justice, and that those who lack the capacity for a sense of justice 
also lack the capacity to care about others.612 
 Even if we allow, contra-Rawls, the possibility that people can lack the capacity for 
the sense of justice, but still be able to form ties with particular others, however, I maintain 
that they cannot be owed justice. The relationship between these individuals, and those 
outside their circle of relationships, is no different from that between the egoist and other 
persons in general. Those with a sense of justice who do share attachments and sentimental 
ties with this individual will be allowing the possibility of injustice if they grant them the 
privileges and responsibilities of the just. This is not to say that no moral requirements then 
                                                          
611  See TJ, pp. 485—487/425—427 
612  TJ, pp. 487—490/427—429 
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obtain. If you are friends with a person who is incapable of justice, if you abandon your 
friendship due to your friend’s lack of justice, then you violate the ideals of friendship. But, 
so long as the requirements of justice and friendship can come apart, you must act as a 
friend to your friend, but act justly towards the just. For better or worse, these two values 
can compete.613 
 Finally, it may be wondered whether Rawls truly thought that justice could be 
extended to those who lack a sense of justice but who are able to cooperate. I believe that 
the jury is out, due to the brevity of Rawls's discussion of the moral powers only being 
sufficient. Some have interpreted him to be talking about only the mentally and physically 
impaired in this section.614 Nothing I see suggests this, however. Whatever he meant to 
suggest, it seems that including the cooperative but unjust is incompatible with his account 
of the moral psychology of Justice as Fairness. 
 
16.3 The moral status of contribution 
 
 In a recent article, Cynthia A. Stark has defended the moral salience of both of the 
elements of the ideal of Rawlsian citizenship we identified above: the capacity for a sense 
of justice, and the ability to contribute. The moral relevance of contribution is based on 
what Stark calls an anti-exploitation principle: 
 
The contractarian's commitment to the anti-exploitation principle ... requires 
him to treat the ability to cooperate as morally relevant because the anti-
exploitation principle regards the fact of one's social cooperation as bearing 
upon what share of the social product one is owed; a person contributing to a 
scheme of cooperation is owed, due to her contributing, a certain portion of 
the cooperative surplus (all things being equal).615 
 
This principle, and a principle expressing the idea that moral persons are owed equal 
recognition and respect as such, are said to be separate and distinct parts of our pre-
theoretical notion of justice.616 If we neglect the moral relevance of the capacity for the 
                                                          
613  In Theory, Rawls has arguments which may suggest that in a well-ordered society, the demands of 
our personal attachments and the demands of justice and our wider society, cannot come apart (see esp. pp. 
474—475/415—416). In later work, however, Rawls appears to be much less sure of this claim. See, for 
example, PL, pp. 57, 197—198. 
614  For example, Nussbaum (2006) and Freeman (2006) 
615  Stark (2009) p. 90 
616  Ibid. 
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moral powers, then our theory may be impossible to justify to the non-contributing. If we 
neglect the moral relevance of contribution to the cooperative surplus of society, then our 
theory may be impossible to justify to the contributing.617 
 I have no reason to deny that, pre-theoretically, we may view justice as having 
these distinct elements. But, if we accept Rawls's account of the basis of equality, the 
capacity for the moral powers must be viewed as more fundamental. It is the basis from 
which the other element of justice is derived (subsection 15.1). We expect things from 
moral persons, and if they fulfil these expectations, we hold that there are certain things 
they should receive. When people meet expectations that they should work, and they do not 
receive what they should in return for this, we call this exploitation. Work, and exploitation, 
are just two of the moral concepts associated with the relations moral agents should 
maintain between each other. Equal recognition as moral agents is at the basis of both these 
concepts, as well as others. 
 Contribution to a cooperative surplus does not have independent moral standing. If 
an individual who lacks the capacity for a sense of justice has contributed to a cooperative 
surplus, this does not mean they are owed remuneration in anything more than a 
conventional or legal sense. The reason for us interacting with the unjust is that we are able 
to benefit from them without allowing an injustice to befall any of us. If we cannot 
guarantee our security, there cannot be a reason for us to interact with them. We give them 
things in return for what they do in order to prevent them from causing injustices, not 
because they are owed them for what they have done. As I have noted, we can owe them 
other duties. But we cannot owe them duties of reciprocity. We cannot exploit them, in the 
relevant sense. We can only exploit them in the sense that people speak of human beings 
“exploiting” nature. This is a corruption of the precise meaning of exploitation – it simply 
refers to misuse. As noted above, they cannot complain of our having this attitude towards 
them, as they cannot recognise that we ourselves are owed this attitude. 
 Stark identifies as equally fundamental two principles of justice which in fact 
occupy different levels of the concept. Exploitation is relevant between those who 
contribute to the cooperative surplus of society. But it presupposes a more basic, and 
expansive, conception of the duties and rights of a moral agent. Justification between 
persons begins from this basic equal status, and then moves outwards through each of the 
various social positions and roles that persons are able to occupy. 
 The arguments I have presented here and in the previous subsection cast doubt, at 
least, on the claim that the ability to contribute to the cooperative scheme of a well-ordered 
                                                          
617  Ibid. p. 91 
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society is sufficient, in itself, to be owed justice. It now remains to ask whether those 
without the capacity for the moral powers are to be included within the scope of justice on 
the basis of some further attribute. 
  
Section 17: Those who lack moral powers and the ability to contribute 
 
17.1 Those without a sense of justice aren't owed justice 
 
 I have argued that possession of the ability to contribute to the maintenance of the 
basic structure of society is, by itself, insufficient to be owed justice. Such individuals who 
possess this ability, but lack the moral power of the sense of justice, are in the same boat, 
morally, as the remaining two groups which I shall consider. These are those who lack a 
sense of justice and an ability to cooperate, and those who lack any cooperative ability or 
moral powers. I shall assume that the bare minimum to be included in these three groups is 
simply that one have interests, and shall from now on treat these three groups as a single 
group. I hence assume that having interests is not equivalent to having a conception of the 
good, as this seems plausibly tied to the notion of rationality, and hence freedom (section 
8). Nothing essential turns on this assumption. 
 Is having interests sufficient to be owed justice? Rawls should claim not. I shall 
only add a little to what has already been said in the previous section here. In subsection 
17.2, I shall then address Rawls's own arguments that possession of the moral powers is 
only sufficient, and not necessary, to be owed justice. 
 The considerations put forward in the previous section already take us half way to 
our eventual conclusion. Justice cannot be given to those without a sense of justice. Giving 
them the rights and privileges of justice, and expecting them to act on the duties of justice, 
will, in most circumstances, put those who possess a sense of justice at risk. This is in 
effect to commit an injustice towards others who have a sense of justice, by leaving them 
open to be preyed on by the unjust. However, some of the group we are now considering 
can be assumed to be incapable of causing injustices to occur, if their impairments are 
severe enough. Nevertheless, we incorrectly grasp the scope of justice when we then 
conclude that these individuals can be granted justice due to the lack of threat they pose. 
For it is undeniable that, if these individuals were capable of injuring us, there is nothing in 
their character which would prevent them doing so. In a similar way that we can fail to 
acknowledge the good will of those with a sense of justice who are unable to cooperate, 
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similarly we can fail to acknowledge the lack of good will in those who lack a sense of 
justice but who are unable to harm. If we view these two groups as both being owed the 
same, on the basis that both have interests, we fail to acknowledge the motivation to 
reciprocate found in the former group. In essence, we fail to give the willingness to 
reciprocate its proper due. Assuming that duties and rights of justice are founded on 
reciprocity, then justice cannot be extended to those who are unable to respond in kind. 
 
17.2 Rawls's arguments for the sufficiency of the moral powers 
 
 As noted earlier, Rawls backs away from his earlier stance that the moral powers 
are necessary and sufficient to be owed justice, and in A Theory of Justice believes them to 
be merely sufficient. What are his arguments for this change? 
 Below, I quote the whole relevant passage 
 
The capacity for moral personality is a sufficient condition for being entitled to 
equal justice. ... Whether moral personality is also a necessary condition I shall 
leave aside. I assume that the capacity for a sense of justice is possessed by the 
overwhelming majority of mankind, and therefore this question does not raise 
a serious practical problem. That moral personality suffices to make one a 
subject of claims is the essential thing. We cannot go far wrong in supposing 
that the sufficient condition is always satisfied. Even if the capacity were 
necessary, it would be unwise in practice to withhold justice on this ground. 
The risk to just institutions would be too great. 
 
It should be stressed that the sufficient condition for equal justice, the capacity 
for moral personality, is not at all stringent. When someone lacks the requisite 
potentiality either from birth or accident, this is regarded as a defect or 
deprivation. There is no race or recognised group of human beings that lacks 
this attribute. Only scattered individuals are without this capacity, for its 
realisation to some minimum degree, and the failure to realise it is the 
consequence of unjust or impoverished circumstances, or fortuitous 
contingencies.618  
 
                                                          
618  TJ, p. 506/442—443 
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Later he adds 
 
It is reasonable to say that those who could take part in the initial agreement, 
were it not for fortuitous circumstances, are assured equal justice.619 
 
It will be clear from the first paragraph that Rawls gives no explicit argument for including 
those without the capacity for the sense of justice within the scope of justice. Instead, he is 
simply going to assume that just about everyone has this capacity. Because of this 
assumption, there is no need, or at least less need, to argue as to whether the sense of 
justice is merely sufficient. Even if it is necessary, it will be in practice be unwise not to act 
justly towards any human being. 
 This last practical suggestion I can partially agree with. My discussions in the 
previous section assumed perfect knowledge of who is capable of a sense of justice and 
who is not. But faced with imperfect knowledge, we will be better to give individuals the 
benefit of the doubt, rather than not afford them justice. Providing that Rawls's empirical 
assumption is correct, we do not seemingly place those capable of justice in danger by 
generically extending justice to everyone. Indeed, we may place those capable of justice in 
danger by not so extending matters. However, I do not think such an extension of justice is 
best viewed as extending the scope of justice in a moral sense. Rather, within an overall 
Rawlsian position, I believe that such an extension is best thought of in a legal or 
conventional sense, in order to secure better prospects for protecting the rights of 
individuals who fall under the scope of justice in a moral sense.620 
 In addition, however, it is not obvious that we will always have imperfect 
knowledge of who is included within the moral scope of justice. We do know of certain 
individuals who are verified criminal psychopaths. Obviously, we section such persons to 
protect the rest of society. Intuitively, I am unsure as to whether this is a matter of justice. 
From Rawls's presuppositions, it is not. Furthermore, we know of certain individuals who 
are incapable of developing a sense of justice, such as certain autistic persons. We certainly 
owe them something. But again to try to give them what justice would advise – and expect 
                                                          
619  TJ, p. 509/446. This sentence occurs within a paragraph discussing the rights of children. But it 
appears to be perfectly appropriate here. The reference to “fortuitous circumstances” is to being a child in the 
well-ordered society when the members of that society reflect on the thought-experiment of the original 
position. 
620  Dudley Knowles has insisted to me that he believes that Rawls was most likely being moved by 
moral compunctions to extend the scope of justice at this point, and adds “Good for him.” I say good for him 
as well, but this does not mean that such an extension would fit very well with the rest of his theory. From 
the most coherent interpretation of Rawls’s theory (not his overall thought and attitudes), I believe it does not 
fit at all, and that Rawls became increasingly aware of this over the course of his career. 
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this from them – would carry a risk of putting them and others in danger. 
 The second paragraph, together with the latter sentence I have quoted, suggest that 
an inability to develop a sense of justice can be viewed in certain cases as a contingent 
deprivation. This is the third possible case which was left aside in subsection 15.5 D. What 
do we now say about those who had a capacity for the sense of justice, but whose 
upbringing has meant that this disposition now cannot be realised? This occurrence appears 
to be a morally arbitrary matter. But on the other hand, this person is now outside the scope 
of relationships of reciprocity. An obvious tension arises in respect to the considerations 
for restricting justice to those with the capacity for a sense of justice which we have just 
proposed.  
 In response, I note that such deprivations often represent non-ideal circumstances. I 
shall not explore what non-ideal theory would require for such cases as this. In the ideal 
case, any such loss of one's capacity to develop the moral powers would most likely not 
occur. If it did, this would be due to misfortune in otherwise favourable circumstances and 
just institutions. This limits, but does not eliminate our problems, but I leave aside how 
they might be resolved for some other time. 
 I conclude, then, that there are no sufficient conditions to be owed justice, on the 
most defensible variation of Rawls's theory, apart from possessing the capacity for the 
moral powers. Practical considerations may lead us to extend the scope of justice further in 
a legal or conventional sense. But this is not to truly extend it further in a moral sense. 
Given that there are no further sufficient conditions to be owed justice, having the capacity 
for the moral powers is both necessary and sufficient to be owed justice.  
 
Section 18: The Demands of Political Justice 
 
 In this chapter, I have attempted to develop an account of the scope of justice 
roughly along the lines taken by Rawls. I have attempted to clarify some of my moral 
intuitions regarding this kind of approach, in order to present it in a more powerful form. I 
have also tried to point to elements in Rawls's own theory which suggest that he should be 
sympathetic to such revisions. Of course, there is no way of knowing how much sympathy 
he would have shown. I recognise that there is still a lot to be clarified – not least in 
continuing to work out what the various aspects of Rawls's theory commit him to regarding 
this matter. But I put these thoughts out, much like those in chapters 2 and 4, to any 
Rawlsian who would wish to develop them. 
 But of late, and perhaps even earlier, I have begun to doubt that I could ever 
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endorse this project, and indeed the rest of the Rawlsian political liberal project, myself. Or, 
more precisely, if I could ever wholeheartedly endorse it, in the way I take most people 
think it should be endorsed, i.e. as giving us an account of political legitimacy, and the 
limits of state action.621 I believe I should put down these reflections here, so that the 
reader is aware of my dissatisfaction with some of the possible implications which follow 
from accepting the account of the scope of justice given above, and the ideas of political 
liberalism. 
 To lead on to my worry, consider the following passage from Political Liberalism. 
 
We may ask whether justice can be extended to our relations to animals and 
the order of nature ... In [this] case we start from the status of adult citizens 
and proceed subject to certain constraints to obtain a reasonable law [for] the 
claims of animals and the rest of nature; this has been the traditional view of 
Christian ages. Animals and nature are seen as subject to our use and wont. 
This has the virtue of clarity and yields some kind of answer. There are 
numerous political values here to invoke: to further the good of ourselves and 
future generations by preserving the natural order and its life-sustaining 
properties; to foster species of animals and plants for the sake of biological and 
medical knowledge with its potential applications to human health; to protect 
the beauties of nature for purposes of public recreation and the pleasures of a 
deeper understanding of the world. The appeal to values of this kind gives 
what many have found a reasonable answer to the status of animals and the 
rest of nature. 
 
Of course, some will not accept these values as alone sufficient to settle the 
case. Thus, suppose our attitude towards the world is one of natural religion: 
we think it utterly wrong to appeal solely to those values, and others like them, 
to determine out relations with the natural world. To do that is to see the 
natural order from a narrowly anthropocentric point of view whereas human 
beings should assume a certain stewardship towards nature and give weight to 
an altogether different family of values. In this case our attitude might be much 
the same as those who reject abortion on theological grounds. Yet there is this 
                                                          
621  That this is the ambition of political liberalism is clear from many elements – see especially PL on 
liberal legitimacy (pp. 135—137), and the priority of right (pp. 173—176). Quong's (2011) introduction to 
his book-length defence of political liberalism makes is clear that the primary interest of political liberalism 
is to set the ultimate bounds on the actions of the state. See esp. pp. 1—2 
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important difference: the status of the natural world and our proper relation to 
it is not a constitutional essential or a basic question of justice as these 
questions have been specified. It is a matter in regard to which citizens can 
vote their nonpolitical values and try to convince other citizens accordingly. 
The limits of public reason do not apply.622 
  
 We should make some initial observations. The first is that the status Rawls 
attributes to animals here is less than in the earlier philosophy. As I mentioned in 
subsection 16.2 Rawls there held that we possess duties of compassion and humanity 
towards animals. Rawls must presumably view these duties as components of a 
comprehensive doctrine, as they do not seem to be referred to here. 
 The second observation is that, given Rawls's assumptions, I cannot see why he 
should not say roughly similar things about those without the capacity for one or both of 
the moral powers. Remember that the majority of such people are not dangerous 
psychopaths.  
 Rawls's later position, then – and perhaps also the earlier one, if the commitments 
of public justification are thought through – leaves those individuals without the moral 
powers lacking any intrinsic political standing. How are we then allowed to act, if we share 
a society with a culture which would deny animals, or those persons without the moral 
powers, any moral standing? We cannot legislate against them doing what they like. It 
would be illegitimate. The members of such a culture might perfectly abide by public 
reason. We cannot intervene to stop their behaviour. This would be illegal. All we can do 
is try to convince them, non-publicly, to change their ways. 
 I see no obvious way in which Rawls, or indeed any sufficiently similar 
contractualist or public justification liberalism, can go against this conclusion, or alter their 
theory so as to avoid it. Hence, for example, returning to a topic in subsection 15.5 A 
above, I find it difficult to see how Rawls can fit human rights – which I take to be rights 
which apply simply to all members of Homo Sapiens – into Justice as Fairness in anything 
more than an ad hoc manner. For the individuals who cannot stand in a reciprocal moral 
relationship with moral persons simply cannot have their own political standing: how can 
they be part of the original contract?623  
                                                          
622  PL, p. 245—246 
623  Other contractarian proposals for dealing with those who are unable to express the Rawlsian moral 
powers, or who cannot contribute to the upkeep of the basic structure of society in the way Rawls assumes 
(subsection 15.2), but who can nevertheless reciprocate in some fashion, may face a lessened version of this 
problem. Nevertheless, they may still threatened by it (as examples, see Silvers and Francis (2005) and 
Hartley (2009)). I do not investigate these further matters here. 
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 I do not think this is necessarily a problem for the theory as an analysis of justice. I 
view it as a problem if the theory is taken to set ultimate limits on legitimate political 
action. For these are simply things we must be willing to legislate regarding. I have 
reflected as long and hard about this as about anything. I believe that we cannot simply 
treat animals as we please, and that we should not allow others to do so either. The same 
goes for persons who are not capable of moral personality. My point is that we cannot 
simply put these considerations aside, and see them as a non-public matter, if we happen to 
be in a well-ordered society in which others in the society deny the interests of these 
individuals (animals and humans). The very fact that this can be seen as even potentially a 
non-public, non-political matter is what is problematic. 
 To make vivid what is at issue here, consider the following scenario. If we lived in 
a world in which everyone was born with a moral capacity which could be realised, and 
there were no animals, things would be different. In John W. Campbell Jnr's624 1951 
novella The Moon is Hell, a spaceship crash-lands on the dark side of the Moon. But, the 
astronauts work out how to synthesize all of the oxygen and food they need from the 
inorganic matter of the Moon. A society descended from those astronauts could organise 
itself perfectly according to the requirements of a liberal political conception without 
worrying about animals, at least. But we are faced with the circumstances we have. No 
appeal to the inevitability of reasonable pluralism, and the limitations it brings on public 
justification, can eliminate the fact that there are individuals who fall outside the scope of 
justice, and hence political standing, as these are understood by Rawls. 
 I believe this represents a limit on the extent to which anyone should subscribe to 
political liberalism, and to Rawlsian contractualism. I also believe it represents a limit to 
the extent that any government can so subscribe — and this is problematic, as political 
liberalism incorporates what is meant to be itself a full account of liberal legitimacy. At 
this point, I feel I simply have to say that it must be an incomplete account. I simply do not 
believe that governments can ignore the interests of the individuals I have identified. And 
no amount of considering the importance of political reasonableness, or the burdens of 
judgement, is going to make me think otherwise. It is not that I do not grasp that there 
could be considerations to be balanced here. If certain ritual practices mean that domestic 
animals must be slaughtered in certain ways, I can recognise that there are things to be said 
on both sides (note that in the considerations presented here, I have not taken myself to be 
arguing for vegetarianism or veganism necessarily – much as I think vegetarianism pretty 
                                                          
624  John W. Campbell Jnr. was an American science fiction author, and editor of the historically 
important Astounding Science Fiction. 
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much holds all the cards in its moral debate). But the strictures of public reasoning appear 
to prevent me from saying that there is anything on the side of the animals which does not 
derive from my own interest in them. And this is the wrong way to view the matter, so I 
unavoidably believe. 
 I realise that these comments come to less than full philosophical argument. But 
they do relate a commitment which, no matter how hard I tried, I do not think I could ever 
give up. As it is not mine to give up – these animals and persons really do exist here in the 
world with us. We can attempt to develop a theory to its most charitable form. But when 
we are as sure as we can be that we are not being self-serving or blinkered, we cannot 
ignore what we conscientiously take to have value of its own. 
 Finally, I might comment on the question as to whether this problem could be 
remedied by revising the scope of justice. I am unsure, as I am unsure what the content of 
justice is. However, what I firmly believe is that we cannot simply revise our conception of 
justice to incorporate whatever we might like. It may be that, in the final analysis, a 
government which passes anti-cruelty legislation and healthcare legislation to protect 
individuals with the relevant severe mental or neurological conditions, given a certain 
public culture and certain pattern of comprehensive doctrines, is behaving unjustly. But if 
this is true, then it just goes to show how it is sometimes right for a government to behave 
unjustly, and how the scope of justice does not always link to the scope of justified 
government action.625  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
625  In this conclusion, I have obviously been influenced by work by Cohen (2008) esp. chapters 6 and 7. 
I must also acknowledge my debt to Steiner (1994) through my long reflections on what I did not agree with 
about his theory, and how I could respond. His theory I take to have the similar problems as Rawls's, only 
they are even more severe. The same sentiments which move me are presumably those that move Nussbaum 
(2006), with one difference – I am less convinced than she that the importance of animals, and some of the 
severally impaired, is a matter of justice. But then, I believe that thinking that unless we can show an issue to 
be a matter of justice, then we have nothing strong enough to say against our opponents is a regrettable 
kowtowing to a certain prominent trend in political and legal thought.  
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Epilogue 
 
 I have laid out the roles of moral psychology within Rawls’s theory. Moral 
psychology is to demonstrate how Rawls’s principles, and the society which embodies 
them, is realisable and stable. Through playing this role, moral psychology is then able to 
play a further two roles. It is able to play its part in justifying the Rawlsian society, through 
showing it is not a futile ambition to attempt to realise that society, and also through 
showing that such a society is comparatively more stable than societies based on different 
principles. If we understand Rawls’s moral theory to be, taken as a whole, an account of 
the morality of the just society, then given that the moral psychology of the persons in that 
society is part of what can be properly called the morality of that society, then moral 
psychology is constitutive of (at least part of) morality (from within the perspective of 
Rawls’s theory). It is the possession of (the capacity for) Rawls’s moral psychology which 
identifies those who fall within the scope of justice. These roles, and the overall place in 
Rawls’s theory which moral psychology occupies, does not significantly change between 
Rawls’s earlier and later work. 
 I should like to end this work with some comments on the significance of my work, 
both in itself and within the broader context of moral philosophy. The ideas that follow 
may have been suggested to the reader by the preceding chapters, or they may have not. 
They are regrettably sketchy – I cannot render them as precise as I would like at this stage, 
though I believe it would be quite possible to do so. 
 What overall shape does moral psychology have within Rawls’s theory? Given his 
fundamental normative assumptions, and the shape of his theory, moral psychology then 
interacts with our moral intuitions, to finalise the contract between our representatives in 
the original position. The principles agreed to are then for us, as they are ultimately agreed 
to by us in the right way, and they are between us, as beings without the right moral 
capacities are excluded. Moral psychology – an element of the full description of human 
nature – hence completes an account of morality which aims to arise entirely from 
ourselves, to apply to ourselves, and to be realisable by ourselves. 
 There are three ways such an account of morality might be rejected. We might 
reject the account of the capacities of human nature, and reject the idea that human beings 
can possess the moral powers. Or we might reject the idea that these capacities are most 
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deeply seated in human nature as it would be realised in a free and equal society, and 
instead claim, for example, that altruism is. This is to dispute Rawls’s claims about human 
nature at their broadest scope. To dispute Rawls claims at narrower levels would be to 
accept the broad account of the moral powers, and the basing of our fundamental moral 
powers on the psychological propensity to reciprocity, but to derive different principles 
from these presuppositions, on the basis of different fine grained claims about human 
psychology (plus sociology etc.). 
 A third and final way to dispute Rawls’s account of morality would be to reject his 
assumption that the content of morality must ultimately be constrained by human nature. 
Moral psychology would then describe the psychology of moral beings, but without a 
guarantee at all that the characteristics of human beings match up to these moral beings. 
 The exegesis and analysis I have presented here can help us to orientate ourselves 
in investigating the first and second ways in which we might dispute Rawls’s account. But 
it cannot help us decide the third matter, as it has been assumed by the entire analysis. The 
full, honest, philosophical assessment of the content of morality – how we should act if we 
are to be moral beings – and whether that content can contain requirements which we 
cannot act on, is, to my eyes the fundamental issue moral philosophers should address, if 
they are to understand themselves to be, as I think they should do, those who are interested 
in morality for its own sake, and for the sake of nothing else. Any posture which presumes 
the answer to these questions addresses not morality directly, but morality through the lens 
of partial interest and rhetoric, and runs at least the risk of distorting and admixing our 
view of morality with other concerns: other concerns including those worthwhile 
themselves, but the worthless. 
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Appendix I: Constructivism 
 
 Constructivisms are anti-realist but (most usually) objectivist accounts of 
morality.626 Rawls's constructivism about justice is a particular variety of constructivism. 
To begin to outline Rawls's constructivism, we should distinguish between practical and 
theoretical reason. Rawls writes 
 
Following Kant's way of making the distinction, we say: practical reason is 
concerned with the production of objects according to a conception of those 
objects – for example, the conception of a just constitutional regime taken as 
the aim of political endeavour – while theoretical reason is concerned with the 
knowledge of given objects.627 
 
In constructivism, then, practical reason produces moral principles and moral reasons. In 
some constructivisms, practical reason also produces prudential principles and reasons, 
evaluative reasons (and principles), and so on for other normative and evaluative types.628 
In Rawls's constructivism,629 however, only reasonable principles – which include 
principles of justice630 – are produced.631 In Rawls's constructivism, then, principles of 
practical reason are rational and reasonable principles. Principles of practical reason, 
simply put, are the principles that are applied by us in “reasoning about what to do.”632 
 Rawls often contrasts constructivism to what he calls rational intuitionism. The 
debate between constructivism and rational intuitionism,633 is whether moral principles are 
                                                          
626 Anti-realist positions see morality as mind-dependent, as opposed to mind independent. See the 
characterisation of constructivism in Shafer-Landau and Cuneo (2007) pp. 79—83. Objectivist views hold 
that moral requirements are the same for all agents – they do not differ between different individuals or 
groups of agents. Not all views classified as constructivist are objectivist (i.e. Harman (1975)). Even if one 
accepts this classification (as not all do, e.g. O'Neill (2003) p. 348), it is true to say that most developed 
constructivisms are objectivist.  
627 PL, p. 93 
628 For example, Street (2008) pp. 208—209 esp fn4, 223—242 
629 Rawls's most thorough treatments of his constructivism can be found in Political Liberalism and 
“Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory” and his account of Kant's constructivism in Lectures on the 
History of Moral Philosophy. I note here that these are the central sources of my understanding of 
constructivism. I am not a Kant scholar, and do not have extensive knowledge of the wider debate. 
630 PL, p. 83 
631 TJ, p. 446/392 is evidence for that principles of rationality are not constructed. On Rawls's reading 
of Kant this is true as well (LHMP, pp. 237, 239). 
632 LP, p. 87 
633 See PL, pp. 90—92, CP, pp. 343—345 for the basics of Rawls's understanding of rational 
intuitionism. Rawls's understanding of “rational intuitionism” is overly Platonic. Many contemporary 
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discovered by theoretical reason, or produced by practical reason.634 In rational 
intuitionism practical reason still plays a role. Objects are still created in accordance with 
our conception of them – namely our actions, and the products of our actions. But in 
constructivism, not only the actions but the principles which guide those actions are 
produced. 
 Practical reason is composed of conceptions of practical reason as well as 
principles of practical reason. Conceptions of practical reason “characterise the agents who 
[practically] reason and ... specify the context for the problems and questions to which 
principles of practical reason apply.”635 In Rawls's constructivism, such conceptions 
include the conception of persons as reasonable and rational, free and equal, and the 
conception of the well-ordered society governed by a public conception of justice. 
Conceptions of practical reason are not constructed.636 But they are said to “arise” and to 
be “appropriate” because they complement the principles of practical reason. The 
“principles do not apply themselves, but are used by us in forming our intentions ... and 
plans ..., in our relations with other persons” such that “ without conceptions of society and 
person, the principles of practical reason would have no point, use, or application.”637 This 
last point is obscure. How I interpret it is that conceptions of practical reason are not 
constructed. But they only acquire normative authority if we are able to construct 
principles which compliment them. If we cannot, then they are empty conceptions. They 
fail to describe our actual faculties of practical reasoning, and hence do not refer to 
                                                                                                                                                                                
intuitionists would also call themselves naturalists, in contrast with Rawls's usage over these passages.  The 
central intuitionist claims are simply that we know moral principles through  a priori theoretical (not 
practical) reasoning, and also that moral concepts cannot be reduced down to those of the natural sciences. I 
am indebted to discussions with Robert Cowan on these matters.   
634 PL, pp. 91—93, 96 
635 PL, p. 107 
636 PL, p. 108. Note that when Rawls also says here that the “principles of practical reason” are not 
constructed, he surely can't mean the principles of justice and the other reasonable principles. I see two ways 
out. He may have simply meant the rational principles. Alternatively, in LP, p. 86—87 incl. fn33, Rawls 
comments that “at no point are we deducing the principles of right and justice, or decency, or the principles 
of rationality, from a conception of practical reason in the background.” He confesses that “there are many 
places in [PL] where I gave the impression that the content of the reasonable and the rational is derived from 
the principles of practical reason.” Instead, he now only claims that Justice as Fairness gives “content to an 
idea of practical reason” and that the specification of the normative ideas of the reasonableness and 
rationality “are not deduced, but enumerated and characterised in each case.” I do not think anything of 
significance I say hinges on this change. Though to say for sure would take more examination, his most 
obvious concern here seems to be to distinguish his view from Kant's. I conjecture this may all be in order to 
ensure that the requirements of political liberalism are met. Hence “an idea” of practical reason, rather than 
just practical reason straight up. I am at a loss as to how to make sense of the distinction made here between 
principles of practical reason, and the content of the reasonable and rational. As far as the text of PL reads, 
the principles of practical reason aren't meant to be prior to this content, but are rather the same thing. 
Perhaps by content he is thinking of reasons of reasonableness and rationality, which he appears to 
distinguish from principles (PL, pp. 121—122). Street (2008) pp. 210—211 manages to produce a very 
coherent reading from this observation. 
637 PL, pp. 107—108 
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anything. 
 Constructivist theories usually hold that moral or political principles are to be 
conceived as the outcome of a “procedure of construction” or a construction procedure.638 
The original position is an example of such a procedure, as are contractarian procedures in 
general. Construction procedures can also be non-contractarian, such as Ideal Observer 
Theory.639 Such procedures of construction are “based essentially on practical reason and 
not on theoretical reason.”640 What this means is that they are assembled641 out of 
conceptions of practical reason –   which as I have said are not constructed or produced 
themselves – and then produce principles of practical reason.  
 Theoretical reason also has a role to play in assembling the original position. 
Theoretical reason “shapes the belief and knowledge of the rational persons who have a 
part in the construction; and these persons also use their general capacities of reasoning, 
inference and judgement in selecting principles of justice.”642 In addition, the parties are 
provided with factual data and knowledge for theoretical reason to work upon.643 
 Rawls's assumption that conceptions of practical reason are not constructed mirrors 
his reading of Kant.644 Onora O'Neill questions this reading, holding that Kant can be read 
as holding the conceptions of practical reasoning to also be constructed by practical 
reasoning.645 It is beyond my expertise to adjudicate. But it is clear that Rawls follows his 
reading of Kant in developing his own version of constructivism. 
 Rawls proposes two constructivisms in his work. The first is his Kantian 
Constructivism. This is a moral constructivism which is meant to provide the metaethical 
basis of a comprehensive moral conception of justice. The second is his Political 
Constructivism. This provides the metaethical basis only for a political conception of 
justice. Structurally, the two constructivisms are the same, except that due to the 
requirements of political liberalism, political constructivism only claims that its political 
conception is constructed from its own standpoint, not from the standpoint of 
comprehensive moral doctrines.646 Kantian constructivism, by contrast, claims that justice 
                                                          
638 PL, pp. 89—90, 93. For further characterisations compatible with Rawls's, see Cohen (2008) pp. 
274—276, Barry (1989) pp. 264—82, 348—53. Note I say most: for example, Street (2008) is not committed 
to this. 
639 Cohen (2008) p. 275 observes this. This appears to make good sense of TJ, pp. 183—189/160—165 
640 PL, p. 93. My emphasis 
641 PL, p. 108, also 103 
642 PL, p. 108 
643 PL, pp. 121—123 
644 LHMP, pp. 239—240, 253—261, 268—271 
645 See O'Neill (2003) pp. 356—361. See further O'Neill (1989) chapter 1 
646 See, for example, PL, pp. 119—120, 128—129 
191 
 
is constructed from a comprehensive perspective.647 On the distinction between political 
and comprehensive conceptions, see subsection 12.1  
 
Appendix II: Psychological Tendencies to Reciprocity and Altruism 
 
 Rawls holds that human moral psychology is governed by, amongst other 
tendencies, psychological tendencies towards altruism, and psychological tendencies 
towards reciprocity. Psychological principles of reciprocity state that human beings have a 
tendency to respond in kind to how others have acted towards them. Psychological 
principles of altruism state that human beings have a tendency to care for the good of 
others, independent of their own good. 
 Rawls develops an account of moral development in which moral development 
occurs in stages, following the Cognitive-Developmental School of Jean Piaget and 
Lawrence Kohlberg.648 Rawls postulates three such stages: the initial stage of moral 
sensibility developed by young children,649 a mediate stage of moral development which 
occurs between later childhood and early adulthood, as we enter various associations in 
civil society,650 and a final stage at which we acquire an attachment to acting morally apart 
from our ties to particular others.651 At each stage, moral development occurs due to our 
good being cared for by those around us, because the reasons for the need to act morally 
are explained clearly, and because the forms of life displayed by those around us are 
admirable and display human virtue and excellence.652 Transition between these stages is 
roughly governed by psychological principles of reciprocity.653 These represent a more 
general psychological tendency towards reciprocity – “a tendency to answer in kind.”654 
 Rawls does not deny that human beings also have psychological tendencies to 
altruism.655 But he speculates that these are less powerful or pervasive, and hence less 
appropriate as a foundation for a moral psychology.656 
                                                          
647 See, for example, CP, pp. 353—356 
648  See TJ, p. 461/404 fn8. For criticisms of the Cognitive-Developmental School, see Flanagan (1991) 
chapters 7 and 8. Rawls’s claims and requirements for his moral psychology are less than those 
psychologists, so I am not convinced that problems for the Cognitive-Developmental School necessarily 
spell trouble for him. 
649  TJ, pp. 462—467/405—409 
650  TJ, pp. 467—472/409—413 
651  TJ, pp. 472—479/414—419 
652  TJ, pp. 498—499/436 
653  TJ, pp. 490—491/429—430 
654  TJ, p. 494/433. See also JF, pp. 195—196 
655  E.g. TJ, p. 486 
656  E.g. TJ, p. 500—501/437—438 
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 General psychological tendencies such as reciprocity and altruism do not represent 
moral psychologies in themselves. Moral psychologies, as stressed in subsection 5.2, 
presuppose moral principles. Without this, psychological tendencies such as reciprocity 
and altruism can be orientated towards evil as easily as good.657 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
657  See, for example, TJ, pp. 190/166, for altruism. Similar scenarios of misplaced reciprocity can be 
reconstructed from pp. 472—473/413—414.  
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